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 Ruth Mason & Michael S.  Knoll 
 
What Is Tax Discrimination? 
abstract .  Prohibitions of tax discrimination have long appeared in constitutions, tax 
treaties, trade treaties, and other sources, but despite their ubiquity, little agreement exists as to 
how such provisions should be interpreted. Some commentators have concluded that tax 
discrimination is an incoherent concept. In this Article, we argue that in common markets, like 
the EU and the United States, the best interpretation of the nondiscrimination principle is that it 
requires what we call “competitive neutrality,” which prevents states from putting residents at a 
tax-induced competitive advantage or disadvantage relative to nonresidents in securing jobs. We 
show that, contrary to the prevailing view, maintaining a level playing field between resident and 
nonresident taxpayers requires neither tax rate harmonization nor equal taxation of residents and 
nonresidents. Our approach produces simple rules of thumb that provide states and courts with 
clear direction in writing tax laws and evaluating challenges to those laws. 
 
authors.  Ruth Mason is Professor of Law and Nancy & Bill Trachsel Corporate Law 
Scholar, University of Connecticut School of Law. Michael S. Knoll is the Theodore K. Warner 
Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Professor of Real Estate, Wharton School; 
Co-Director, Center for Tax Law and Policy, University of Pennsylvania. Copyright 2012 by 
Ruth Mason and Michael Knoll. All rights reserved. The authors would like to thank Reuven 
Avi-Yonah, Yariv Brauner, Kim Brooks, Karen Brown, Albert Choi, Graeme Cooper, Steven 
Dean, Mihir Desai, William Eskridge, Mary Louise Fellows, Michael Graetz, James Hines, 
Mitchell Kane, Lily Kahng, Michael Lang, Sarah Lawsky, Pasquale Pistone, Diane Ring, 
Alexander Rust, Wolfgang Schön, Daniel Shaviro, Kirk Stark, Alvin Warren, Ethan Yale, George 
Yin, tax workshop participants at McGill Faculty of Law, University of Michigan Law School, 
National Tax Association, NYU School of Law, Seattle University School of Law, Vienna 
University of Economics and Business, and faculty workshop participants at Brooklyn Law 
School, Columbia Law School, Georgetown Law Center, University of New South Wales 
Australian School of Business, University of Pennsylvania Law School, University of Virginia 
School of Law, and Yale Law School. We owe special thanks to Mike Aikins, Al Dong, Benjamin 
Meltzer, and Jarrod Shobe for research assistance. 
  
what is tax discrimination? 
1015 
 
 
 
 
 
article contents 
introduction 1017 
i. nondiscrimination in eu taxation 1023 
A. Goals of the EU 1023 
B. ECJ Interpretations of Tax Discrimination 1026 
C. Two Cases 1030 
ii. toward a coherent conception of tax discrimination 1033 
A. Some Caveats 1034 
1. Economic Efficiency 1034 
2. Labor, Not Capital 1036 
3. Assumptions 1038 
4. What We Mean by Welfare 1040 
5. Why These Benchmarks? 1040 
B. Locational Neutrality 1043 
C. Leisure Neutrality 1047 
D. Competitive Neutrality 1051 
1. Source Taxes 1055 
2. Residence Taxes 1057 
3. Maintaining Competitive Neutrality 1060 
E. Simple Guidelines for Tax Neutrality 1072 
F. Limits on Judicial Authority To Impose Tax Neutrality 1074 
G. Resolving Cases Using the Benchmarks 1076 
iii. eu nondiscrimination as competitive neutrality 1085 
A. Interpretive Arguments 1087 
1. The Goals of the EU Treaties 1087 
2. The Language and Structure of the Treaty 1088 
a. Avoiding Construing Treaty Provisions as Superfluous 1088 
b. Consistency in Interpreting the Fundamental Freedoms 1090 
c. The Language of the Fundamental Freedoms 1090 
3. ECJ Nondiscrimination Doctrine 1092 
a. “Direct Effect” 1092 
  
the yale law journal 121:1014  2012  
1016 
 
b. Tax Cases 1093 
c. Distinguishing the ECJ’s “Nondiscrimination” and “Restrictions” 
Jurisprudence 1097 
B. Normative Arguments 1097 
1. Welfare Promotion 1098 
2. Increased Predictability 1099 
3. Promotion of Representation Reinforcement and Political Unity 1100 
4. Avoidance of Legislative Decisions 1101 
C. Settling Open Questions 1102 
1. Comparing Absolute Tax Rates 1102 
2. Progressive Taxation 1103 
3. Double Benefits and Burdens 1104 
4. A Way out of the Labyrinth 1105 
iv. tax nondiscrimination in the united states 1106 
conclusion 1115 
 
  
what is tax discrimination? 
1017 
 
introduction 
States may be accused of “tax discrimination” when they tax outsiders 
differently from insiders, where “insiders” refers to nationals, resident 
individuals, and resident companies.1 Stating the tax nondiscrimination 
principle is deceptively simple: tax likes alike. For example, suppose a resident 
and a nonresident both earn $100,000 in the same jurisdiction. At first blush, a 
principle of tax nondiscrimination would seem to require that the resident and 
nonresident be taxed the same. But differences between insiders and outsiders, 
such as their usage of government services, may justify differences in their tax 
treatment. Accordingly, before we can conclude that treating such taxpayers 
differently is discriminatory, we must first understand what values the 
nondiscrimination principle promotes. 
So far, however, judges, government officials, and scholars have failed to 
clearly articulate the value or values that legal prohibitions of tax 
discrimination promote. That failure has provoked commentators to describe 
the concept of nondiscrimination adopted by the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) as “baffling,”2 “theoretical and arcane,”3 and “incoherent.”4 Similarly, 
commentators describe the U.S. tax discrimination cases as “slippery”5 and in 
need of a “principled approach.”6  And the Supreme Court has labeled its own 
tax discrimination jurisprudence a “quagmire”7 and a “‘tangled underbrush.’”8 
 
1.  Residence for tax purposes is determined by a taxpayer’s connections with a jurisdiction. 
For example, states define tax residence for natural persons with respect to a person’s 
citizenship, domicile, or physical presence. See HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, 
COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 347-49 (2d ed. 2004). 
2.  Mary C. Bennett, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: Nondiscrimination in International Tax 
Law: A Concept in Search of a Principle, 59 TAX L. REV. 439, 439 (2006) (comparing EU and 
tax treaty approaches to nondiscrimination). 
3.  Luc Hinnekens & Philippe Hinnekens, General Report, 93a CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL INT’L 
15, 50 (2008) (surveying enforcement of tax nondiscrimination in domestic law, in EU law, 
and under tax treaties in two dozen countries). 
4.  Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination Against International Commerce, 54 TAX L. 
REV. 131, 131 (2001) (discussing trade treaty, tax treaty, EU treaty, and U.S. constitutional 
conceptions of nondiscrimination). 
5.  Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 
895, 929 (1992) (discussing nondiscrimination under the dormant Commerce Clause). 
6.  Dan T. Coenen & Walter Hellerstein, Suspect Linkage: The Interplay of State Taxing and 
Spending Measures in the Application of Constitutional Antidiscrimination Rules, 95 MICH. L. 
REV. 2167, 2173 (1997) (considering the treatment of linked tax-and-subsidy schemes under 
the dormant Commerce Clause). 
7.  Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959); see also Wardair 
Can., Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 17 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part 
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Lack of a clear definition has not prevented prohibitions of tax 
discrimination from appearing in (or being read into) statutes, constitutions, 
and international treaties.9 For example, the Supreme Court interprets the 
dormant Commerce Clause to prohibit tax discrimination by U.S. states.10 
Similarly, the ECJ has interpreted the fundamental freedoms of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to prevent tax discrimination 
by EU member states.11 Explicit prohibitions of tax discrimination also appear 
in every U.S. income tax treaty currently in force,12 and the influential model 
tax treaties of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD),13 the United States,14 and the United Nations15 all dedicate an article 
to tax discrimination. Finally, prohibitions of tax discrimination appear in 
major multilateral and regional trade agreements.16 
Although the concept of tax discrimination is ill-defined and poorly 
understood, its influence seems continually to expand. It has become 
particularly important in the EU, where tax cases constitute about 10% of the 
ECJ’s caseload.17 The ECJ has relied upon the nondiscrimination concept to 
 
and concurring in the judgment) (referring to “the cloudy waters of this Court’s ‘dormant 
Commerce Clause’ doctrine”). 
8.  Nw. States Portland Cemen Co., 358 U.S. at 457 (quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 
U.S. 435, 445 (1940)). 
9.  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 891 (2006) (permitting the U.S. President to double the tax rates of 
foreigners if their home state subjects U.S. persons to “discriminatory or extraterritorial 
taxes”). 
10.  See JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION  ¶¶ 4.01-.26 (3d ed. 
1999 & Supp. 2009).  
11.  See RUTH MASON, PRIMER ON DIRECT TAXATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 37-113 (2011). 
12.  See RICHARD E. ANDERSEN, ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES ¶ 20.01 
(2011). 
13.  See OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, art. 24 (July 22, 2010) 
[hereinafter OECD Model Tax Treaty], condensed version available at http://www.oecd 
-ilibrary.org/taxation/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-condensed-version 
-2010_mtc_cond-2010-en.  
14.  See United States Model Income Tax Convention of November 15, 2006, 1 Tax Treaties 
(CCH) ¶ 209.24, art. 24 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/model006.pdf. 
15.  U.N. Model Double Taxation Convention Between Developed and Developing Countries, 
art. 24, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/PAD/SER.E/21 (U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs 2001), 
available at http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=ST/ESA/PAD/SER.E/21. 
16.  See Warren, supra note 4, at 141-46. 
17.  See Ruth Mason, Made in America for European Tax: The Internal Consistency Test,  
49 B.C. L. REV. 1277, 1281 (2008) (citing annual statistics kept by the ECJ, which aggregate 
direct and indirect tax cases). Our concern here is only with direct tax cases, but the ECJ 
does not separate out statistics on direct tax cases. 
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justify invalidating longstanding tax practices, prompting harsh criticism from 
scholars and tax officials.18 For example, the ECJ held that an EU member state 
could not categorically deny an EU national earning income within its territory 
but residing in another member state the same deductions for personal and 
family expenses that it allowed to its own residents.19 The court held such 
denials discriminatory notwithstanding the fact that the practice is widespread 
internationally and expressly permitted under tax treaties.20 In interpreting the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court has drawn the 
same conclusion: a U.S. state cannot categorically deny personal tax benefits to 
residents of other U.S. states.21 Spurred by these judicial decisions, tax officials 
and scholars have begun to scrutinize the nondiscrimination concept 
intensely.22 Notwithstanding this scrutiny, a clear definition of tax 
discrimination has failed to emerge. This continuing lack of guidance leaves 
government officials to develop tax policies and taxpayers to make business 
decisions in a highly uncertain legal environment. 
Although legal limits on tax discrimination are widely viewed as promoting 
economic efficiency, there is no consensus regarding what efficiency value they 
promote. As this Article explains, economists and policymakers traditionally 
have evaluated cross-border tax policies under two competing efficiency 
 
18.  See, e.g., Philip Baker, Protection of the Taxpayer by the European Court of Justice, 44 EUR. 
TAX’N 453, 453-54 (2004) (describing criticism of tax officials); Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. 
Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination and the Political and Economic Integration of Europe,  
115 YALE L.J. 1186, 1219 (2006). 
19.  See, e.g., Case C-279/93, Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. I-225, 
discussed infra Section I.C. 
20.  Ruth Mason, Tax Expenditures and Global Labor Mobility, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1540, 1608-10 
(2009) (discussing Schumacker). 
21.  See, e.g., Lunding v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287 (1998) (holding that New 
York violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause when it denied alimony deductions to a 
Connecticut resident with New York-taxable income while permitting New York residents 
to deduct alimony). 
22.  See, e.g., COMPARATIVE FISCAL FEDERALISM: COMPARING THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 
AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S TAX JURISPRUDENCE (Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, James R. 
Hines, Jr. & Michael Lang eds., 2007) (publishing proceedings of a tax discrimination 
conference at the University of Michigan Law School); Hugh J. Ault & Jacques Sasseville, 
Taxation and Non-Discrimination: A Reconsideration, 2 WORLD TAX J. 101 (2010) [hereinafter 
OECD Discussion Draft] (introducing published proceedings of an OECD conference at the 
International Tax Centre, Leiden); Symposium, Corporate Tax Policy in the European Union, 
62 TAX L. REV. 1 (2009) (publishing proceedings of a tax discrimination conference at 
N.Y.U. School of Law). 
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criteria: capital export neutrality and capital import neutrality.23 A law is 
capital-export-neutral when it does not distort the allocation of capital across 
states.24 In contrast, a law is capital-import-neutral when it does not differently 
distort the savings-consumption tradeoff across taxpayers residing in different 
states.25 
In an influential recent article in this Journal, Professors Michael Graetz 
and Alvin Warren argued that the ECJ’s approach to tax discrimination cases is 
fundamentally inconsistent.26 As support for this claim, Graetz and Warren 
pointed to the fact that the ECJ has imposed nondiscrimination obligations on 
both states taxing in a source capacity and states taxing in a residence 
capacity.27 In international tax parlance, the source state is the state where the 
taxpayer earns income, while the residence state is the state where the taxpayer 
resides. But a capital export neutrality construction of nondiscrimination 
would impose nondiscrimination obligations only on residence states, whereas 
a capital import neutrality construction of nondiscrimination would impose 
nondiscrimination obligations only on source states.28 Graetz and Warren 
argued that the ECJ’s imposition of nondiscrimination obligations at both 
source and residence did not appear to pursue either neutrality principle. 
Making matters worse in their view, by imposing nondiscrimination 
obligations at both source and residence, the ECJ seemed to evince an intention 
simultaneously to achieve both capital export neutrality and capital import 
neutrality. But, as Graetz and Warren correctly point out, it is impossible for 
states to achieve both kinds of efficiency benchmarks simultaneously unless 
they harmonize their tax rates and bases.29 Accordingly, because the ECJ has 
repeatedly held that EU law does not require tax harmonization on the grounds 
 
23.  See Michael J. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: Taxing International Income: 
Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261 (2001) 
(criticizing the use of these concepts to evaluate U.S. international tax policies because they 
elevate worldwide welfare over national welfare). 
24.  See discussion infra Section II.B. 
25.  See discussion infra Section II.C. 
26.  Graetz & Warren, supra note 18, at 1219. 
27.  Id. at 1216-19. 
28.  For further discussion, see infra Sections II.A-E. 
29.  Graetz & Warren, supra note 18, at 1212-23. The inability to establish both neutrality 
benchmarks in the absence of tax harmonization has been well established. See, e.g., Reuven 
S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State,  
113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1606 (2000). For an explanation of this phenomenon, see discussion 
infra notes 135-138 and accompanying text. 
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that such harmonization would invade the member states’ tax autonomy,30 
imposition of nondiscrimination obligations at source and residence seemed 
not only to serve no clear efficiency goal, but also erected, in Graetz and 
Warren’s terms, a “labyrinth of impossibility.”31 Similarly, although Graetz and 
Warren did not address the issue, tax discrimination doctrine in the United 
States is susceptible to the same criticism, since U.S. courts have interpreted 
the Constitution to place nondiscrimination obligations on states taxing in 
both source and residence capacities, while at the same time holding that the 
Constitution does not require states to harmonize their taxes.32 
In this Article, we provide a way out of this “labyrinth of impossibility” by 
offering a new efficiency benchmark that is consistent with imposing 
nondiscrimination obligations on both source and residence states. We draw 
on recent scholarship by economists Michael Devereux, Mihir Desai, and James 
Hines to formulate a new version of nondiscrimination, one we call 
“competitive neutrality.”33 A tax law is competitively neutral when it does not 
distort the matching of owners with investments (or workers with jobs). 
Viewed in this way, a tax system is competitively neutral if it maintains a level 
tax playing field between resident and nonresident taxpayers. As a result, 
competitive neutrality formalizes the intuition that the nondiscrimination 
principle is about promoting competition. 
Part I provides background on tax discrimination and uses examples from 
ECJ case law to illustrate the kinds of state tax practices that give rise to 
discrimination challenges. Part I also shows that a clear conception of the 
principle of tax nondiscrimination has failed to emerge. 
Part II provides three alternative interpretations for tax discrimination. 
Because we analyze labor taxation, in Part II we translate the traditional tax 
efficiency benchmarks, which were developed to analyze capital taxes, into the 
labor tax context. We call the labor analogue of capital export neutrality 
“locational neutrality,” because it obtains when taxes do not distort the 
allocation of labor across states. We call the labor analogue of capital import 
neutrality “leisure neutrality,” because it obtains when taxes do not differently 
distort the work-leisure tradeoffs faced by taxpayers residing in different states. 
 
30.  See, e.g., Case C-336/96, Gilly v. Directeur des Services Fiscaux du Bas-Rhin, 1998 E.C.R.  
I-2793, para. 34. 
31.  Graetz & Warren, supra note 18, at 1243. 
32.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
33.  See Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Evaluating International Tax Reform, 56 NAT’L TAX 
J. 487, 494 (2003); Michael P. Devereux, Capital Export Neutrality, Capital Import 
Neutrality, Capital Ownership Neutrality and All That (June 11, 1990) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the authors). 
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In Part II, we provide the first formal account of what it would mean to 
interpret the nondiscrimination principle to require locational neutrality or 
leisure neutrality. Thus, for courts and scholars that reject our argument that 
the efficiency component of the tax nondiscrimination principle in common 
markets best accords with competitive neutrality, we provide clear guidelines 
for resolving cases under the two traditional tax efficiency benchmarks. In Part 
II, we also explain why imposing nondiscrimination obligations at both source 
and residence is not compatible with either locational or leisure neutrality. We 
dedicate the largest portion of Part II to the introduction of competitive 
neutrality, the new tax neutrality benchmark. We explain its formal 
requirements, explain how it would work as a nondiscrimination principle 
using simple examples, and show that competitive neutrality is consistent with 
imposing nondiscrimination obligations on both source and residence states. 
Finally, Part II makes our formal discussion of the three neutrality benchmarks 
concrete by showing how each benchmark would apply to the ECJ labor tax 
cases discussed in Part I. 
While the principal goal of this Article is to elaborate an efficiency 
benchmark that accords better with the ECJ’s tax doctrine than do either of the 
traditional benchmarks, Part III goes further to argue that competitive 
neutrality also represents a better interpretation of the TFEU than do either of 
the other benchmarks. In Part III, we also set forth normative and practical 
arguments in favor of a competitive neutrality interpretation of 
nondiscrimination. For example, leveling the playing field between resident 
and nonresident workers and between foreign and domestic work would 
promote welfare. This becomes clear when we consider that protectionist 
sentiments can be strong, especially during tough economic times. We also 
argue that competitive neutrality aligns better than do the other benchmarks 
with other non-efficiency goals, such as the promotion of political unity among 
EU nationals from different member states. On a more practical note, expressly 
adopting a competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination would 
simplify the resolution of tax cases and further integrate the common market. 
Finally, it would resolve several persistent questions posed in the scholarly 
literature analyzing tax discrimination. For example, we show that, contrary to 
widespread assumption, discrimination cannot be identified by a simple 
comparison of absolute tax rates. 
While we use the ECJ tax cases as an example to illustrate our arguments 
about the meaning of tax discrimination, our arguments have broader 
applicability due to the pervasiveness of legal prohibitions of tax discrimination. 
Accordingly, Part IV discusses the implications of our arguments for U.S. 
constitutional law. Although the U.S. Constitution does not contain an express 
prohibition of tax discrimination, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Equal 
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Protection, Commerce, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses to prohibit the 
states from engaging in tax discrimination. Our guidelines for how to interpret 
nondiscrimination to require, in the alternative, locational, leisure, or 
competitive neutrality, also could be used by U.S. courts adjudicating tax 
discrimination claims brought under the Constitution. Moreover, we argue 
that, like the ECJ, the Supreme Court regards competitive neutrality as an 
important component of tax nondiscrimination under the Constitution. As 
with the ECJ, clear announcement by the Supreme Court that tax 
nondiscrimination requires competitive neutrality (or either of the other two 
benchmarks) would bring much-needed clarity and predictability to the 
Supreme Court’s tax discrimination cases. 
We conclude by observing that, although we rely heavily on economic 
analysis in arguing that the principle of nondiscrimination in taxation should 
be understood as promoting competitive neutrality, the approach we develop 
does not require courts to engage in extensive economic analysis. Rather, our 
approach reduces to straightforward directives both for courts to apply when 
evaluating tax discrimination claims and for legislatures to follow when 
enacting tax laws. 
i .  nondiscrimination in eu taxation 
This Part provides background on tax discrimination in common markets, 
and, in particular, in the EU common market. Section I.A briefly traces the 
origins of the prohibition of tax discrimination in the EU, and Section I.B 
illustrates the operation of that principle in two canonical ECJ tax 
discrimination cases. Together, these Sections illustrate that a clear guiding 
principle for resolving such cases has failed to emerge, resulting in haphazard 
and unsatisfying decisions. 
A. Goals of the EU 
The fundamental economic purpose motivating adoption of the EU treaties 
was to raise European wages and living standards by uniting the independent 
nations of Europe into a cohesive economic union that would eliminate barriers 
to cross-border trade, investment, business, and work.34 The founders of the 
 
34.  See, e.g., Towards a Single Market Act for a Highly Competitive Social Market Economy: 50 
Proposals for Improving Our Work, Business, and Exchanges with One Another, at 2, COM 
(2010) 608 final (Oct. 27, 2010) (“The construction of one big market is at the heart of the 
European project envisaged by the founding fathers.”). 
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EU believed that fusing the separate national economies of Europe into a single 
and substantially larger economy would allow local, European-based 
companies to assemble capital, labor, and resources on a larger and more 
efficient scale. The resulting improvement in productivity would be the engine 
of economic growth and improved living standards.35 
Since the adoption of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the member states of 
what is now the EU have endorsed the notion that they can improve the living 
and working conditions of their citizens by furthering the integration of  
the member states’ economies.36 The Single European Act of 1986 and the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1992 reiterate this position.37 The entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon at the end of 2009 preserves and reinforces the primacy of 
economic integration. Throughout this Article, we refer to both the EU and the 
United States as “common markets,” although the integration of the EU 
member states’ economies has been referred to variously as establishing a 
common market, a “single market,” or an “internal market.”38 
Economic integration among the EU member states is accomplished 
through both “positive integration” and “negative integration.”39 Positive 
integration refers to legislative harmonization of member state policies 
pursuant to EU-level regulations or directives.40 For example, EU-wide 
harmonization of value-added taxation was accomplished by a series of council 
directives.41 
Negative integration refers to elimination by the ECJ of individual member 
state policies and practices that, in violation of EU law, impede the integration 
of the various member states into a single market.42 Principles of negative 
integration usually take the form of “thou-shalt-not” dictates directed to the 
 
35.  See Rita de la Feria & Clemens Fuest, Closer to an Internal Market? The Economic Effects of EU 
Tax Jurisprudence 3-4 (Oxford Univ. Ctr. for Bus. Taxation, Working Paper No. 11/12, 2011), 
available at http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/centres/tax/papers/Documents/WP1112.pdf. 
36.  See Wolfgang Schön, Tax Competition in Europe—The Legal Perspective, 9 EC TAX REV. 90, 
90 (2000). 
37.  Id. 
38.  Id. The current Treaty on European Union and the TFEU use the term “internal market,” 
although in the past the EU and EC treaties also used the term “common market.” 
39.  ADOLFO J. MARTIN JIMÉNEZ, TOWARDS CORPORATE TAX HARMONIZATION IN THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY: AN INSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS 2-3 (1999). 
40.  See JOSEPHINE STEINER & LORNA WOODS, EU LAW 361-62 (2009). 
41.  See, e.g., Council Regulation 1777/2005, Laying Down Implementing Measures for Directive 
77/388/EEC on the Common System of Value Added Tax, 2005 O.J. (L 288) (EC). 
42.  BÉLA BALASSA, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (1961); JIMÉNEZ, supra note 39, at 3. 
  
what is tax discrimination? 
1025 
 
member states,43 but they can also be stated affirmatively, usually as rights. 
The EU “fundamental freedoms” prominently promote negative integration.44 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) sets forth 
four fundamental freedoms—the free movement of goods, workers, capital, 
and services.45 Together with the freedom of establishment,46 these freedoms 
represent the cornerstones of the EU’s internal market, and the principle of tax 
nondiscrimination derives from them. For example, Article 45 of the TFEU 
states that the freedom of movement of workers “entail[s] the abolition of any 
discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as 
regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and 
employment.”47 
Although Article 45 does not mention taxation, the ECJ has interpreted it to 
prevent nationality-based tax discrimination. Specifically, a member state may 
not use its tax system to discriminate against nationals of other member states 
who enter its territory to work.48 Nor may a member state use its tax system to 
discriminate against its own nationals when they earn income in other member 
states.49 Moreover, since it regards tax residence as a proxy for nationality, the 
ECJ also has interpreted the TFEU to forbid residence-based tax 
discrimination.50 The ECJ likewise has interpreted the Treaty’s other 
 
43.  JIMÉNEZ, supra note 39, at 3. 
44.  See Servaas van Thiel, The Direct Income Tax Case Law of the European Court of Justice: Past 
Trends and Future Developments, 62 TAX L. REV. 143 (2008). 
45.  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 18, Mar. 
30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 56 [hereinafter TFEU] (“[A]ny discrimination on grounds of 
nationality shall be prohibited.”); id. art. 45, at 66 (“Such freedom of movement shall entail 
the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality . . . .”); id. art. 49, at 67 (business 
establishment); id. art. 56, at 70 (services); id. art. 63, at 71 (capital and payments). 
46.  Id. art. 49, at 67. 
47.  Id. art. 45, at 66. 
48.  In Bachmann v. Belgium, for example, the court held that Belgium discriminated in violation 
of the free movement of workers by allowing deduction of life insurance premiums only 
when those premiums were paid to Belgian insurance companies. The court reasoned that 
since nonresident workers were more likely to hold life insurance policies written by  
non-Belgian insurers than were resident workers, the rule was likely to disadvantage EU 
nationals from other states who worked in Belgium. See Case C-204/90, Bachmann v. 
Belgium, 1992 E.C.R. I-249 (holding that this treatment constituted discrimination but was 
nonetheless justified on other grounds). 
49.  See, for example, the De Groot case, discussed infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.  
50.  See, e.g., Case C-279/93, Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. I-225, paras. 
27-29 (concluding that a member state tax provision that denied benefits to nonresidents 
was liable to operate primarily to the detriment of non-nationals). Most states define tax 
residence for natural persons by reference to physical presence. For example, some EU 
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fundamental freedoms to prohibit discrimination in the taxation of business 
establishments, the provision of services, and investment.51 
The ECJ interprets the EU’s four freedoms, and consequently the tax 
nondiscrimination principle, to give rise to private rights of action in national 
courts; in EU parlance, the four freedoms have “direct effect.” The ECJ and 
national courts enforce the four freedoms as individual rights by looking 
closely at the claims of plaintiffs to standing and in evaluating whether a state’s 
tax laws interfere with EU nationals’ exercise of their fundamental freedoms.52 
Thus, in the EU, tax discrimination violates the personal rights of private 
parties, who have standing to sue in a national court for abridgement of those 
rights. 
EU nationals regularly challenge member state tax laws that they believe 
interfere with their fundamental freedoms. Such suits arise in the first instance 
in the national court of the offending member state, but under certain 
circumstances the TFEU permits or requires national courts to refer questions 
of EU law to the ECJ for binding interpretive rulings.53 All of the ECJ cases 
discussed in this Article consist of such references from national courts to the 
ECJ. 
B. ECJ Interpretations of Tax Discrimination 
This Section gives background on EU taxation and the ECJ’s tax 
discrimination doctrine. Each member state has its own tax system, and since 
national income tax law is not harmonized in the EU, tax bases and rates vary 
significantly across the member states, as do methods of taxing cross-border 
income. These differences in member state tax systems may create barriers to 
the exercise by EU nationals of their fundamental freedoms to work, reside, 
invest, provide services, and establish businesses anywhere in the EU. 
 
member states consider persons spending more than six continuous months in the state to 
be a tax resident. See AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 1, at 433. 
51.  See MASON, supra note 11, at 37-92. 
52.  Standing also would seem to be essential to administration, which relies heavily on 
individuals bringing suit to enforce their rights.  
53.  TFEU, supra note 45, art. 267 (stating that lower national courts may, and courts of last 
resort must, refer to the ECJ for preliminary ruling any EU question that is vital to the 
resolution of a case before them). But see Case 283/81, CILFIT v. Ministry of Health, 1982 
E.C.R. 3415 (holding that national courts have discretion not to refer questions identical to 
those previously decided by the ECJ or questions where the correct application of EU law is 
obvious). 
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Generally, two states have jurisdiction to tax cross-border income. The 
state where the income was earned (the “source” state) has jurisdiction to tax 
on a “source” basis, and the state where the taxpayer resides (the “residence” 
state) has jurisdiction to tax on a “residence” basis. Thus, a musician who 
resides in the Netherlands but earns income from performances in Germany 
will be taxable by both states. Under longstanding custom, the tax entitlement 
of the source state is superior to that of the residence state.54 As a result, the 
residence state typically employs one of the following two methods to prevent 
double taxation.55 A state implementing “exemption” forgoes its opportunity to 
tax its residents’ foreign-source income. A state implementing “worldwide 
taxation” taxes such foreign-source income as if it had been earned 
domestically, but allows a credit for taxes paid to the source jurisdiction. 
Source states tax nonresidents differently than residents. For example, 
source states typically tax nonresidents on their gross income at flat tax rates, 
whereas they tax residents on their net income at progressive tax rates. The flat 
tax rate applicable to nonresidents typically falls somewhere between the top 
and the bottom progressive rates applicable to residents. At least two reasons 
justify this difference in treatment. First, taxing nonresidents on a gross, rather 
than net, basis means that nonresidents do not have to file complete income tax 
returns in their source state(s), which reduces their compliance burden. 
Second, states argue that nonresidents would secure an unfair tax advantage if 
progressive tax rates applied only to the income earned in the source state, 
since that income usually represents only a portion of the cross-border 
worker’s overall income.56 In the same vein, source states argue that they lack 
sufficient information about nonresident taxpayers to confer upon them 
personal tax benefits. As a result, most states confer personal tax benefits on 
 
54.  This is true as a practical matter because the source state has the first opportunity to tax the 
income. Source state priority is reinforced by the international tax norm that places the 
obligation to relieve juridical double taxation entirely on the residence state in the absence of 
a tax treaty. See Warren, supra note 4, at 132. 
55.  A third alternative not currently practiced would involve reducing the tax on residents’ 
foreign income by allowing a deduction from taxable income for source state taxes. 
However, this method would not fully relieve double taxation. 
56.  If each state applied its progressive tax rates to only the portion of the cross-border worker’s 
overall income that she earned within its territory, more of her overall income would fall 
into low tax brackets compared to workers who earned the same overall amount of income 
from a single state. The simplest design for a progressive tax system in which the brackets 
depend upon global (not just local) income would proportionately reduce the size of each 
state’s tax brackets to correspond to the share of income the cross-border worker earned in 
that state. Such systems would require accurate reporting of worldwide income and would 
be very difficult to police. 
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resident, but not nonresident, taxpayers. Such tax benefits may include social 
welfare expenditures (such as wage supplements for low-income taxpayers) or 
deductions for personal expenses (such as home mortgage interest, childcare, 
and medical expenses).  
When a state administers social benefits through its tax system but limits 
those benefits to resident taxpayers, the result may be the application of 
systematically lower tax rates to resident than nonresident taxpayers. 
Nonetheless, the ECJ has held that under certain circumstances, a source state 
may deny nonresidents the personal tax benefits it grants to its own residents.57 
Thus, the nondiscrimination principle does not appear to require source states 
to equalize tax rates for residents and nonresidents.   
Likewise, under the ECJ’s interpretation, the nondiscrimination principle 
does not appear to require that states equalize the tax rates that their residents 
pay on foreign-source and domestic-source income. For example, in Gilly v. 
Directeur des Services Fiscaux du Bas-Rhin, a French resident worked as a teacher 
in Germany, where her salary was taxable on a source basis. Because German 
tax rates were higher than French tax rates, Gilly paid more tax on her salary 
when she worked in Germany than she would have paid on an equivalent 
amount in France.58 She argued that the higher taxes she paid for work in 
Germany violated the freedom of movement of workers, and as a result, that 
France should be required to credit her German taxes fully. The ECJ rejected 
this argument, concluding that there was no EU law requirement “to ensure 
that the tax to which the taxpayer is subject in one state is no higher than that 
to which he or she would be subject in the other.”59 Thus, the ECJ held that 
France did not violate the freedom of movement of workers by failing to 
equalize the rates its residents paid abroad with the rates they would have paid 
at home. 
These examples show that not all tax barriers to European economic 
integration constitute discrimination within the meaning of the TFEU. Other 
examples reinforce the point. For instance, tax rate differentials distort the 
allocation of capital and labor among member states by discouraging residents 
 
57.  See, e.g., Case C-234/01, Gerritse v. Finanzamt Neukölln-Nord, 2003 E.C.R. I-5933 (holding 
that a source state may deny nonresidents the benefit of personal tax exemptions, as long as 
the nonresident does not earn all or almost all her income in the source state). In contrast, 
the ECJ held that Greece discriminated when it taxed Greek banks doing business in Greece 
at only 35%, while taxing banks residing in other member states doing business in Greece at 
40%. Case C-311/97, Royal Bank of Scot. plc v. Greece, 1999 E.C.R. I-2651.  
58.  Case C-336/96, Gilly v. Directeur des Services Fiscaux du Bas-Rhin, 1998 E.C.R. I-2793, 
paras. 11-12. 
59.  Id. para. 46. 
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of EU member states from working, investing, or establishing businesses in 
high-tax states.60 However, because EU law does not require harmonization of 
tax rates and bases, the ECJ has expressly held that cross-border tax 
disadvantages arising from rate differentials do not constitute discrimination, 
as long as the defendant member state does not single out cross-border 
taxpayers or cross-border income for higher taxation.61 Thus, if Germany taxed 
all income at 50%, while France taxed all income at 25%, neither state would 
discriminate, even though a French resident might suffer a tax increase if she 
worked in Germany as compared to if she worked in France. 
The challenge for the ECJ is distinguishing permissible from impermissible 
tax differentials imposed on cross-border economic activity. The ECJ takes the 
following approach to evaluating member state tax laws for discrimination. 
First, the ECJ compares the complaining taxpayer—who is a nonresident with 
income from sources within the defendant member state (or a resident with 
income sourced in other EU member states)—to a “similarly situated” resident 
taxpayer with income from only domestic sources. If the nonresident (or 
resident with foreign-source income) receives worse tax treatment than the 
similarly situated resident with only domestic income, the court generally 
concludes that the defendant member state engaged in discrimination. Unless 
the discrimination can be justified for public policy reasons, such as the need to 
prevent tax fraud, the court will hold the provision incompatible with EU 
law.62 Determining whether taxpayers are similarly situated is therefore crucial 
for determining whether there is discrimination. But the ECJ has not provided 
clear guidance on when resident and nonresident taxpayers are similarly 
 
60.  See, e.g., PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME 
74-75 (1969); Thomas Horst, A Note on the Optimal Taxation of International Investment 
Income, 94 Q.J. ECON. 793, 796 (1980). 
61.  See, e.g., Gilly, 1998 E.C.R. I-2793, paras. 49, 53 (holding that a cross-border disadvantage 
due to differences in national tax rates was not discriminatory); see also Case C-294/97, 
Eurowings Luftverkehrs AG v. Finanzamt Dortmund-Unna, 1999 E.C.R. I-7447 (rejecting as 
a justification for discriminatory source taxation against nonresidents the fact that such 
nonresidents may be subject to no or lesser taxation in their residence state). 
62.  Although the ECJ has held that public policies may justify tax discrimination, it rarely finds 
the means used by the state proportional to its justifiable goal. For cases in which the ECJ 
held that tax discrimination was justified and proportionate, see Case C-446/03, Marks & 
Spencer plc v. Halsey, 2005 E.C.R. I-10837, which holds that discrimination was justified by 
the need to protect a balanced allocation of tax power among the member states, the need to 
avoid duplication of tax losses, and the need to prevent tax avoidance; and Case C-204/90, 
Bachmann v. Belgium, 1992 E.C.R. I-249, which holds that tax discrimination was justified 
by the member state’s need to maintain the fiscal cohesion of its tax system. For 
justifications in tax cases generally, see MASON, supra note 11, at 93-115. 
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situated, such that they must be taxed the same way, and when they are not.63 
The resulting collection of decisions is a hodgepodge, lacking any clear set of 
guiding principles. Not surprisingly, the ECJ’s tax jurisprudence is highly 
controversial. Reflecting fundamental uncertainty regarding the meaning of tax 
discrimination, many of the court’s critics argue that it has been overzealous in 
its interpretation of nondiscrimination,64 while others argue that the court has 
not been zealous enough.65 
C. Two Cases 
This Section selects two cross-border labor tax cases—one involving source 
taxes and the other involving residence taxes—to illustrate the controversies 
surrounding EU tax discrimination doctrine. 
The landmark Schumacker case involved source taxes. Schumacker resided 
in Belgium but earned all his income in Germany. Because he was a 
nonresident, Germany denied Schumacker several tax benefits available to 
residents, including marital income splitting, automatic refunds of tax over-
withholding, and certain other personal and family deductions.66 Schumacker 
argued that by denying him these tax benefits, Germany placed him in “a less 
advantageous position than residents,” thereby discriminating against him in 
violation of the EU freedom of movement of workers.67 
The ECJ concluded that a state need not always tax residents and 
nonresidents the same way because residents and nonresidents ordinarily are 
not “similarly situated,” in part because nonresident workers typically earn 
only part of their overall income in the source state. As a result, cross-border 
workers ordinarily should seek personal tax benefits only from their residence 
state, where the court assumed that they would earn most of their income.68 
Despite its conclusion that resident and nonresident workers ordinarily are not 
similarly situated, the court held that Schumacker’s case was special because he 
earned all of his income from Germany, and his residence state (Belgium) 
 
63.  See Ruth Mason, Flunking the ECJ’s Tax Discrimination Test, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72 
(2007) (arguing that the ECJ has not provided clear guidelines on when two taxpayers are 
similar for tax discrimination purposes). 
64.  See, e.g., Graetz & Warren, supra note 18. 
65.  See, e.g., Georg W. Kofler & Ruth Mason, Double Taxation: A European “Switch in Time?,”  
14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63, 97-98 (2007) (criticizing the ECJ for ruling that member states’ 
failure to relieve juridical double taxation did not violate EU law). 
66.  Case C-279/93, Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. I-225. 
67.  Id. para. 52. 
68.  Id. para. 32. 
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exempted his foreign-source income. Thus, any claims Schumacker had to 
personal tax benefits in Belgium were of no use to him because he had no tax 
liability there. As a result, if Germany did not take his personal expenses into 
account, they would not be accounted for anywhere.69 To solve this dilemma, 
the court held that when a nonresident worker earns “almost all” of his income 
in a source state, such that his residence state cannot grant him personal tax 
benefits, the source state must tax him like a resident worker.70 This so-called 
Schumacker Rule runs contrary to long-standing tax treaty practice, under 
which a source state is not obliged to grant nonresident taxpayers personal tax 
benefits under any circumstances.71 Thus, in Schumacker, the ECJ established a 
new EU law requirement, namely, that although cross-border workers should 
not be able to claim duplicative personal tax benefits in more than one EU 
state,72 they must be able to claim such benefits in at least one state. We call 
this the “once somewhere” principle.73 
In addition to cases like Schumacker, in which the ECJ found states taxing 
in a source capacity to discriminate, the ECJ has also found states taxing in a 
residence capacity to discriminate when they use their tax systems to 
discourage their own residents from working in other EU member states. For 
example, the ECJ case De Groot involved a Dutch resident taxpayer who earned 
income from several other EU member states.74 To avoid double taxation, the 
Netherlands exempted De Groot’s foreign-source income from tax, but it also 
reduced his entitlement to personal tax benefits (such as personal deductions 
and the personal exemption) in proportion to his exempt foreign-source 
income.75 De Groot argued that by reducing his residence state tax benefits in 
 
69.  Id. para. 36.  
70.  Id. para. 38. 
71.  See OECD Model Tax Treaty, supra note 13, art. 24, para. 3; see also Mason, supra note 20 
(arguing that this OECD tax treaty practice is simple, efficient, and fair). 
72.   In Schumacker, as in prior cases, the court based the conclusion that workers should seek 
personal tax benefits from their residence state in part on the need to avoid situations in 
which cross-border workers would deduct the same personal expenses both at home and 
abroad. Id. paras. 40-41 (citing Case C-204/90 Bachmann v. Belgium, 1992 E.C.R. I-249, 
para. 28). 
73.  See Peter J. Wattel, Judicial Restraint and Three Trends in the ECJ’s Direct Tax Case Law,  
62 TAX L. REV. 205, 216 (2008) (referring to the ECJ’s “always-somewhere” approach to 
deductions). 
74.  Case C-385/00, De Groot v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën, 2002 E.C.R. I-11819. 
75.  Id. para. 18. For example, suppose that if De Groot earned all of his income in the 
Netherlands, he would be entitled to the full Dutch personal exemption of ¤10,000 and 
other personal deductions worth ¤5000. Under proportionality, if De Groot earned 60% of 
his income abroad, he would be taxable by the Netherlands only on the 40% he earned in 
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proportion to his foreign-source income, the Netherlands discouraged him 
from working abroad.76 The Netherlands responded that a proportionate 
reduction in residence state tax benefits was a necessary complement to 
exempting his foreign-source income; since the Netherlands did not tax all of 
De Groot’s income, why should it grant him a full set of personal tax 
benefits?77 The Netherlands argued that, instead, the other member states in 
which De Groot earned income should grant De Groot a fraction of their 
personal tax benefits proportional to the fraction of his worldwide income 
earned and taxed in each state.78 Having already ruled in Schumacker that the 
residence state has the primary duty to afford cross-border workers personal 
tax benefits, however, the ECJ rejected the Dutch proportionality method in De 
Groot because it “discourage[d]” De Groot from “tak[ing] up paid 
employment” in another member state.79 
Even these two cases show that tax discrimination cases raise complex 
questions without ready solutions. For instance, how do tax rate differentials 
impact the determination of whether there has been discrimination? Does 
subjecting nonresidents to higher taxation always constitute discrimination? If 
not—as suggested by the ECJ’s conclusion in Schumacker that residents and 
nonresidents ordinarily are not similarly situated (and confirmed in its later 
rulings)80—then under what circumstances does higher taxation constitute 
discrimination? Such questions generate significant commentary, but neither 
the judicial opinions themselves nor academic commentary on them provide 
answers to these fundamental questions. While we discuss the issue at greater 
 
the Netherlands, and the other 60% would be exempt. However, the Netherlands would 
also reduce by 60% De Groot’s personal exemption to ¤4000 and his personal deductions to 
¤2000. 
76.  Id. para. 33. 
77.  Id. paras. 59-62. 
78.  Id. paras. 57-59. 
79.  Id. para. 84. 
80.  In Schumacker, the ECJ concluded that residents and nonresidents ordinarily are not 
similarly situated because nonresidents usually earn most of their income outside the source 
state. Case C-279/93, Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. I-225, para. 31. 
In another case, where a source state denied its personal exemption to a nonresident who 
did not earn almost all of his income in the source state, the ECJ found no discrimination 
even though the denial had the effect of raising the nonresident’s tax burden compared to 
residents who received the benefit of personal exemptions. See Case C-234/01, Gerritse v. 
Finanzamt Neukölln-Nord, 2003 E.C.R. I-5933. 
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length later, for now we simply note that very similar cases have arisen in the 
U.S. context.81 
Despite the lack of clear guidelines on how to resolve specific cases, one 
thing is clear: the ECJ consistently demonstrates concern for the functioning of 
the common market and the promotion of the freedom of movement in its tax 
discrimination cases. The ECJ frequently concludes that tax policies 
discriminate because they “discourage” or “deter” cross-border economic 
activity.82 This interpretation makes sense when we consider that one of the 
express purposes of the formation of the EU was to integrate the economies of 
previously independent states by tearing down barriers to cross-border 
economic activities and by preventing states from enacting new barriers that 
would prevent taxpayers from operating across borders. The problem with the 
tax discrimination decisions, however, is that they provide little guidance as to 
when tax policies “discourage” or “deter” the relevant type of cross-border 
economic activity. Providing a clear, operational theory of tax discrimination is 
the principal challenge in this area, and one we undertake in the next Part. 
i i .  toward a coherent conception of tax discrimination 
In this Part, we introduce three alternative efficiency interpretations for tax 
nondiscrimination. Two of these alternatives derive from the traditional capital 
neutrality benchmarks that have been used to analyze international tax laws 
since the 1960s. They are: locational neutrality, which minimizes distortions of 
decisions about where to work, and leisure neutrality, which minimizes 
distortions about how much to work. The third alternative, which we call 
“competitive neutrality,” derives from recent economics literature. Rather than 
 
81.  See, e.g., Lunding v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287 (1998) (holding that a state 
violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause when it denied nonresident taxpayers 
alimony deductions available to resident taxpayers); Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co.,  
252 U.S. 60 (1920) (holding that a state violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause when 
it denied nonresident taxpayers personal exemptions available to resident taxpayers); 
Wheeler v. State, 249 A.2d 887 (Vt. 1969) (rejecting equal-protection and privileges-and-
immunities challenges to a law that applied Vermont’s progressive tax rates to both in-state 
and out-of-state taxpayers). 
82.  See, e.g., Case C-334/02, Comm’n of the Eur. Cmty. v. France, 2004 E.C.R. I-2229, para. 23; 
Case C-242/03, Ministre des Finances v. Weidert, 2004 E.C.R. I-7379, paras. 13-14; Case  
C-364/01, Barbier v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst, 2003 E.C.R. I-15013, para. 62;  
De Groot, 2002 E.C.R. I-11819, paras. 84, 91; Case C-436/00, X & Y v. Riksskatteverket, 
2002 E.C.R. I-10829, para. 36; Case C-294/97, Eurowings Luftverkehrs AG v. Finanzamt 
Dortmund-Unna, 1999 E.C.R. I-7447, para. 37; Case C-439/97, Sandoz GmbH v. 
Finanzlandesdirektion für Wien, 1999 E.C.R. I-7041, para. 19; Case C-118/96, Safir v. 
Skattemyndigheten i Dalarnas Län, 1998 E.C.R. I-1897, para. 29. 
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seeking to ensure that every worker in a particular jurisdiction faces the same 
tax rate, or that any given worker who resides in a particular jurisdiction faces 
the same tax rate regardless of where she works, competitive neutrality seeks to 
ensure that tax-rate differences do not differentially affect each worker’s choice 
of job. That is to say, competitive neutrality requires that tax rate differences 
not affect comparative advantage.83 More precisely, if the tax system causes 
Worker 1, who is relatively more productive than Worker 2 in State X as 
compared to State Y, to work in State Y, and causes Worker 2, who is relatively 
more productive than Worker 1 in State Y as compared to State X, to work in 
State X, then the tax system violates competitive neutrality. Expressed more 
colloquially, a competitively neutral tax system does not interfere with the 
matching of workers to jobs, whereas a system that violates this neutrality is 
one in which workers sort into jobs not only on the basis of comparative 
advantage, but also residence. In addition to explaining the benchmarks, this 
Part provides, for the first time in the scholarly literature, clear guidelines for 
interpreting the tax nondiscrimination principle to require each kind of 
neutrality. Later, in Part III, we will argue that, of the three benchmarks, 
competitive neutrality best reflects EU goals and the ECJ’s nondiscrimination 
doctrine. 
A. Some Caveats 
Before presenting our three alternatives for interpreting nondiscrimination, 
we set out a few caveats and assumptions in this Section. 
1. Economic Efficiency 
This Subsection discusses our decision to focus on the economic efficiency 
rationale for the tax nondiscrimination principle. Commentators recognize 
three “standard” values promoted by prohibitions on discrimination by states 
in a common market: economic efficiency, representation reinforcement, and 
 
83.  The use of the principle of comparative advantage in this context might seem unfamiliar or 
misplaced to some readers because the principle, which was first described by David Ricardo 
in the context of trade in goods between states, is the foundation for the economic argument 
in favor of free trade between states. The principle, however, applies more broadly, 
including to individuals, and is as much about the benefits of specialization as it is about the 
benefits of exchange. See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 
679-81 (15th ed. 1995) (illustrating the principle of comparative advantage using the 
example of the best lawyer in town who is also the best typist and arguing that the lawyer 
should practice law and her secretary should type, even though her secretary is not as good a 
typist as is she). 
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promoting political unity.84 Despite its modest origins after World War II as a 
coal and steel customs union among six European nations, over the last half-
century the EU has evolved into considerably more.85 With 450 million people 
living in twenty-seven member states, today the EU is the largest common 
market in the world. In addition to a well-integrated economy, the EU 
continues to make strides towards political unity, in part by guaranteeing EU 
nationals the freedom of movement for reasons other than work or business 
and by expanding the role of the European Parliament.  
Despite these transformative developments, and our acknowledgement that 
the EU tax nondiscrimination principle also promotes representation 
reinforcement and political unity, we nevertheless focus primarily on the 
economic efficiency component of tax nondiscrimination. We make this choice 
for several reasons. First, the rhetoric of “ever closer union” does not seem to 
play a prominent role in discussions of direct taxation.86 For example, direct 
taxation remains one of a shrinking number of policy areas that require 
member state unanimity for the passage of legislation.87 In the negotiations for 
the EU Constitution, member state representatives even discussed limiting the 
ECJ’s jurisdiction in tax matters.88 Furthermore, the ECJ’s reasoning in tax 
 
84.  Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 217, 220. 
85.  See, e.g., Single Market Act: Twelve Levers To Boost Growth and Strengthen Confidence: Working 
Together To Create New Growth, at 3, COM (2011) 206 final (Apr. 13, 2011) (“At the heart of 
the European project since its inception, the common market . . . has for over 50 years 
woven strands of solidarity between the men and women of Europe, whilst opening up new 
opportunities for growth for more than 21 million European businesses.”).  
86.  TFEU, supra note 45, pmbl. (citing as one of the motivations for the Treaty the desire for 
“an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”). Although political unity has not 
played a role in tax discrimination cases, it is considered by the European Economic and 
Social Committee (EESC) to be an important element of the movement of workers. See, e.g., 
Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on ‘Freedom of Movement for Workers in the 
Single Market (Single Market Observatory),’ 2001 O.J. (C 155) 47, ¶ 1.1.2 (“Freedom of 
movement of workers is, in the [EESC’s] view, a key factor in the achievement of an ever 
closer Union. It is also one of the most concrete expressions of the concept of Union 
citizenship.”). The EESC provides a forum for EU interest groups to express views on EU 
issues, and the TFEU obliges the Council to consult with both the European Parliament and 
the EESC before undertaking tax and other kinds of legislation. See TFEU, supra note 45, 
art. 115. 
87.  TFEU, supra note 45, art. 115 (“[T]he Council shall, acting unanimously in accordance with 
a special legislative procedure and after consulting the European Parliament and the 
Economic and Social Committee, issue directives for the approximation of such laws, 
regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States as directly affect the 
establishment or functioning of the internal market.”). 
88.  See Frans Vanistendael, The ECJ at the Crossroads: Balancing Tax Sovereignty Against the 
Imperatives of the Single Market, 46 EUR. TAX’N 413, 413 (2006). 
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discrimination cases continues to hew closely to the economic justifications for 
the formation of the EU, even as the court increasingly stresses the importance 
of noneconomic EU values, such as political unity and equality, in other areas 
of law.89 Specifically, the ECJ has never invoked the representation 
reinforcement or political unity rationales in its tax discrimination cases. 
Indeed, to our knowledge, the ECJ has never invoked values other than 
economic efficiency in deciding whether a state used its tax system to 
discriminate. 
The ECJ’s bifurcated approach to deciding tax cases also reinforces the 
primacy of economic efficiency concepts in deciding tax nondiscrimination 
cases. The court’s decisions generally proceed in two stages.90 In the first stage, 
the court considers whether the state discriminated by looking to whether the 
challenged tax law “discourages” or “deters” cross-border economic activity.91 
It is not until the second stage of the court’s ruling, the justification stage, that 
the court even considers other values. Yet, even here, the ECJ has only accepted 
a limited number of justifications, such as the need to prevent fraud or tax 
evasion, all of which directly relate to economic efficiency.92 
Because our goal in this Article is to try to get a clearer understanding of 
what the tax nondiscrimination principle requires, it seems prudent to discuss 
what the ECJ itself has identified as tax nondiscrimination’s most important 
underlying value. Thus, in focusing on efficiency, we take our cue from the 
ECJ. Later, however, we discuss the implications of our interpretation of 
nondiscrimination for representation reinforcement and political unity.93 
2. Labor, Not Capital 
All three of the economic efficiency benchmarks we discuss in this Article 
were developed for the analysis of capital taxation, not labor taxation. 
 
89.  The ECJ has declared its expectation that Union citizenship will continue to take on greater 
importance as a source of legal rights for EU nationals. See, e.g., Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk v. 
Centre Public d’Aide Sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, 2001 E.C.R. I-6193, para. 31 
(“Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member 
States, enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same 
treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly 
provided for.”). 
90.  See MASON, supra note 11, at 93-114 (discussing justifications for tax discrimination). 
91.  See sources cited supra note 82. 
92.  See MASON, supra note 11, at 93-114 (reviewing the limited justifications the ECJ has accepted 
in tax cases, such as the need to prevent tax fraud and the need for fiscal supervision). 
93.  See discussion infra Subsection III.B.3. 
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Nevertheless, we focus on labor taxation for several reasons. First, labor tax 
cases affect many people because many people work outside their residence 
state or have labor income from more than one state.94 Second, because the 
facts, law, and institutional setting of labor tax cases are relatively 
straightforward, they are much easier to explain and understand than are the 
capital tax cases.95 Third, illustrating our arguments using labor, rather than 
capital, allows the reader to more readily connect our conception of tax 
nondiscrimination with more intuitive notions of nondiscrimination that 
implicate political equality, such as discrimination on the basis of race or 
national origin. Thus, the labor tax cases remind us that the desire to avoid 
nationality discrimination animates the fundamental freedoms, as does the 
desire to forge political unity among the peoples of Europe, even though the 
ECJ has not specifically acknowledged that value in its tax discrimination 
doctrine. Finally, the freedom of capital movement has a different scope than 
do the other fundamental freedoms. Specifically, while the other fundamental 
freedoms, including the free movement of goods, workers, services, and 
business establishments, only apply to EU situations, the freedom of capital 
movement also applies to capital moving into or out of the EU.96 The 
application of the freedom of capital movement to so-called third countries and 
the consequent protection of non-EU nationals under that freedom has 
 
94.  Although we could not find statistics on the number of people working outside their state of 
tax residence, statistics on related cross-border worker mobility issues provide some insight 
into the size of that population. See Reaffirming the Free Movement of Workers: Rights and 
Major Developments, at 2, COM (2010) 373 final at 2 (July 13, 2010) (noting that “10% of 
persons polled in EU-27 replied that they had lived and worked in another country at some 
point in the past, while 17% intended to take advantage of free movement in the future”); cf. 
Posting of Workers in the Framework of the Provision of Services: Maximizing Its Benefits and 
Potential While Guaranteeing the Protection of Workers, at 3, COM (2007) 304 final at 3 (June 
13, 2007) (noting that the number of workers employed in one member state, but 
temporarily posted by their employer in another member state was “just under 1 million, or 
about 0.4% of the EU working age population in 2005”).  
95.  Members of the court have remarked on the complexities in these cases. See, e.g., Case  
C-374/04, Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Grp. Litig. v. Comm’rs of Inland Revenue, 
2006 E.C.R. I-11673, para.3 (opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed) (“This is an area in 
which the Court, faced with increasingly complicated factual and legislative contexts and 
arguments seeking to test the limits of the Treaty, has developed a substantial body of rather 
complex case-law.”). Scholars agree. See, e.g., Walter Hellerstein et al., Constitutional 
Restraints on Corporate Tax Integration, 62 TAX L. REV. 1, 18, 65 (2008) (describing the 
corporate tax integration jurisprudence in the ECJ as “woefully complex”). 
96.  TFEU, supra note 45, art. 63, para. 2 (“[A]ll restrictions on payments between Member 
States and between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited.”). 
  
the yale law journal    
1038 
 
complicated its interpretation.97 Because our goal in this Article is to address 
the meaning of tax discrimination within a common market, we do not 
expressly consider the freedom of capital movement, which has third-party 
effects. Although our arguments have implications for capital taxation, we do 
not consider those implications here. 
3. Assumptions 
As part of our analysis, we present a simple two-state model of how 
taxation distorts labor markets. In developing that model, we make two 
assumptions, namely, that only taxes matter and that tax residence is fixed. 
The more important assumption is that only taxes matter. Of course, taxes are 
not the only factor that workers consider when answering important questions, 
such as where to work, how much to work, and which job to work. A whole 
variety of other factors—both economic and noneconomic—influence such 
decisions. These varied factors include everything from wage rates to climate, 
from religion to love of unpasteurized cheese. People’s work decisions depend 
not only on taxation but also on geography, working conditions, family and 
community support and expectations, cultural factors, standards and costs of 
living, labor and immigration regulations, moving costs, transportation costs, 
and other frictions. Many of these factors weigh more heavily than taxation in 
decisions about work. However, in order to isolate the effect of taxation on 
work decisions, we assume that the only factor that influences work decisions 
is taxation and that there are no nontax costs of moving.98 
Second, in order to explore the impact of taxes on decisions about where to 
work, how much to work, and which job to work, we hold taxpayers’ residence 
fixed. This means that we assume that taxes will not cause workers to change 
their state of tax residence, even though taxes may cause people to commute to 
other jurisdictions or to work there for long periods. Although this assumption 
is contrary to fact, it is justified given the limited applicability of the legal 
prohibition of tax discrimination under EU law. Specifically, EU law only 
covers cross-border situations. For example, EU nondiscrimination law 
protects an EU national who is a French tax resident when she earns income 
from Germany. However, should the French resident move her residence to 
 
97.  See, e.g., Case C-452/04, Fidium Finanz AG v. Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, 
2006 E.C.R. I-9521 (struggling to determine whether cross-border lending involves the 
freedom to provide services, the freedom of capital movement, or both). 
98.  We do not believe that introducing these complications would dramatically change our 
results, although doing so would dramatically complicate our examples, exposition, and 
analysis. 
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Germany and continue to work in Germany, her tax treatment would no longer 
be a concern of EU law, since she would be a resident of Germany earning only 
domestic income. EU nondiscrimination law generally does not concern 
member states’ tax treatment of their own residents’ purely domestic income.99 
If the taxpayer became a German tax resident, Germany would treat her like 
other German tax residents (most of whom are German nationals). Because tax 
law applies on the basis of residence, rather than nationality, once a taxpayer 
establishes tax residency in a member state, that state generally will treat her 
the same as other tax residents.100 Thus, the application of the tax 
nondiscrimination principle generally concerns cases in which an EU national 
resides in one state, but earns income in another state. Of course, should the 
taxpayer in our example, who now resides in Germany, begin to earn income 
from work in Belgium, EU law would protect her from tax discrimination by 
Germany or Belgium. And in our analysis, we now would assume that her 
residence is fixed in Germany.101 
 
99.  That is not to say that the ECJ never looks at member states’ tax treatments of their own 
residents with only domestic income. It regularly does so in comparison with residents of 
other member states earning income in that country or with its own residents earning 
income abroad. The purpose of such assessments, however, is to determine whether the 
state is discriminating against foreign residents working or seeking to work in that country 
or domestic residents seeking to work abroad. See, e.g., Case C-385/00, De Groot v. 
Staatssecretaris van Financiën, 2002 E.C.R. I-11819 (comparing the Netherlands’ treatment 
of it residents’ foreign-source income with the Netherlands’ treatment of its residents’ 
Dutch-source income); Case C-279/93, Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v. Schumacker,  
1995 E.C.R. I-225 (comparing Germany’s treatment of its own residents’ German-source 
income with Germany’s treatment of nonresidents’ German-source income). 
100.  Cf. Case C-112/91, Werner v. Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt, 1993 E.C.R. I-429 (holding 
that the freedom of establishment did not apply to a German national establishing a 
business in Germany). We could imagine scenarios involving discrimination against new 
residents, which would be a concern for EU law, but we are aware of no such cases in the 
EU. 
Similarly, in the U.S. state tax context, the assumption of fixed residence allows us to 
focus on the most constitutionally relevant set of circumstances: specifically, occasions when 
a taxpayer resides in one state, but has income from another. While it is not impossible for a 
state to discriminate against its own residents with only in-state income (or only in-state 
activities), such cases have proven exceptional in comparison to the bulk of cases, which 
involve state tax discrimination against nonresidents or against residents with out-of-state 
income. Cf. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 12 (1992) (ruling that California’s Proposition 
13A, which based property taxes on assessments made in 1975-76, did not discriminate 
against new residents in violation of the Equal Protection Clause because the rule was 
rationally related to the state’s goal to encourage “neighborhood preservation, continuity, 
and stability”). 
101.  Moreover, the assumption of fixed residence, although designed to make our models 
tractable, is not necessary for our results, as we show later. See infra note 170. 
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4. What We Mean by Welfare 
Throughout this Article, we use the traditional economist’s concept of 
welfare. We derive welfare from individual preferences. We also generally 
ignore the possibility of externalities and so generally assume that an 
unregulated environment would yield an efficient equilibrium. At the same 
time, we recognize that governments raise revenue through taxes for a variety 
of purposes, some of which are because of market imperfections, such as 
externalities. Such taxes, however, distort behavior along a number of different 
dimensions. In our view, a tax distorts behavior if it would in theory be 
possible for a central planner to adjust behavior, compensate the losers, and 
have a surplus remaining. Thus, when we talk about welfare we are using the 
criterion of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.102 
5. Why These Benchmarks? 
Finally, given the many possible margins upon which tax-induced 
distortions can occur, one might question our choice to consider whether the 
tax nondiscrimination principle can best be understood as requiring only 
locational neutrality, leisure neutrality, or competitive neutrality. We chose 
these benchmarks because they dominate cross-border tax debates.103 In 
addition the ECJ has made clear that the nondiscrimination principle does not 
govern certain margins, such as residence-based discrimination by a member 
state against its own nationals with only domestic income,104 although the 
freedom of EU nationals to choose their state of residence is protected by other 
parts of the TFEU.105  
 
102.  See generally BALASSA, supra note 42, at 10-14 (discussing how integration of the economies 
of different states can impact economic welfare). 
103.  See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 102D CONG., FACTORS AFFECTING THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS OF THE UNITED STATES 5 (Comm. Print 1991) (discussing 
locational neutrality and savings neutrality); see also Desai & Hines, supra note 33 (discussing 
all three benchmarks); Graetz, supra note 23 (discussing locational and savings neutrality 
and arguing that U.S. international tax policy should focus more on promoting national 
welfare).	
104.  Werner, 1993 E.C.R. I-429, para. 17 (holding that EU law “does not preclude a Member 
State from imposing on its nationals who carry on their professional activities within its 
territory and who earn all or almost all of their income there or possess all or almost all of 
their assets there a heavier tax burden if they do not reside in that State than if they do”).	
105.  TFEU, supra note 45, art. 21 (“Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and 
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The first of the benchmarks we consider is locational neutrality, and it 
obtains when taxes do not distort the location of workers. In the capital tax 
context, this benchmark is known as “capital export neutrality,” and it obtains 
when taxes do not distort the location in which capital is employed. Capital 
export neutrality, which requires an investor to pay the same tax regardless of 
where an investment is located, was described by economist Peggy Musgrave 
in the 1960s.106 It has become one of the standard tools for evaluating the 
impact of national tax measures upon the efficiency of global capital markets. 
Reflecting its importance, explicit appeals to locational neutrality appear in 
foundational policy documents written by domestic tax authorities107 and 
major international tax policymaking bodies, such as the OECD.108 
The second benchmark, savings neutrality, obtains when the supply of 
savings is allocated efficiently across jurisdictions. Savings neutrality was 
explained most clearly by economist Thomas Horst in the 1980s under the 
term “capital import neutrality.” Capital import neutrality requires residents of 
different states to face the same consumption-saving tradeoff. In the form 
described by Horst, capital import neutrality does not have many advocates 
among policymakers or economists.109 Nevertheless, capital export neutrality 
and capital import neutrality together represent the standard efficiency 
benchmarks for analyzing cross-border tax issues, and so our analysis would be 
incomplete without them.110 
We also consider what we call competitive neutrality. We derive 
competitive neutrality from recent scholarship by economists Michael 
Devereux, Mihir Desai, and James Hines emphasizing “capital ownership 
neutrality,” which obtains when taxes do not distort the ownership of assets.111 
Although economists have only recently formalized the requirements of capital 
ownership neutrality, the notion of competitive or ownership neutrality is 
older. Discussions of the role that internal, firm-specific factors play in 
understanding the pattern of foreign direct investment first appeared in the 
 
conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them effect.”). 
Article 21 of the TFEU was not in force at the time of the Werner decision. 	
106.  PEGGY BREWER RICHMAN, TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME 8 (1963).  
107.  See Graetz, supra note 23, at 270-77. 
108.  See, e.g., OECD Discussion Draft, supra note 22, at 102-03. 
109.  Horst, supra note 60. 
110.  See Graetz, supra note 23, at 270-77 (criticizing the overreliance by the U.S. Treasury 
Department on the concept of locational neutrality, and citing many government 
publications referencing the neutrality benchmarks). 
111.  Desai & Hines, supra note 33; Devereux, supra note 33. 
  
the yale law journal    
1042 
 
economics literature in the 1950s.112 References to competitive or ownership 
neutrality first appeared in academic scholarship in the 1990s.113 In the U.S. 
legal literature, we believe the term “ownership neutrality” was first used in 
1994.114 But even before the introduction of the term “ownership neutrality,” 
international tax analysts and policymakers had long emphasized the 
importance of maintaining a level playing field among taxpayers resident in 
different states who compete for jobs, investments, or customers in the same 
markets. Given the sustained importance assigned to competitiveness by 
policymakers and experts, and given the new emphasis on the formal 
requirements of ownership neutrality in economics scholarship, we add 
analysis of competitive neutrality to the usual approach to international tax 
questions, which limits discussion to capital export neutrality and capital 
import neutrality. As we will show, competitive neutrality turns out to be a 
better fit than locational neutrality or leisure neutrality for the 
nondiscrimination principle, given the text of the TFEU, the goals of the EU, 
and the ECJ’s tax nondiscrimination doctrine. 
Our last caveat involves the acknowledgement that international tax 
scholarship and policy documents reflect confusion over the meaning of the 
term capital import neutrality. Noneconomist international tax experts have 
long used the term to refer to something akin to competitive or ownership 
neutrality, while economists have used the term to refer to savings neutrality. 
This divergence in usage between economists and others has created significant 
confusion.115 To avoid this confusion, we do not use the term capital import 
neutrality. Instead, we use the term “savings neutrality” to refer to what 
economists call capital import neutrality, and we use the term “leisure 
neutrality” to refer to the labor analogue of savings neutrality. Finally, we use 
the term “competitive neutrality” to refer to both what economists call capital 
ownership neutrality as well as to its labor analogue. 
 
112.  EDWARD M. GRAHAM & PAUL R. KRUGMAN, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED 
STATES 191-93 (3d ed. 1995) (surveying economic explanations for foreign direct 
investment). 
113.  Devereux, supra note 33. 
114.  See Robert A. Green, The Troubled Rule of Nondiscrimination in Taxing Foreign Direct 
Investment, 26 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 113, 138 (1994) (“Ownership neutrality prevails if the 
international tax system is neutral with respect to the identity of the firm that owns and 
controls capital in a given country.”). 
115.  Michael S. Knoll, Reconsidering International Tax Neutrality, 64 TAX L. REV. 99, 101-18 (2011) 
(arguing that Musgrave’s original description of capital import neutrality was a type of 
competitive neutrality and that many noneconomists continued to use the term capital 
import neutrality to refer to competitive neutrality long after economists following Horst 
switched to using the term to refer to savings neutrality). 
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B. Locational Neutrality 
Capital export neutrality is the first traditional tax neutrality benchmark. A 
tax system achieves capital export neutrality when it does not distort the 
location of capital. If the tax system achieves capital export neutrality, then 
shifting capital across borders does not increase global output.116 We label both  
capital export neutrality and its labor analogue “locational neutrality.” A tax 
system is locationally neutral when it does not distort the location where 
individuals work. If the tax system achieves locational neutrality, then shifting 
workers across jurisdictions does not increase global welfare.  
As with taxing capital income, taxing labor income may create distortions. 
We demonstrate the notion that taxes can distort the location of labor with a 
simple example. If the world consisted only of two states, France and 
Germany, Figure 1 would describe the four possible categories of workers 
based on where they work and where they reside.117 The bottom left quadrant 
(Quadrant 1) represents German residents working in Germany. The top left 
quadrant (Quadrant 2) represents German residents working in France. The 
bottom right quadrant (Quadrant 3) represents French residents working in 
Germany. The top right quadrant (Quadrant 4) represents French residents 
working in France.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
116.  For concise explanations of capital export neutrality and capital import neutrality, see 
DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, DECODING THE U.S. CORPORATE TAX 122-25 (2009); and Richard A. 
Musgrave & Peggy B. Musgrave, Inter-Nation Equity, in MODERN FISCAL ISSUES: ESSAYS IN 
HONOR OF CARL S. SHOUP 63 (Richard M. Bird & John G. Head eds., 1972). 
117.  Figure 1 is similar to the figure developed by Professor Alvin Warren to describe 
discrimination against foreign production and foreign producers. See Warren, supra note 4, 
at 149. Our analysis differs from his, however, because we emphasize labor mobility and 
competitive neutrality. 
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Figure 1. 
four types of workers 
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The solid vertical line separating Quadrants 1 and 2 from Quadrants 3 and 4 
separates the work done by German residents from that done by French 
residents. Similarly, the solid horizontal line separating Quadrants 1 and 3 from 
Quadrants 2 and 4 separates the work done in Germany from that done in 
France. Figure 1 assumes an environment without taxes (or with harmonized 
taxes).118  
 
118.  The solid horizontal line separating Quadrants 1 and 3 from Quadrants 2 and 4 separates 
work that is efficiently performed in Germany (below that line) from work that is efficiently 
performed in France (above that line). Accordingly, the area just below that line represents 
tasks performed in Germany that could be performed almost (but not quite) as efficiently if 
those tasks were shifted to France. Similarly, the solid vertical line separating Quadrants 1 
and 2 from Quadrants 3 and 4 separates work that is most efficiently performed by German 
residents (left of that line) from work that is most efficiently performed by French residents 
(right of that line). Accordingly, the area just to the left of that line represents tasks 
performed by German residents that could be performed almost (but not quite) as 
efficiently by French residents. Thus, the area in the lower left corner of Quadrant 1 
represents tasks that can be performed much more efficiently by German residents working 
in Germany than by French residents working in either Germany or France or by German 
residents working in France (for example, designing and testing German grammar books 
for German primary school students). In contrast, the area in the lower right corner of 
Quadrant 3 represents tasks that can be performed much more efficiently by French 
residents working in Germany than by German residents working anywhere or French 
residents working in France (for example, baking soufflés for customers in Berlin). 
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Throughout this Article, we assume Germany is considering imposing a 
tax. In contrast, France, which represents the rest of the world or at least the 
rest of the EU, will not change its tax policies regardless of what Germany 
does. Because France represents the rest of the world, Germany is 
(counterfactually) a small state relative to France. That implies that prices and 
wages in France are given and will not be affected by German tax policies. 
German prices and wages, however, will change in response to the tax.  
Suppose, for example, Germany imposes a uniform 10% source tax. By a 
“uniform” source tax we mean that the state applies the tax to all workers with 
income from its territory, regardless of the workers’ residence. Thus, to be 
uniform, Germany would have to apply the tax to both German residents and 
French residents working in Germany. We represent the work performed in 
Germany that is subject to the uniform source tax with light shading in Figure 
2. Because all workers in Quadrants 1 and 3 are subject to the German source 
tax, we shade all of Quadrant 1 and all of Quadrant 3. 
 
Figure 2. 
source-tax-induced distortion of location 
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As compared to Figure 1, which represented the no-tax world, in Figure 2 
Quadrants 1 and 3 are smaller and Quadrants 2 and 4 are larger. The shift in 
the size of the quadrants represents the locational distortion caused by the 
German source tax; the German source tax drives labor out of Germany and 
into France. Specifically, a taxpayer will choose to work in Germany only if she 
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earns at least 111% of what she can earn in France.119 Thus, the effect of the tax 
would be to shift workers from Germany to France, as represented by the 
downward shift in the solid horizontal line separating work in France from 
work in Germany. This locational distortion reduces welfare by reducing work 
and therefore production in Germany.120 
Any source tax, including a uniform source tax that applies to both 
residents and nonresidents like the one described here, distorts locational 
neutrality. To raise tax revenue without distorting the location of labor, states 
must ensure that their residents face the same tax burden on their work, no 
matter whether they earn their income at home or abroad.121 If where they earn 
their income has no effect on how much tax they pay, workers will choose 
where to work based on where they earn the highest pre-tax wages. There are 
two tax systems that can achieve this effect without requiring global 
harmonization of tax rates and bases: residence-only taxation and worldwide 
taxation with unlimited credits for source taxes.122 
Under residence-only taxation, states would tax all their residents’ income, 
whether earned domestically or abroad, and source taxation would be 
forbidden. Similarly, under worldwide taxation with unlimited credits 
 
119.  Viewing France as a proxy for the rest of the world and assuming that Germany is not such a 
large state in labor markets that its policies affect wages elsewhere, it follows that the 
productivity of workers in France will remain unchanged. 
120.  To see why, consider a worker who could earn ¤111 in Germany, but who works in France 
where she earns only ¤100. She is indifferent between working in France where she earns 
¤100, which is not subject to tax, and working in Germany, where she would earn ¤111, but 
pay ¤11 in tax. Shifting her work to Germany will allow her to produce ¤111. Of that 
amount, ¤100 would be enough to compensate the worker for her lost French wages. We 
need not compensate the French government, which does not tax, nor the German 
government, because before the shift the French resident worked in France and so the 
German government collected no tax from her. Thus, the shift leaves a surplus of ¤11, which 
is proof of the locational distortion. 
121.  Let  
)(
)(
Fw
DrR   
represent the after-all-taxes retention rate on work performed by an individual who resides 
in jurisdiction D on work performed in jurisdiction F. The retention rate is the portion of 
the worker’s before-tax salary that she retains after paying all source and all residence taxes. 
Thus, locational neutrality requires that 
 
)(
)(
Fw
DrR =
)(
)(
Dw
DrR .
In our two-state example, this means that for all German residents, the retention rate on 
Quadrant 2 must equal the retention rate on Quadrant 1. Likewise, for all French residents, 
the retention rate on Quadrant 3 must equal the retention rate on Quadrant 4. 
122.  States also could maintain locational neutrality by agreeing to assess taxes at the same rate. 
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(“worldwide taxation”), states also would tax all their residents’ income, no 
matter where earned. But source taxation would be permitted. To maintain 
locational neutrality, states would fully credit any taxes their residents paid to 
source states. In this way, residents of a particular state would always face the 
same tax burden on their income, no matter where they earned it, so the 
presence of higher or lower tax rates in other states would not influence 
residents’ decisions about where to work.123 Because we assume residence is 
fixed, worldwide taxation tends to push before-tax wages into equality across 
borders so that shifting labor across jurisdictions will not increase output. 
Worldwide taxation is an example of what we call a “uniform residence tax” 
because it applies on the same basis to all residents, regardless of the source of 
their income. 
C. Leisure Neutrality 
The second traditional tax neutrality benchmark is “capital import 
neutrality,” or “savings neutrality,” which obtains when savings are allocated 
efficiently across jurisdictions.124 We call capital import neutrality “savings 
neutrality,” and we call the labor analogue to savings neutrality “leisure 
neutrality.” Leisure neutrality obtains when leisure is allocated efficiently 
across jurisdictions. In other words, leisure-neutral taxes do not create different 
distortions of the labor/leisure tradeoff for workers residing in different states. 
In the absence of taxes, people would decide how much time to devote to 
work and how much to leisure based purely on their preferences regarding 
those activities. However, because income from work is taxed, whereas leisure 
is not taxed, all income tax systems favor leisure over work. This distortion 
between work and leisure arises under any system that taxes income, and 
would exist even if the world consisted of a single taxing jurisdiction. But the 
existence of multiple jurisdictions that impose taxes at different rates creates an 
additional distortion. For example, if Germany is a high-tax jurisdiction, and 
France is a low-tax jurisdiction, French residents will receive higher after-tax 
wages from their work than will German residents. As a result, French 
residents may work too much compared to German residents, who work too 
 
123.  See Musgrave & Musgrave, supra note 116, at 69. Notice that, to maintain locational 
neutrality, states would have to refund foreign taxes that exceeded their own. The United 
States relieves double taxation via the credit method, but it limits the credit to the tax that 
would have been due on domestic income. Thus, if a U.S. resident earns $100 of foreign 
source income and if the U.S. tax rate is 35%, then the maximum credit for foreign taxes it 
will allow is $35, even if a U.S. resident pays a higher rate abroad. See I.R.C. § 901 (2006). 
124.  Horst, supra note 60, at 794-96; see also Knoll, supra note 115 (discussing terminology). 
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little.125 Thus, shifting units of work from French residents to German 
residents could improve global welfare.126 
A tax system violates leisure neutrality when residents of different states 
face different work-leisure tradeoffs. A tax system satisfies leisure neutrality 
when residents from different states face the same work-leisure tradeoff. That 
will occur only if everyone working in a jurisdiction faces the same marginal 
tax rate. Of course, even if everyone faced the same marginal tax rate, there 
would still be a work-leisure distortion as long as the tax rate was not zero. 
However, there would not be a differential distortion across residents of 
different states. As we use the term here, “leisure neutrality” refers to the 
elimination of differential work-leisure distortions across residents of different 
states.  
We demonstrate that residence taxation distorts leisure neutrality using our 
two-state example. Suppose that the only tax is a uniform 20% German 
residence tax. Recall that a uniform residence tax is one that a state applies to 
all its residents’ income, regardless of where earned. Thus, Germany would tax 
the income of all German residents at 20%, regardless of whether they earn 
that income in Germany or abroad in France. When Germany taxes its 
residents, it makes work less attractive for them than it is for French residents 
because German residents keep only 80% of what they earn after taxes, 
whereas French residents keep 100%. As a result, whether they work in 
Germany or France, German residents face a different work-leisure tradeoff 
than do French residents. This difference is a violation of leisure neutrality. 
The effect of the German tax on the total hours worked by Germans is 
theoretically indeterminate: it could go either up or down. If the substitution 
effect predominates,127 such that taxpayers prefer to spend more time at leisure 
than to work more to earn after-tax wages, then by lowering the after-tax 
wages of German residents relative to French residents, the German residence 
tax reduces the amount worked by German residents compared to French 
residents. For no special reason, we drew Figure 3 using the assumption that 
the substitution effect would predominate. 
 
125.  Cf. Rosanne Altshuler, Recent Developments in the Debate on Deferral, 20 TAX NOTES INT’L 
1579, 1581-82 (2000) (discussing capital taxation, and therefore couching her discussion in 
terms of savings and consumption, rather than work and leisure). 
126.  Cf. SHAVIRO, supra note 116, at 122-26 (analyzing capital taxes); Altshuler, supra note 125 
(analyzing capital taxes). 
127.  The substitution effect states that when the price of a good (such as ice cream or leisure) 
rises, consumers tend to consume less of that good, and vice versa. SAMUELSON & 
NORDHAUS, supra note 83, at 78. 
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As in the last figure, we use light shading to represent the work that is 
subject to the German tax. In this case, however, because we posit a uniform 
German residence tax, all workers in Quadrants 1 and 2 are subject to the tax so 
we shade all of Quadrant 1 and all of Quadrant 2:  
 
Figure 3. 
residence-tax-induced distortion of leisure 
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Under our assumption that the substitution effect predominates, the 
German residence tax shifts units of work from German residents to French 
residents, and it therefore shifts to the left the solid line separating Quadrants 1 
and 2 from Quadrants 3 and 4, as compared to its position in a no-tax world. 
Unlike in Figure 2, in Figure 3, the change in the size of the quadrants does not 
represent a physical shift of workers across state borders. Instead, in Figure 3, 
the change in the size of the quadrants represents a shift in the amount of work 
done by the workers in each quadrant relative to the no-tax world. Uniform 
residence taxation does not cause anyone to change where they work;128 instead, 
 
128.  In the previous Section, we explained that uniform residence taxation does not create 
locational distortions. 
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it causes people to change the amount they work. That distortion reduces 
welfare.129 
In Figure 3, we assumed that the substitution effect would dominate, but it 
is possible that the income effect may dominate instead,130 such that earning 
lower after-tax wages encourages German residents to work more in order to 
increase these wages. In that case, there would still be a distortion: the solid 
vertical line separating Quadrants 1 and 2 from Quadrants 3 and 4 would shift 
to the right as compared to its position in a no-tax world. Now welfare could 
be improved by having German residents work less and French residents work 
more. No matter whether the substitution or income effect dominates, in the 
absence of global tax rate harmonization, all residence taxation distorts leisure 
 
129.  The German residence tax creates a distortion by shifting units of work from German 
residents to French residents. We demonstrate this distortion by showing that it is possible 
to increase aggregate welfare by rearranging work and leisure between French and German 
residents. Assume an additional unit of work by either a French or German resident is just 
enough to generate ¤100 before tax. At the margin, because the German residence tax does 
not apply to residents of France, a French resident is indifferent between working the 
additional unit (thereby earning ¤100) and not working. Similarly, at the margin, a German 
resident, who must pay residence tax at 20%, is indifferent between working the additional 
unit (thereby earning ¤80 after the German residence tax) and not working. Recall that in 
our example in the text, we assumed that the substitution effect would dominate, so that the 
German residence tax would reduce work by German residents. Now consider the 
possibility of partially offsetting that change by reducing the work of a French resident and 
increasing the work of a German resident. Because the French resident is indifferent at the 
margin between working and earning ¤100 and not working, reducing the French resident’s 
work by one unit will reduce her income by ¤100 without reducing her welfare. The 
German resident has to be paid only ¤80 for the additional work to compensate for his lost 
leisure. We need not compensate the French government for any loss of tax, since, no matter 
who performs the work, France will not tax it. Nor need we compensate the German 
government, since, if the French resident had performed the work instead of the German 
resident, Germany would not have collected any tax on it. Thus, as compared to the scenario 
where the French worker performs the work and demands ¤100 to compensate her for her 
lost leisure, if the German resident performs the work he demands only ¤80 to compensate 
him for his lost leisure, leaving¤20 to be shared among the German worker and his 
employer. This is proof of the work-leisure distortion across residents of different states.   
130.  The income effect is the effect of a change in income on the quantity of a good (such as ice 
cream or leisure) consumed. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 83, at 79. For most 
goods, the quantity consumed increases with income, but for some goods (economists called 
these inferior goods) the quantity decreases as income rises (e.g., packaged ramen noodles). 
See id. at 754 (defining inferior goods). When the price of a good rises, there is both a 
substitution effect, which is away from the good, and an income effect, which can be away 
from or towards the good. An income tax lowers the price of leisure, which encourages 
consumption of leisure, but it also lowers income, which would lower such consumption 
(assuming leisure is a normal, not an inferior, good). Thus, with an income tax, the 
substitution and income effects on leisure are in the opposite direction. See id. at 79. 
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neutrality, although uniform residence taxes do not also distort locational 
neutrality.131 
To achieve leisure neutrality in the absence of global tax rate 
harmonization, taxpayers must earn the same after-tax wage, no matter where 
they reside.132 This means that states may not assess taxes on a residence basis. 
Instead, they must practice exemption. Additionally, states that tax on a source 
basis must use uniform source taxes—those that apply on the same basis to 
resident and nonresident workers.133 Under this system, after-tax wages 
converge across jurisdictions, so shifting leisure among residents of different 
states would not raise welfare. 
Many common tax policies violate leisure neutrality. For example, some 
states tax resident workers on a net basis but nonresident workers on a gross 
basis. Applying different tax bases to residents and nonresidents working in 
the same jurisdiction distorts their labor/leisure decisions because members of 
the group that faces the higher effective tax rate will either work fewer hours (if 
the substitution effect predominates) or more hours (if the income effect 
predominates) than the other group. Both cases violate leisure neutrality. 
Likewise, in the absence of tax rate harmonization, all residence taxation 
violates leisure neutrality because taxpayers pay different rates depending upon 
where they reside. 
D. Competitive Neutrality 
As we have shown, to achieve locational neutrality, all taxpayers residing in 
the same state must face the same tax burden on their foreign and domestic 
earned income, namely, the residence state’s tax rate. Thus, the burden to 
maintain locational neutrality falls on residence states, which must tax 
residents’ foreign and domestic income the same way, including by granting 
unlimited credits for source taxes if necessary. In contrast, to achieve leisure 
 
131.  See supra Section II.B. 
132.  Using the notation supra in note 121, leisure neutrality requires that 
)(
)(
Dw
FrR
 
equal
 )(
)(
Dw
DrR . 
In our two-state example, this means that the retention rate for all taxpayers who work in 
Germany must be the same no matter where those workers reside (i.e., the retention rate for 
Quadrant 1 must equal the retention rate for Quadrant 3). Likewise, the retention rate for all 
taxpayers who work in France must be the same no matter where those workers reside (i.e., 
the retention rate for Quadrant 2 must equal the retention rate for Quadrant 4). 
133.  In the terminology of international law, states must grant nonresidents national treatment 
with respect to source taxes. Since states must extend national treatment to all nonresidents 
regardless of where they reside, leisure neutrality effectively also encompasses a most-
favored-nation treatment requirement for source taxation. Leisure neutrality forbids 
residence taxation in the absence of rate harmonization. 
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neutrality, all taxpayers must face the same tax burden on income earned in a 
jurisdiction no matter where they reside, namely, the source state’s tax rate. 
This means that residence states must not tax at all and source states must tax 
nonresidents the same way that they tax residents.134 Thus, the burden to 
maintain leisure neutrality falls primarily on source states, because only source 
states tax under leisure neutrality. 
Notwithstanding that the burden to maintain locational neutrality would 
fall on residence states and the burden to maintain leisure neutrality would fall 
on source states, the ECJ has imposed nondiscrimination obligations on states 
taxing in both a source capacity and a residence capacity. Professors Graetz and 
Warren have argued that imposition of nondiscrimination at both source and 
residence shows that the ECJ’s approach to nondiscrimination is incoherent.135 
Crucial to their argument is the fact that, unless all states harmonize their tax 
rates, locational neutrality is incompatible with leisure neutrality.136 This is a 
simple matter of logic: if locational neutrality requires cross-border workers to 
be taxed at their residence state’s rate, and leisure neutrality requires cross-
border workers to be taxed at their source state’s rate, then those two 
requirements can only hold simultaneously if the source and residence states 
have the same tax rate. 
But the ECJ repeatedly has held that EU law does not require tax rate 
harmonization, because rate harmonization would invade the member states’ 
retained tax autonomy.137 Thus, the ECJ’s imposition of nondiscrimination 
burdens at both source and residence cannot logically be understood as an 
 
134.  Leisure neutrality is not distorted by source states taxing at different rates from each other. 
Assuming each state has a single tax rate, wages across states will adjust so that after-tax 
wages are the same everywhere. Thus, workers will face the same labor/leisure tradeoff 
regardless of where they work or where they reside. The lower wage paid in a low-tax state 
is called an implicit tax. Thus, the total tax—the sum of implicit and explicit tax—is equal 
across states. 
135.  Graetz & Warren, supra note 18, at 1219. 
136.  Id. at 1212-23 (couching their discussion in terms of capital export neutrality and capital 
import neutrality rather than locational neutrality and leisure neutrality); see also Michael J. 
Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Dividend Taxation in Europe: When the ECJ Makes Tax Policy, 
44 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1577, 1577 (2007) (“[T]he Court’s general approach to income tax 
issues is incoherent because it seeks to eliminate discrimination based on both the origin and 
destination of economic activity—an impossible quest in the absence of harmonized income 
tax bases and rates . . . .”). The inability to achieve locational neutrality and savings (leisure) 
neutrality simultaneously in the absence of rate harmonization is well-established. See 
Graetz & Warren, supra note 18, at 1217 (framing their discussion in terms of capital import 
and export neutrality). 
137.  See, e.g., Case C-336/96, Gilly v. Directeur des Services Fiscaux du Bas-Rhin, 1998 E.C.R.  
I-2793, para. 34. 
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attempt by the court to impose both locational and leisure neutrality. Or, at 
least, if the court were trying to impose both neutrality benchmarks 
simultaneously, it would be entering, in Graetz and Warren’s terms, a 
“labyrinth of impossibility.”138 
The competitive neutrality construction of nondiscrimination offers a way 
out of this labyrinth. From a competitive neutrality perspective, there is 
nothing fundamentally incoherent about imposing nondiscrimination 
obligations at both source and residence. 
A tax system is competitively neutral when it is not possible to increase 
productivity by shifting jobs among people. In contrast with locational 
neutrality, which concerns the global allocation of workers across all 
jurisdictions, competitive neutrality concerns the matching of workers with 
jobs. States violate competitive neutrality when their tax systems distort which 
people occupy particular jobs. If the tax system causes one worker who is more 
productive in State X to work in State Y instead and causes another worker 
who is more productive in State Y to work in State X instead, the tax system 
violates competitive neutrality.139 
The principal insight of competitive neutrality for capital is that if 
productivity differs across capital owners, then removing tax distortions to 
ownership can increase welfare. Whereas outmoded theories conceived of 
foreign direct investment and the firms that engaged in it as mere conduits for 
net transfers of savings between states, modern economic theory emphasizes 
that multinational firms exist to exploit the advantages of common ownership 
of proprietary assets across different jurisdictions. For example, by investing in 
a jurisdiction directly through a controlled subsidiary, rather than dealing at 
arm’s length with local firms, multinational firms can exploit unique 
intangibles (such as patents, production processes, brands, and know-how) in 
the local jurisdiction without having to license or otherwise share the 
intangibles with local firms.140 That significant foreign direct investment by 
multinationals takes the form of acquisitions of local firms and assets (rather 
 
138.  Graetz & Warren, supra note 18, at 1243. 
139.  For example, if the effective tax rate on French residents working in France relative to the 
effective tax rate of French residents working in Germany is lower than the effective tax rate 
on German residents working in France relative to the effective tax rate of German residents 
working in Germany (taking into consideration both source and residence taxes), then taxes 
might allow a French resident to underbid a German resident for the job in France, even if 
the German resident is the better candidate. 
140.  For developments in the literature on foreign direct investment, see Desai & Hines, supra 
note 33, at 488-91. Other advantages of multinational firms include the opportunity to 
integrate local production into preexisting global production processes. Id. at 489. 
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than new investments) suggests that multinationals sometimes possess 
productivity advantages over local firms.141 If differences in ownership result in 
differences in productivity, then taxes that distort ownership reduce welfare.142 
The easiest way to conceive of competitive neutrality for capital is as a 
competition between taxpayers residing in different states to acquire a target 
asset. We adopt Professor Mitchell Kane’s formulation of competitive 
neutrality for capital, which states that competitive neutrality obtains when 
“the potential acquirer with the greatest productivity advantage will be able to 
offer the highest bid for the target.”143 This requires that an investor not face 
tax advantages or disadvantages in the acquisition of assets in a jurisdiction 
relative to competing investors in that jurisdiction. This logic carries over to 
labor because workers compete for jobs similarly to how investors compete for 
assets: investors bid up prices and down rates of return, whereas workers bid 
down wages. 
Both types of competition can be distorted by taxation. Just as competitive 
neutrality for capital obtains when it is not possible to increase productivity by 
shifting assets among owners, competitive neutrality for labor obtains when it 
is not possible to increase productivity by shifting jobs among people. 
Violations of competitive neutrality occur when states assess nonuniform 
source taxes or nonuniform residence taxes.144 Source taxes are nonuniform if 
 
141.  Id. at 490 (noting that the evidence on acquisitions also tends to negate the view that foreign 
direct investment represents merely transfers of net savings across jurisdictions). 
142.  The welfare gains from achieving competitive neutrality have not been estimated. In 
developing the capital ownership neutrality framework, Desai and Hines begin with the 
“extreme case in which the total stock of physical capital in each country is unaffected by 
international tax rules.” Id. at 494. They acknowledge that “[t]he welfare implications of 
[capital ownership neutrality] are less decisive in settings in which the location of plant, 
equipment, and other productive factors is mobile between countries in response to tax rate 
differences.” Id. at 495. Moreover, if achieved via source-only taxation, capital ownership 
neutrality would violate locational neutrality, “encourag[ing] excessive investment in low-
tax countries” resulting in potentially “substantial” welfare impacts. Id. at 495-96. Mitchell 
Kane challenges the notion that ownership distortions caused by methods of double tax 
relief justify adopting ownership neutrality as a normative benchmark. See Mitchell A. Kane, 
Ownership Neutrality, Ownership Distortions, and International Tax Welfare Benchmarks,  
26 VA. TAX REV. 53, 60-66 (2006). 
143.  Kane, supra note 142, at 59. 
144.  As explained supra Section II.C, residence taxes always violate leisure neutrality unless they 
are harmonized across all the states. In addition to violating competitive neutrality, 
nonuniform source taxes also violate locational neutrality, unless all states have adopted 
worldwide taxation with unlimited credits for source taxes. Nonuniform source taxes do not 
violate locational neutrality under such a system because the availability of unlimited foreign 
tax credits means that taxation at source has no impact on the cross-border worker’s overall 
tax burden. 
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they do not apply on the same basis to all workers in the jurisdiction, both 
residents and nonresidents. Residence taxes are nonuniform if they do not 
apply on the same basis to all residents, no matter where they earn their 
income. 
1. Source Taxes 
Consider nonuniform source taxes first. Suppose that in our hypothetical 
world consisting only of Germany and France, Germany assesses a 10% source 
tax only on French residents working in Germany. French residents working in 
Germany pay the tax, but no one else does, including German residents 
working in Germany. In Figure 4, we represent with light shading of Quadrant 
3 the work that is subject to German tax. Notice that, unlike in our prior 
examples, because this tax is nonuniform, it applies to only one quadrant, 
namely Quadrant 3. While this tax is highly stylized, real world examples of 
nonuniform source taxes abound. For example, when a state taxes nonresidents 
on their gross income while taxing residents on their net income, the state 
assesses nonuniform source taxes.145 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
145.  Since tax benefits are economically equivalent to negative taxes, a state could also be said to 
apply nonuniform source taxes when it grants a tax holiday to nonresident taxpayers but 
fails to make that holiday available to residents. This would be equivalent to a German 
source tax only on Quadrant 1.  
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Figure 4. 
source-tax-induced distortion of competition 
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Upper dark shaded region: French residents can underbid equally and (certain) more 
productive German residents for work in France. Since in our example, France is large 
compared to Germany, the distortion is smaller in France than in Germany. 
 
Lower dark shaded region: German residents can underbid equally and (certain) more 
productive French residents for work in Germany.  
 
 The nonuniform German source tax in our example causes a locational 
distortion. It causes some French residents to work in France, even if they 
could earn more in Germany before taxes. Specifically, under the 10% German 
source tax that applies only to French residents, unless a French resident can 
earn more than 111% in Germany of what she could earn in France, she will 
work in France to avoid the tax. Thus, some work done by French workers in 
Germany that can easily be shifted to France will move to France (e.g., the 
baking of croissants in German border towns). In Figure 4, we represent this 
distortion by enlarging Quadrant 4 relative to Quadrant 3; compared to the no-
tax world, fewer French residents work in Germany when they face German 
source taxation. 
But there is an additional distortion. Since German residents are not taxed, 
they will work wherever they earn the most. Thus, taxes distort French, but not 
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German, residents’ decisions about where to work, thereby distorting 
competition between French and German residents for jobs.146 Accordingly, 
some jobs previously performed by French residents in Germany will remain in 
Germany, but those jobs now will be performed by German residents rather 
than by French residents (e.g., waiting tables at French restaurants in German 
border towns). This impact is different from the locational distortion because 
instead of affecting the aggregate number of workers in Germany, it affects the 
composition of the workforce in Germany, skewing it in favor of German 
residents. We represent this distortion with the lower, dark-shaded region in 
Figure 4. In addition to giving German residents a competitive advantage over 
French residents in Germany, the nonuniform German source tax, which 
applies only to French residents working in France, also gives French residents 
a competitive advantage over German residents for work in France. Thus, in 
addition to skewing the workforce in Germany towards Germans, the 
nonuniform source tax also skews the workforce in France towards French 
residents. We represent this distortion with the upper dark-shaded region of 
Figure 4. This (two-directional) distortion of competitive neutrality means that 
the vertical line separating work performed by French and German residents is 
not continuous because workers with the same earning potential will work in 
different jurisdictions based on where they reside. 
2. Residence Taxes 
Now consider nonuniform residence taxes, which also distort competition 
for jobs. There are many real-world examples of nonuniform residence taxes. 
Such taxes may create a preference for foreign work. For example, for U.S. 
residents meeting certain statutory requirements, the United States exempts 
 
146.  Nonuniform source taxes also violate locational neutrality, unless the residence state 
implements worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits. For a numerical 
example, see supra note 120. 
Nonuniform source taxes also violate leisure neutrality. This can be seen in the current 
example because French residents face a different tradeoff between work and leisure than do 
German residents. German residents always retain 100% of their productivity-determined 
wage. In contrast, French residents working in Germany retain less than their productivity-
determined wage due to the source tax. This includes French residents who are between 
100% and 111% as productive in Germany as France and therefore work in France to avoid 
German source taxes. They earn ¤100 in France, but France does not tax. It also includes 
French residents whose productivity in Germany is more than 110% of their productivity in 
France. This latter group works in Germany but receives only 90% of their productivity-
determined wage due to German source taxes. Thus, whereas French residents face variable 
work-leisure tradeoffs, Germans always face the same tradeoff. This violates leisure 
neutrality. 
  
the yale law journal    
1058 
 
nearly $100,000 of their foreign-earned income.147 Other nonuniform 
residence taxes create a preference for domestic work.148 For example, the 
United States limits the foreign tax credit to the amount of tax that the United 
States would have assessed on the relevant income, and it restricts the credit in 
various other ways. 
We use another example to illustrate that nonuniform residence taxes 
violate competitive neutrality. Suppose Germany applies a 20% tax to German 
residents’ foreign-source income (but not to German residents’ domestic 
income). The only people who pay taxes in this system are German residents 
who work in France.149 This tax is nonuniform; Germany applies the tax to 
only one quadrant, namely Quadrant 2. In Figure 5, we represent the work 
performed by German residents in France that is subject to the tax with light 
shading. 
 
147.  I.R.C. §§ 911(a)(1) and (b)(2) allow for the exclusion of foreign income up to a statutorily 
established cap, which is indexed for inflation. A maximum of $92,900 was excludable in 
2011. See Foreign Earned Income Exclusion—Requirements, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/international/article/0,,id=96817,00.html (last 
updated Dec. 6, 2011). 
148.  For example, when enacted by low-tax states, exemption systems may preference residents’ 
domestic work over their foreign work. 
149.  Thus, nonuniform residence taxation violates leisure neutrality because German residents 
working in France keep 80% of what they earn whereas French residents working in France 
keep 100%. 
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Figure 5. 
residence-tax-induced distortion of competition 
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As in the last example, the nonunifom tax causes both a locational and a 
competitive distortion. It causes a locational distortion by discouraging some 
German residents from taking jobs in France, even if they would earn more 
there on a pre-tax basis. Specifically, German residents will choose to work in 
Germany as long as they can earn at least 80% in Germany of what they can 
earn in France before taxes. To the extent that it shifts jobs from France to 
Germany, the nonuniform residence tax causes a locational distortion. We 
represent this distortion in Figure 5 by enlarging Quadrant 1 relative to 
Quadrant 2. 
But the tax also causes a competitive distortion. Specifically, it causes some 
jobs in Germany to be occupied by Germans instead of French residents.150 In 
 
150.  The tax has another effect: German residents working in Germany will earn less after taxes 
than French residents earning the same before-tax wage. Whether German wages decline or 
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addition, the tax causes French residents to occupy some of the jobs in France 
vacated by departing Germans. We represent that two-directional distortion 
with the two dark shaded rectangles in Figure 5. In the current example, where 
German residents face a nonuniform 20% residence tax that applies only to 
income they earn in France, some German residents who have a comparative 
advantage for working in France will nevertheless work in Germany to avoid 
the tax.151 Because these German residents are willing to lower the wage they 
seek in Germany to avoid the nonuniform residence tax (which applies only to 
wages they earn in France), they may win jobs from French residents seeking 
to work in Germany, even in cases where the French residents have a 
comparative advantage for working in Germany over France. Thus, the result 
of the tax is that some German residents with a comparative advantage for 
working in France will work in Germany and some French residents with a 
comparative advantage for working in Germany will work in France. Thus, 
nonuniform residence taxation distorts the matching of workers to jobs 
because workers sort into jobs not solely according to productivity or earnings 
potential, but also according to residence. 
3. Maintaining Competitive Neutrality 
Taxes would not distort competition for jobs if all states had exactly the 
same tax base and rates. In the absence of global tax harmonization, however, 
there are two principal ways to prevent competitive distortions.152 First, all 
states could adopt worldwide taxation with unlimited credits for source taxes. 
Under worldwide taxation, each state sets its own tax rates. Source taxes 
become irrelevant to competition because they are effectively refunded by the 
residence state through the unlimited credit. Thus, only residence taxes matter, 
and states must apply their residence taxes uniformly to all their residents, no 
matter where those residents earn their income. Because competitive neutrality 
does not require tax rate harmonization, taxpayers residing in different states 
will earn different after-all-tax wages.153 Specifically, residents of high-tax 
 
French wages rise depends on the demand and supply of labor. Assuming Germany is a 
small state relative to France, German wages are likely to decline more than French wages 
rise. 
151.  Specifically, German residents whose productivity in Germany is between 80% and 100% of 
their productivity in France will work in Germany. 
152.  Forbidding source taxation entirely would also satisfy competitive neutrality, but since all 
states tax on a source basis, we do not consider this option. 
153.  Non-harmonized residence taxes distort leisure neutrality, since taxpayers residing in 
different states face different labor/leisure tradeoffs. 
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states will tend to earn less (after all taxes) than residents of low-tax states. 
However, such taxes will not distort competitive neutrality.154 
A concrete example will help illustrate this point and drive home the notion 
that it is comparative, not absolute, tax rates that matter for competitive 
neutrality. Suppose Françoise resides in France and Günther resides in 
Germany, and that they both compete for a job in each jurisdiction. Assume 
further that Françoise and Günther are equally productive working in France, 
but that Françoise is substantially more productive than Günther when 
working in Germany. Putting some numbers to these assumptions, let us say 
that Françoise and Günther both would produce €100 of output in France, that 
Günther would produce €100 in Germany, and that Françoise would produce 
€150 in Germany. Table 1 illustrates this. 
 
154.  Using the notation supra note 121, competitive neutrality requires that  
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  In a world with only two states, France and Germany, to prevent competitive tax distortions 
between two equally competitive German and French workers, the ratio of the French 
worker’s retention rate on work in France compared to her retention rate on work in 
Germany must be the same as the ratio of the German worker’s retention rate in France 
compared to his retention rate in Germany, i.e.,  
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  In terms of Figure 4, this means that 
 
Retention rate on Quadrant 4 Retention rate on Quadrant 2
Retention rate on Quadrant 3 
= 
Retention rate on Quadrant 1 
. 
  
 Notice that the equality of these ratios does not require that French and German 
workers pay the same effective marginal tax rate on work in France or Germany (i.e., the tax 
rate on Quadrant 2 need not equal the tax rate on Quadrant 4, and the tax rate on Quadrant 
1 need not equal the tax rate on Quadrant 3). Instead, what is required is that the ratios of 
the taxes they pay on work in those jurisdictions must be the same. See infra note 156 for a 
demonstration that worldwide taxation does not distort competitive neutrality. 
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Table 1. 
competitive neutrality in a no-tax world 
 
 JOB IN FRANCE JOB IN GERMANY 
 Françoise Günther Françoise Günther 
Gross Income and  
Take-home Pay 
100 100 150 100 
 
Under these circumstances, productive efficiency requires Françoise to 
work in Germany and Günther to work in France. Françoise should work in 
France because the ratio (1½) of her productivity in Germany (€150) to her 
productivity in France (€100) exceeds the ratio (1) of Günther’s productivity in 
Germany (€100) to his productivity in France (€100). Conversely, Günther 
should work in France because the ratio (1) of his productivity in France (€100) 
to his productivity in Germany (€100) exceeds the ratio (2/3) of Françoise’s 
productivity in France (€100) as compared to her productivity in Germany 
(€150). 
That the market will reach the productively efficient matching of workers 
to jobs can be seen by assuming that Françoise and Günther compete for jobs 
by offering to take less than the full value that they produce. When considering 
how much to bid for a job in Germany, both Françoise and Günther consider 
their alternative job opportunities in France. Since Günther can earn €100 if he 
takes a job in France, which is the full value of his output there, he will not be 
willing to accept less than €100 in Germany, which is the full value of his 
output in Germany. In contrast, because Françoise is more productive in 
Germany than in France, she can lower the wage she demands in Germany 
(relative to her productivity) and still come out ahead compared to if she works 
in France, where the maximum she can earn is €100 (the full value of her 
output in France). Specifically, Françoise will be willing to work for as little as 
€100 in Germany, even though she produces €150 there. Assuming that there 
are many Françoises and Günthers and that employers are not restricted to 
hiring a fixed number of employees, but rather are trying to produce a given 
output at least cost, then employers will select employees with the greatest 
relative difference between their wage and their output. Thus, because 
Françoise would be willing to accept as little as 2/3 of her total output in 
Germany as payment for her services for working there, Françoise will 
outcompete Günther for the job in Germany. In contrast, Günther, who 
requires payment equal to his full productivity in either state, will work in 
France. Because it results in Françoise working in Germany and Günther 
working in France, the no-tax world maintains competitive neutrality. 
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Now we show that the introduction of residence taxes with unlimited 
credits for foreign taxes likewise maintains competitive neutrality. Assume that 
both France and Germany implement worldwide taxation with unlimited 
foreign tax credits. Assume further that France taxes at 20% and Germany 
taxes at 50%. The following chart compares how much each worker would take 
home after taxes if each earned his or her productivity-determined wage in 
each state: 
 
Table 2. 
competitive neutrality under worldwide taxation 
 
  
job in france 
Uniform 20% 
worldwide taxation  
job in germany 
Uniform 50% 
worldwide taxation 
  Françoise Günther Françoise Günther 
a. Gross Income 100 100 150 100 
b. Source Tax (20) (20) (75) (50) 
c. Net Residence Tax/Refund
155
 0 
 
(30) 45 0 
 
d. Take-home Pay 80 50 120 50 
 
As residents of different states that have different tax rates, Françoise and 
Günther take home different amounts after payment of all taxes. However, 
because the ratio of their after-tax wages relative to each other are unchanged 
from the world without taxes, taxation has not distorted the competition 
between Françoise and Günther for jobs. Even after taxes, Françoise still earns 
50% more when she works in Germany than when she works in France, 
whereas Günther still earns the same amount no matter where he works. 
Although Françoise is taxed at a total tax rate of 20% whereas Günther is taxed 
at a total tax rate of 50%, the difference in tax liability does not translate into a 
change in the ratio of Françoise’s earnings in Germany relative to her earnings 
in France; nor does it translate into a change in the ratio of Günther’s earnings 
in Germany relative to his earnings in France. (Hence, it does not result in a 
change in the ratio of these two ratios.) Thus, in order to have a job in 
Germany rather than in France, Françoise still would be willing to accept a 
salary equal to only two-thirds of what she produces in Germany. In contrast, 
Günther still would require payment for all he produces in Germany (or 
 
155.   Taxes paid and cash outflows are negative numbers and are in parentheses; refunds and 
cash inflows are positive numbers and are not in parentheses. Our examples assume that the 
residence state provides unlimited credits for source taxes under worldwide taxation. 
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France). Thus, implementation of worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign 
tax credits maintains competitive neutrality even in the presence of national tax 
rate diversity. 
Expressed in the language of comparative advantage, although Françoise 
and Günther are taxed at different rates, the tax system does not affect 
comparative advantage because comparative advantage is based on the ratio of 
two ratios. Since universal adoption of worldwide taxation with unlimited 
foreign tax credits does not affect either ratio, it does not affect comparative 
advantage. It therefore follows that such a system maintains competitive 
neutrality.156 
The second way to achieve competitive neutrality would be for all states to 
enact what we call “ideal deduction” or the “ideal deduction method” of double 
tax relief, one instantiation of which is exemption. Under this method, taxes on 
cross-border income would consist of two stages. The first stage would consist 
of uniform source taxes. That is, each state would apply its source tax regime 
on the same basis to both nonresidents and residents who work in its territory. 
In the second stage, states would tax the worldwide income of their residents, 
but first-stage taxes (i.e., source taxes, including domestic source taxes) would 
be deductible from income taxable at residence. Thus, under the ideal 
deduction method, states would tax their own residents on two jurisdictional 
predicates: source and residence.157 Under ideal deduction, states need not 
 
156.  In the absence of taxes, Françoise has a comparative advantage in Germany because her 
productivity-determined wage in Germany (¤150) relative to France (¤100) as compared to 
Günther’s productivity-determined wage in Germany (¤100) relative to France (¤100) is 
3/2. Conversely, Günther has a comparative advantage in France because Günther’s 
productivity-determined wage in France (¤100) relative to Germany (¤100) as compared to 
Françoise’s productivity-determined wage in France (¤100) relative to Germany (¤150) is 
3/2. Introduce uniform worldwide taxation at 20% in France and at 50% in Germany. 
Françoise still has a comparative advantage in Germany because her productivity-
determined wage in Germany (¤120) relative to France (¤80) as compared to Günther’s 
productivity-determined wage in Germany (¤50) relative to France (¤50) is 3/2 as in the 
example without taxes. Conversely, Günther’s productivity-determined wage in France 
(¤50) relative to Germany (¤50) as compared to Françoise’s productivity-determined wage 
in France (¤80) relative to Germany (¤120) is 3/2 again, as in the example without taxes. It, 
therefore, follows that uniform taxation does not distort competitive neutrality because 
none of the ratios expressing comparative advantage (3/2) changes upon the introduction of 
the tax. 
157.  Although the tax method contemplated here might seem unfamiliar, it resembles the way 
corporate profits are generally taxed. Many states tax active (corporate) income on a source 
basis and also tax passive (personal investment) income on a residence basis. It also 
resembles the way states provide personal tax benefits in the context of an income tax. States 
often tax income on a source basis and grant tax benefits on a residence basis. 
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adopt the same tax rates as each other; that is, they need not harmonize their 
tax rates. However, each state must apply its own taxes uniformly. 
A small adjustment in the example will show that ideal deduction does not 
distort competition.158 Again assume Françoise resides in France where both 
source taxes and residence taxes are 20%, and Günther resides in Germany 
where both source and residence taxes are 50%. Because German-source 
income is taxed at 50%, whereas French-source income is taxed at only 20%, in 
equilibrium jobs in Germany will pay more than jobs in France so that, 
regardless of their residence, workers will earn the same amount after payment 
of source taxes. For example, if a French job pays €100, then the equivalent job 
in Germany will pay €160.159 Thus, in equilibrium, the after-source-tax wage in 
each jurisdiction will be the same, namely €80. 
For this example, we maintain our assumption that Françoise and Günther 
are equally productive when they work in France, and we assume that they 
would both earn €100 (before tax) for work there. When they work in 
Germany, however, since in equilibrium wages are 60% higher in Germany 
than in France to compensate for higher German source taxes, both Françoise 
and Günther will earn more in Germany than in France.160 Since we continue 
to assume for this example that Françoise is 50% more productive than 
Günther when they both work in Germany, Günther will earn €160 if he works 
in Germany and Françoise will earn €240 if she works in Germany. If both 
states implement ideal deduction, which requires residence states to allow 
deductions for source state taxes, the following chart shows that competitive 
neutrality is maintained. 161 
 
158.  Under this system, because each state assesses the same source taxes against resident and 
nonresident workers, before-tax wages will differ across states by the difference in source 
taxes. And because states assess different residence taxes, after-tax wages also will differ for 
residents of different states by the difference in residence taxes. Thus, taxpayers from high-
tax states will tend to earn less (after all taxes) than residents from low-tax states. However, 
as long as each state assesses residence taxes at the same rate on all its residents (whether 
they have foreign or domestic income), then such taxes will not violate competitive 
neutrality. 
159.  Given the salary in France (¤100), the salary in Germany is calculated as follows:  
¤160 = ¤100 x (1-20%) / (1-50%). 
160.  The higher German taxes will drive jobs to France. Only those positions in which workers 
are productive enough to cover the additional German source taxes will remain in Germany. 
161.  The simplest version of ideal deduction is an exemption system. If the example in the text 
were changed so that France and Germany employed exemption, the tax rate in the second 
stage would be zero, which effectively eliminates the second stage. The taxpayers’ take-
home pay would be as follows: 
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Table 3. 
competitive neutrality under ideal deduction 
  
  
job in france 
Uniform 20% source 
and residence taxes 
job in germany 
Uniform 50% source 
and residence taxes 
  Françoise Günther Françoise Günther 
a. Gross Income 100 100 240 160 
b. Source Tax (20) (20) (120) (80) 
c. Residence Income 80 80 120 80 
d. Residence Tax
162
 (16) (40) (24) (40) 
e. Take-home Pay 64 40 96 40 
 
As in the example with worldwide taxation, Françoise and Günther earn 
different after-all-tax wages and pay taxes at different total rates. Even so, 
taxation will not affect the matching of workers with jobs. Günther will 
continue to work in France, and Françoise will continue to work in Germany. 
As in the prior examples, Günther is not willing to accept less than the full 
value of what he produces in order to take a job in Germany, whereas Françoise 
is willing to take a one-third discount. Thus, as with worldwide taxation, 
 
 
 Table A. 
 competitive neutrality under exemption 
 
  job in france 
Uniform 20% source tax, 
no residence tax 
job in germany 
Uniform 50% source tax, 
no residence tax 
  Françoise Günther Françoise Günther 
a. Gross Income 100 100 240 160 
b. Source Tax (20) (20) (120) (80) 
c. Residence Tax N/A N/A N/A N/A 
      
d. Take-home Pay 80 80 120 80 
 
  When all the states employ exemption, no worker has a tax-induced advantage or 
disadvantage compared to any other for work in any particular jurisdiction. Thus, 
exemption maintains competitive neutrality. 
162.  Under ideal deduction, workers are subject to tax on their worldwide income at their 
residence state’s rate, but source taxes (including domestic source taxes) are deductible from 
taxable income. 
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implementation of the ideal deduction method maintains competitive 
neutrality even in the presence of national tax rate diversity.163 
 
163.  Using a numerical example, we argued in the text that universal adoption of either 
worldwide taxation or the ideal deduction method will not compromise competitive 
neutrality. In this footnote, we provide a more general example for the two-worker and two-
state example. Denote the productivity of a worker in any quadrant by P with a subscript to 
indicate the quadrant. Thus, P1 represents the productivity of a German worker in Germany, 
P2 represents the productivity of a German worker in France, P3 represents the productivity 
of a French worker in Germany, and P4 represents the productivity of a French worker in 
France. 
If (P2/P1) / (P4/P3) > 1, then the German resident has a comparative advantage in France 
(and the French resident has a comparative advantage in Germany), but if (P4/P3)/ (P2/P1) 
> 1, then the French resident has a comparative advantage in France (and the German 
resident has a comparative advantage in Germany). Note that it is not possible to have a 
comparative advantage in both states. 
Denote the total tax rate in any quadrant by t with a subscript for the quadrant number. 
It follows that the tax system does not affect comparative advantage and so does not 
compromise competitive neutrality if: 
                          
        Equation (1)                                                   
(1-t2)P2  
______  
(1-t1)P1   
P2 
___ 
P1 
(1-t4)P4 
______  
(1-t3)P3   
= 
P4 
___ 
P3 
 
   Because the fraction for comparative advantage is on both sides of the equation, it can 
be eliminated from both sides of the equation. After rearranging terms, this yields: 
 
        Equation (2)                                                    
1-t2 1-t4   
1-t1    
= 
1-t3   
,
 
  which is the requirement for a tax system not to distort competitive neutrality. 
If all states adopt worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits, then a taxpayer 
pays the same tax rate wherever that taxpayer works, although taxpayers resident in 
different states might pay tax at different rates. This implies that the left and right sides of 
equation 2 both equal 1. Since worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits satisfies 
equation 2 (i.e., the two sides of the equation are equal), it thus follows that worldwide 
taxation does not distort competitive neutrality. 
The derivation is slightly more complicated when all states use the ideal deduction 
method. More notation is needed because both source and residence taxation affects the 
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We offer one final numerical example to show that adoption by all states of 
the same method for taxing cross-border income (i.e., all states enact 
worldwide taxation or all states enact ideal deduction) is not enough to achieve 
competitive neutrality. Rather, competitive neutrality also requires states to 
implement uniform taxes. For example, assume that both France and Germany 
still implement ideal deduction and that France assesses uniform source and 
residence taxes. Specifically, France assesses uniform 20% source taxes on all 
workers in France, no matter where they reside. France also assesses uniform 
20% residence taxes on French residents’ income, no matter where earned.164 
Although Germany assesses uniform 20% source taxes, its residence taxes are 
nonuniform. Germany imposes a 10% tax on the income earned by German 
residents working in Germany, but it taxes income earned by Germans abroad 
at 50%. Table 4 shows that even though both states adopt ideal deduction, 
 
taxpayer’s final liability. Let subscripts and superscripts G denote Germany and F denote 
France. Let a subscript denote a residence tax and a superscript denote a source tax. Thus, 
for example, with the ideal deduction method, the after-tax income of a French resident who 
earns €1 in Germany (Quadrant 3) is €1(1-tF)(1-t
G
). Thus, substituting the French and 
German taxes into the condition for competitive neutrality given by Equation (2), that 
condition can be rewritten as: 
 
    Equation (3)                                        
(1-tG)(1-t
F
) (1-tF)(1-t
F
) 
(1-tG)(1-t
G
) 
= 
(1-tF)(1-t
G
) 
 
   Simplifying Equation (3) by dropping the expression (1-tG) from the left side of the 
equation because it appears in both the numerator and the denominator and by dropping 
the expression (1-tF) from the right side of the equation for the same reason, we are left with 
just the source taxes, which is equivalent to universal adoption of the exemption method: 
  
   Equation (4)                           (1-t
F
)/(1-tG) = (1-tF)/(1-tG)                                                    
 
   Equation (4) is obviously true. Thus, the ideal deduction method achieves competitive 
neutrality because it also does not distort comparative advantage. 
164.  Note that although for the sake of simplicity we set the German and French source tax rates 
to be the same, that assumption is not necessary for the results. Likewise, although we set 
the French source tax rate to be the same as the French residence tax rate in this example (as 
well as in other examples in this Section), “uniformity,” as we use the term throughout this 
Article, does not require a state to adopt the same tax rate for source and residence taxes. 
Rather, uniformity for source taxation means that source taxes are imposed at the same rate 
and upon the same base for both resident and nonresident workers. Uniformity for 
residence taxes means that both foreign and domestic income is taxed at the same rate and 
upon the same base. 
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competitive neutrality nevertheless is lost when the German tax system is not 
uniform.165 
 
Table 4. 
nonuniform residence taxation violates competitive neutrality 
  
  
job in france 
Uniform 20% source 
and residence taxes 
job in germany 
Uniform 20% source tax, 
nonuniform (10%, 50%) 
residence tax 
  Françoise Günther Françoise Günther 
a. Gross Income 100 100 150 100 
b. Source Tax (20) (20) (30) (20) 
c. Residence Income 80 80 120 80 
d. Residence Tax (16) (40) (24) (8) 
e. Take-home Pay 64 40 96 72 
 
As Table 4 illustrates, although Françoise earns more after all taxes than 
does Günther regardless of where they work, Günther now has an advantage in 
the competition to secure a job in Germany. As in the prior examples, Françoise 
is willing to accept as little as 67% (i.e., €64/€96) of her productivity-
determined wage in Germany to secure a job in Germany rather than a job in 
France at which she would be less productive.166 However, because Günther 
faces a much lower residence tax when he works in Germany than when he 
works in France, Günther is willing to accept as little as 56% (i.e., €40/€72) of 
his productivity-determined wage in Germany in order to secure the job in 
Germany rather than the job in France that would subject him to high German 
residence taxation. Because employers will hire the worker with the largest 
relative difference between productivity and wage, employers in Germany will 
prefer to hire Günther, who demands in wages only 56% of what his 
productivity-determined wage would be, than to hire Françoise, who demands 
 
165.  That competitive neutrality requires uniform source taxation is an important point that has 
been missed in the literature on capital ownership neutrality. See, e.g., Desai & Hines, supra 
note 33, at 494-99 (describing global adoption of exemption as achieving competitive 
neutrality for capital without noting that source taxes also must be uniform). Although 
states may assess source taxes that differ from the source taxes applied by other states, to 
maintain competitive neutrality, each state must apply its own source taxes uniformly to all 
workers within its jurisdiction, regardless of workers’ residence. 
166.  By “productivity-determined wage” we mean the value of marginal product (i.e., the value 
of the marginal output of the factor at issue (labor)). See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES 
OF ECONOMICS 380 (6th ed. 2008) (explaining that a profit-maximizing firm will hire 
workers up to the point where the value of marginal product equals the wage). 
  
the yale law journal    
1070 
 
in wages 67% of what her productivity-determined wage would be. In spite of 
Günther’s lower absolute productivity in Germany (compared to Françoise) 
and his lower relative productivity in Germany than in France (compared to 
Françoise’s relative productivity), nonuniform taxation results in Günther 
being able to outbid Françoise for the job in Germany. 
At the same time, Germany’s nonuniform residence taxation gives 
Françoise a competitive advantage over Günther for the job in France, even 
though she is no more productive than Günther there. Compared with 
working in Germany, Françoise will demand in France a smaller portion of her 
productivity-determined wage (i.e., €96/€64), than will Günther (i.e., 
€72/€40).167 Thus, Françoise will outbid Günther for the job in France. As the 
example illustrates, the reason why the nonuniform tax distorts competitive 
neutrality is because it affects comparative advantage—the ratio of Françoise’s 
earnings in France to her earnings in Germany as compared to the ratio of 
Günther’s earnings in France to his earnings in Germany. In the example, the 
nonuniform German residence tax raises the ratio of Günther’s earnings in 
Germany to his earnings in France, thereby tilting Günther’s comparative 
advantage towards Germany and hence Françoise’s towards France. Similar 
analysis would show that nonuniform source taxation also violates competitive 
neutrality. These results are consistent with the ECJ’s case law, in which the 
court has held that the nondiscrimination principle neither requires residents 
and nonresidents to be taxed at the same tax rate,168 nor requires foreign-
source income to be taxed at the same rate as domestic income.169 
We take the opportunity here to clarify a difference between locational 
neutrality and competitive neutrality. In contrast to competitive neutrality, 
locational neutrality represents a distortion that encourages movement in only 
one direction. In a world with two states and no taxes, if State X violates 
locational neutrality by imposing a source tax, then the source tax will 
encourage workers in State X to give up work in State X for work in State Y. 
However, the tax does not encourage other workers to give up work in State Y 
for work in State X. More generally, the source tax in State X does not create a 
 
167.  For example, assume that Günther outbids Françoise for the job in Germany by accepting a 
shade under 2/3 of his productivity-determined wage. Thus, Günther will earn ¤66.67, pay 
¤13.33 in source tax to Germany, and pay ¤5.33 in residence tax to Germany, leaving him 
with ¤48. To match these after-tax earnings in France, Günther would require 120% of his 
productivity-determined wage (¤48/¤40) in France. In contrast, Françoise requires only 
100% of her productivity-determined wage (¤64/¤64) to work in France. As a result, 
Françoise can outcompete Günther in France. 
168.  See supra note 57. 
169.  See supra notes 58-59. 
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situation where welfare can be improved by shifting a worker in State Y to 
State X and vice versa. Unlike locational neutrality, which concerns movements 
of workers in only one direction (away from the state assessing the tax), 
competitive neutrality concerns distortions that encourage movement in two 
directions—both into and out of the taxing state. The example we just gave of 
the nonuniform German residence tax caused distortions in two directions: it 
enabled Günther to outbid Françoise for work in Germany (despite Françoise’s 
higher productivity than Günther in Germany) and it also enabled Françoise to 
outbid Günther for work in France (despite the two workers’ equal 
productivity there, and despite the fact that Françoise would be less productive 
in France than in Germany). Stated more generally, if in a world without taxes 
State X imposes a tax that violates competitive neutrality, then the tax will 
induce some workers to shift from State X to State Y and other workers to 
move in the opposite direction, from State Y to State X. If the tax violates 
competitive neutrality, then it is possible to increase welfare by shifting a 
worker from State X to State Y and another worker from State Y to State X.  
Furthermore, as the above examples with Françoise and Günther 
demonstrate, in order to attain competitive neutrality it is not necessary for a 
state to tax its own residents and foreign residents earning income in its 
territory at the same total tax rate. For example, in Table 3 above, France taxed 
French residents working in France at 36%, while it taxed German residents 
working in France at only 20%. As we showed, this scheme did not violate 
competitive neutrality. Nor is it necessary for a state to tax residents earning 
income at home at the same total tax rate as residents earning income abroad. 
In Table A above, when Françoise worked in France, her effective tax rate was 
20%, whereas when she worked in Germany, her effective tax rate was 50%. 
We showed that these differences did not affect the competition between 
Françoise and Günther for jobs, and they did not compromise competitive 
neutrality. 
While the foregoing discussion of competitive neutrality has been complex, 
it reduces to straightforward guidelines for identifying taxes that violate 
competitive neutrality. Simply put, uniform taxes promote competitive 
neutrality,170 whereas nonuniform taxes distort competitive neutrality.171 That 
 
170.  We developed our argument that uniform source taxes do not violate competitive neutrality 
under the assumption that residence is fixed. If we were to relax that assumption by 
assuming that some people could freely change their residence, it would still be the case that 
uniform source and residence taxes would not distort competitive neutrality. In terms of the 
example, if residents could freely elect their residence, they would choose France over 
Germany because of its lower residence taxes. Taxes would affect choice of residence, but 
once residence was selected they would not affect job choice. Alternatively, if we assumed 
that residence followed where one worked, then higher residence taxes in Germany would 
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means that any tax that does not fall equally on two adjacent quadrants of 
Figure 1 distorts competitive neutrality. For example, a tax only on German 
workers in Germany (Germany taxes only Quadrant 1)172 distorts competition 
because it encourages German workers to work in France and French workers 
to work in Germany.173 
E. Simple Guidelines for Tax Neutrality 
Interpreting the tax nondiscrimination principle to require any of 
locational, leisure, or competitive neutrality would produce simple guidelines 
for resolving cases. In this Section, we briefly summarize those guidelines 
under the assumptions that states will not harmonize their tax rates and bases, 
and that states will not forego source taxation. 
We begin with the guidelines for implementing locational neutrality. 
Although each state may set its own tax rates, all states must enact worldwide 
taxation with unlimited credits for source taxes. Such worldwide taxation 
constitutes what we have been calling a “uniform residence tax” because it 
applies on the same basis to all of a state’s residents, no matter where they earn 
their income. Locational neutrality permits the assessment of source taxes in 
addition to residence taxes, and because any locational distortions introduced 
at source will be effectively negated at residence by the availability of unlimited 
 
make Germany a less desirable state in which to work and so German wages would have to 
rise relative to French wages. However, as long as states had uniform source and residence 
taxes, competitive neutrality would not be compromised. Under uniform source and 
residence taxes, the only way there could be a distortion to competitive neutrality is if there 
were a threshold amount of work above which a nonresident worker would be considered to 
be a resident of the source state (and, presumably, not of the former residence state). In 
such circumstances, nonresidents might avoid exceeding the work threshold in high-tax 
jurisdictions in order to avoid becoming residents there. As far as we know, no jurisdiction 
imposes such an explicit threshold rule. However, physical presence rules, which are 
common, will have the same effect for many workers who need to live close to their jobs. 
171.  Uniform residence taxes maintain both competitive neutrality and locational neutrality. 
Uniform source taxes maintain both competitive neutrality and leisure neutrality. Although 
nonuniform source taxes violate competitive neutrality, the violation can be cured via global 
adoption of worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits. Thus, whether a 
nonuniform source tax violates competitive neutrality depends on the method of double tax 
relief adopted by the states. 
172.  Such a tax could be enacted by Germany as either a nonuniform source tax or a nonuniform 
residence tax. 
173.  In cases, such as user fees, where the “tax” is not a tax, but rather a payment for services 
received where the tax (cost) equals the value received, there is no distortion. 
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foreign tax credits, locational neutrality contains no tax proscriptions for source 
states. In other words, locational neutrality permits all manner of source taxes. 
The second benchmark is leisure neutrality. Under leisure neutrality, no 
state may tax on a residence basis (assuming residence taxes are not 
harmonized). In addition to forbidding residence taxation, leisure neutrality 
requires all states to assess only what we have been calling “uniform source 
taxes,” meaning that although each state can choose its source tax rates and 
base, those rates and base must apply on the same basis to all workers within 
the source jurisdiction, no matter where those workers reside. 
Finally, to maintain competitive neutrality, states may assess taxes on either 
a residence-basis, a source-basis, or on both bases. Whether competitive 
neutrality requires source uniformity depends on how states achieve 
competitive neutrality. If states achieve competitive neutrality via ideal 
deduction, then source taxation must be uniform. In contrast, if states achieve 
competitive neutrality by adopting worldwide taxation with unlimited credits 
for source taxes, then any manner of source taxation would be permitted, since 
the unlimited foreign tax credit at residence would make source taxes irrelevant 
to competition. In either case, if states assess residence taxes, then such taxes 
must be uniform, meaning that, although states are free to set their own 
residence tax rates, each state must apply its residence taxes the same way to all 
its residents, no matter where they earn their income. The following table 
summarizes these prescriptions for tax neutrality: 
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Table 5. 
prescriptions for tax neutrality 
 
COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY  LOCATIONAL 
NEUTRALITY 
LEISURE 
NEUTRALITY VIA WORLDWIDE 
TAXATION 
VIA IDEAL 
DEDUCTION  
SOURCE 
TAXES 
Permitted without 
restriction 
Permits only 
uniform 
source taxes 
Permitted without 
restriction 
Permits only 
uniform source 
taxes 
RESIDENCE 
TAXES 
Permits only 
uniform residence 
taxation, 
specifically 
worldwide taxation 
with unlimited 
foreign tax credits 
Not 
Permitted 
Permits only 
uniform residence 
taxation, 
specifically 
worldwide 
taxation with 
unlimited foreign 
tax credits  
Permits only 
uniform 
residence taxation 
with deductions 
for source 
taxes
174
 
 
Note that although the prescriptions of locational neutrality are 
incompatible with those of leisure neutrality, competitive neutrality can be 
achieved simultaneously with either locational neutrality or leisure neutrality, 
but not both (unless tax rates and bases are harmonized). Adoption by all 
states of worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits would achieve 
both locational and competitive neutrality. In contrast, adoption by all states of 
one particular form of the ideal deduction method, namely exemption, would 
achieve both leisure neutrality and competitive neutrality. 
F. Limits on Judicial Authority To Impose Tax Neutrality 
This Section explains that although courts generally lack the authority to 
do all that would be necessary to fully achieve any of the tax neutrality 
benchmarks, they can, without exceeding their institutional competence, help 
advance any of the alternative benchmarks by interpreting the 
nondiscrimination principle to require uniform taxation. 
As is clear from our discussion so far and from Table 5 above, achieving any 
of the neutrality benchmarks requires significant international coordination in 
the selection of a method for alleviating the double tax on foreign income. 
 
174.  The deduction method includes exemption systems, in which there is no residence taxation 
(i.e., the second stage, or residence, tax rate is zero), and therefore deductions for source 
taxes have no effect. It also includes tax systems in which the residence tax rate is effectively 
negative because, for example, the residence state grants refundable tax benefits on a 
residence basis.  
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Specifically, locational neutrality requires all states to adopt uniform worldwide 
taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits. Conversely, leisure neutrality 
requires all states to exempt foreign-source income and impose only uniform 
source taxation. Although competitive neutrality is consistent with both 
methods of alleviating double taxation, all states must agree on one or the 
other method. That is to say, the tax system will not be competitively neutral if 
some states enact worldwide taxation (with unlimited foreign tax credits) 
while other states enact exemption. Instead, to achieve competitive neutrality, 
all states must either converge on worldwide taxation with an unlimited 
foreign tax credit or converge on the ideal deduction method, which includes 
exemption. Thus, full achievement of any of the benchmarks by the EU 
member states requires all states to adopt the same method for taxing cross-
border income. 
But, as the ECJ itself has acknowledged, the ECJ lacks the institutional 
competence to impose upon the member states a specific method for taxing 
cross-border income.175 That is, the ECJ cannot require states to implement 
worldwide taxation, or any particular form of the ideal deduction method, 
including exemption. Likewise, it is unlikely that any national court in an EU 
member state possesses the authority to choose its state’s method for taxing 
cross-border income. Instead, the choice of how to tax cross-border income is a 
legislative question. 
Since full achievement of any of the neutrality benchmarks requires states 
to coordinate their methods for taxing cross-border income, full 
implementation of any of the tax neutrality benchmarks we have discussed 
requires legislative harmonization. This could be done at the national level by 
coordinated efforts of the individual EU member states or at the EU level 
under the authority of Article 115 of the TFEU.176 Thus, one of the policy 
recommendations that arises from our analysis is that if states desire to fully 
achieve any of the conceptions of tax neutrality advanced in this Article, they 
do not have to harmonize their tax rates, but they must harmonize their 
 
175.  See, e.g., Case C-513/04, Kerckhaert & Morres v. Belgium, 2006 E.C.R. I-10967, para. 22 
(noting that EU law “does not lay down any general criteria for the attribution of areas of 
competence between the Member States in relation to the elimination of double taxation 
within the Community”); Case C-336/96, Gilly v. Directeur des Services Fiscaux du Bas-
Rhin, 1998 E.C.R. I-2793, para. 24 (“The Member States are competent to determine the 
criteria for taxation on income and wealth with a view to eliminating double taxation . . . .”). 
176.  See TFEU, supra note 45, art. 115 (“[T]he Council shall, acting unanimously in accordance 
with a special legislative procedure and after consulting the European Parliament and the 
Economic and Social Committee, issue directives for the approximation of such laws, 
regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States as directly affect the 
establishment or functioning of the internal market.”). 
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methods of taxing cross-border income. Since most of the EU member states 
already employ exemption systems, EU-wide adoption of the ideal deduction 
method (of which exemption is one instantiation) probably represents the 
easiest path to harmonization. 
In light of the need for legislative harmonization to fully achieve any of the 
neutrality benchmarks, it is reasonable to ask what courts can do to advance tax 
neutrality without exceeding their institutional authority. Our answer is that 
courts can advance tax neutrality goals by interpreting the nondiscrimination 
principle to require fidelity to the uniformity requirement specified by the 
relevant neutrality benchmark. Later, we will show that this approach finds a 
striking analogy in the tax discrimination jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme 
Court under the dormant Commerce Clause.177 
Thus, to promote locational neutrality, courts would interpret the 
nondiscrimination principle to require uniform residence taxes. This would 
mean that courts would strike down a state law that, for example, taxed 
foreign-source income more harshly than domestic income. In contrast, to 
promote leisure neutrality, courts would interpret the nondiscrimination 
principle to require uniform source taxes. This would mean that courts would 
strike down a state law that, for example, taxed nonresidents more harshly 
than residents for work performed in its jurisdiction. Finally, to promote 
competitive neutrality, courts would interpret the nondiscrimination principle 
to require both uniform residence taxes and uniform source taxes. It bears 
emphasizing that the uniformity requirements do not amount to rate 
harmonization requirements. Each state may set its own tax rates. Source 
uniformity requires only that the state apply the same source tax regime to all 
workers within its jurisdiction (no matter where they reside), and residence 
uniformity requires only that the state apply the same residence tax regime to 
all its residents (no matter where they earn their income). As we show in the 
next Section, any of these alternative standards would be easy for courts to 
apply. 
G. Resolving Cases Using the Benchmarks 
This Section applies each of the three neutrality benchmarks to the ECJ 
labor tax cases we presented in Part I to show that interpreting the 
 
177.  See infra Part IV for a discussion of the internal consistency test applied by the U.S. 
Supreme Court to evaluate whether state apportionment formulas violate the 
nondiscrimination principle of the dormant Commerce Clause. 
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nondiscrimination principle to require any of locational, leisure, or competitive 
neutrality would provide simple rules for resolving even such difficult cases. 
We first revisit Schumacker, the case brought against a source state. Recall 
that Schumacker was a Belgian resident working in Germany who argued that 
Germany discriminated against him by denying him the personal tax benefits 
that it granted to German residents, including marital income splitting and 
deductions for family expenses. 
Germany’s decision to exclude nonresident workers from tax benefits it 
granted to resident workers did not violate locational neutrality, simply 
because locational neutrality is not concerned with how source states tax. This 
point bears emphasizing: under locational neutrality, states impose worldwide 
taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits to ensure that residents pay the 
same taxes on their worldwide income, no matter where it is earned.178 With 
unlimited foreign tax credits, taxation by the source state has no impact on 
locational neutrality, so there would be no obligations concerning how source 
states may tax.179 
In terms of Figure 6 below, locational neutrality requires Germany to assess 
uniform residence taxes on Quadrants 1 and 2, but it says nothing about how 
Germany should tax Quadrant 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
178.  Worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits is the only way to achieve locational 
neutrality while allowing both source taxation and unharmonized tax rates. 
179.  Cf. Green, supra note 114, at 128 (noting that as long as the residence state makes the 
taxpayer whole by fully crediting source taxes, there should be no locational distortions 
from differentially applying source taxes); Warren, supra note 4, at 160 (same). Obliging 
source states to tax nonresidents the same as residents, however, likely would make 
maintenance of locational neutrality cheaper for residence states that must credit source 
taxes without limitation. 
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Figure 6. 
requirements to maintain locational neutrality 
 
Works in 
Other EU 
Member 
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2 4 
Works in 
Germany 
1 3 
 
German residence tax on 
Quadrant 1 must be the same 
as the 
German residence tax on 
Quadrant 2. 
 
 
 German 
Resident 
Other EU 
Resident 
 
 
Interpreting nondiscrimination to require locational neutrality would 
greatly simplify resolution of tax cases: all cases against source states would be 
dismissed because they all concern how states tax Quadrant 3 compared to how 
they tax Quadrant 1. 
Since Schumacker involved German source taxes on other EU residents (i.e., 
German taxes on workers in Quadrant 3), it would be dismissed under a 
locational neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination. Instead, under 
locational neutrality the focus of nondiscrimination cases would be on 
residence taxes, and residence taxes would have to be uniform. Thus, under a 
locational neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination, we would conclude 
that Schumacker sued the wrong member state. Instead of suing Germany for 
failing to treat him the same as competing resident workers, he should have 
sued his own residence state, Belgium, for failing to provide him the same 
personal tax benefits (in refundable form, if necessary) provided to residents 
with only domestic income.180 Consistent with locational neutrality, the 
provision of personal tax benefits—including family deductions, personal 
exemptions, and progressive taxation—at residence would prevent national 
differences in tax benefits and tax rates from distorting workers’ decisions 
about whether to work at home or abroad. 
 
180.  In other words, the violation of locational neutrality in Schumacker stemmed from the failure 
of Belgium to apply the same residence taxes to Quadrants 1 and 2. If it instead had a 
locationally neutral tax system characterized by worldwide taxation with unlimited credits 
for foreign taxes, then Schumacker would have been able to collect personal tax benefits at 
home on the same basis as fellow residents with only domestic income. 
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Resolution of tax discrimination cases under leisure neutrality would be 
equally straightforward. Under leisure neutrality, residence taxes are 
forbidden, and a state’s source taxes must be uniform—they must apply the 
same way to residents and nonresidents working in the same jurisdiction. In 
terms of Figure 7 below, Germany would be prohibited from taxing Quadrant 
2, and it would be required to tax Quadrants 1 and 3 the same. 
 
Figure 7. 
requirements to maintain leisure neutrality 
  
Works in 
Other EU 
Member State 
 
2 
 
4 
Works in 
Germany 
1 3 
 
Germany must not tax  
Quadrant 2, and the 
German tax on Quadrant 3 
 must be the same as the 
German tax on Quadrant 1. 
 German 
Resident 
Other EU 
Resident  
 
In Schumacker, by denying nonresidents the same personal tax benefits that 
it granted to residents, Germany violated the source tax uniformity 
requirement. In other words, it assessed different taxes on Quadrants 1 and 3. 
As a result, Germany violated leisure neutrality. 
To resolve Schumacker under a competitive neutrality construction of 
nondiscrimination, we need more information about the German tax system. 
Recall that Germany can, without violating competitive neutrality, assess 
uniform source taxes or uniform residence taxes or both.181 In terms of Figure 8 
below, any German source taxes must treat Quadrants 1 and 3 the same, and 
any German residence taxes must treat Quadrants 1 and 2 the same. 
 
 
181.  To be consistent with competitive neutrality, imposition of both source and residence taxes 
would require the state to use either the ideal deduction method (in which source taxes 
apply uniformly to both residents and nonresidents and are deductible from the worldwide 
income of residents) or worldwide taxation (in which source taxes apply uniformly and the 
residence state grants unlimited foreign tax credits). For a numerical example, see infra note 
249. 
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Figure 8. 
requirements to maintain competitive neutrality 
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We know from the facts of Schumacker that Germany did not confer 
personal tax benefits on a uniform source basis to all workers in Germany. 
Does this mean that Germany put nonresident workers at a competitive 
disadvantage compared to resident workers? Not necessarily, because Germany 
could have offered those benefits on a uniform residence basis, which would 
allow exclusion of nonresident taxpayers without violating competitive 
neutrality. Germany would comply with the requirement to offer tax benefits 
on a uniform residence basis if it offered the same tax benefits to all its 
residents, regardless of where they earned their income.183 In terms of Figure 8, 
Germany would not violate competitive neutrality as long as it distributed the 
benefits on a uniform residence basis to all taxpayers in Quadrants 1 and 2, 
notwithstanding that it denied such benefits to taxpayers in Quadrant 3. Thus, 
to resolve Schumacker under a competitive neutrality interpretation of 
nondiscrimination, we need to know how Germany taxed Quadrant 2, that is, 
how it taxed German-resident taxpayers earning income abroad. 
 
182.  While competitive neutrality requires the German source tax on Quadrants 1 and 3 to be the 
same, and it requires the German residence tax on Quadrants 1 and 2 to be the same, it does 
not, for example, require the total tax on Quadrant 1 to equal the total tax on Quadrant 3, 
since taxpayers in Quadrant 1 are taxable by Germany on a source and a residence basis, and 
those taxes can be cumulative. Similarly, workers in Quadrant 3 are subject to German 
source taxes and the residence taxes of their home state. These taxes can be cumulative, and 
the foreign residence tax can differ from the residence taxes applicable to Germans. 
183.  Competitive neutrality requires that the benefits actually be provided in cash or in kind to 
residents at the same value, regardless of where they work. 
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If German residents always receive German tax benefits, no matter where 
they work (as opposed to only if they work in Germany), then they will not 
reduce the wage they demand in Germany relative to the wage they demand 
elsewhere on account of those benefits. Thus, if offered on a uniform residence 
basis, the German benefits would not affect the relative wages paid in Germany 
or elsewhere, and the German benefits would not distort the matching of 
workers and jobs. If Germany conferred tax benefits in this way, nonresidents 
would not be at a comparative disadvantage when competing for jobs in 
Germany against German residents, despite the fact that German residents 
would receive tax benefits that nonresidents like Schumacker did not. Because 
he would be entitled to fewer tax benefits in Germany than German residents, 
a nonresident like Schumacker might pay higher absolute taxes than 
comparable German residents working in Germany. But this would not affect 
his ability to compete with German residents for jobs because competitive 
neutrality is concerned with comparative advantage. Thus, for a tax system to 
be competitively neutral it is not necessary that all workers in the same 
jurisdiction face the same absolute tax rates (or receive the same personal tax 
benefits). Instead, in order for a tax system to be competitively neutral, it is 
only necessary that the system not change comparative advantage. Higher or 
lower taxes—as long as they are conferred on a uniform source or residence 
basis—will not affect comparative advantage and therefore will not 
compromise competitive neutrality.184 
This conclusion may seem counterintuitive. If Germany denies Schumacker 
personal tax benefits, and Schumacker has no income at home in Belgium 
against which he can use Belgian personal tax benefits, he seems to be at a tax-
induced competitive disadvantage. That may be, but the disadvantage would 
not stem from his tax treatment in Germany, provided Germany confers 
personal tax benefits on a uniform residence basis to all German workers. 
Instead, the disadvantage would stem from his treatment at home in Belgium. 
If Belgium offered personal tax benefits on a nonuniform basis, such that 
Belgian residents received personal tax benefits only if they worked in Belgium, 
then Belgium would violate competitive neutrality. In contrast, if Belgium did 
not offer personal tax benefits at all, or if it offered them on a uniform source 
basis only to residents and nonresidents who worked in Belgium, then 
Schumacker would not be at a competitive disadvantage compared to German 
residents working in Germany, notwithstanding that Schumacker would 
receive personal tax benefits nowhere in the EU. 
 
184.  See supra Section II.D. 
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Likewise, imagine that Schumacker had managed to secure personal tax 
benefits at home in Belgium because Belgium offered them on a (fully 
refundable) residence basis. This would not dispose of the question of whether 
he should also have received them in Germany under a competitive neutrality 
interpretation of tax nondiscrimination. If Germany offered its personal tax 
benefits only to Germans working at home—that is, on a nonuniform (source 
or residence) basis only to taxpayers in Quadrant 1—then notwithstanding that 
Schumacker secured personal tax benefits at home in Belgium, the German 
fiscal system would still discourage Schumacker and all other nonresidents 
from working in Germany.185 
To see why, consider a German resident who is just as productive as 
Schumacker in both Belgium and Germany. If Belgium offers personal tax 
benefits on a uniform residence basis, then Schumacker will not reduce the 
wage he seeks in Belgium relative to the wage he seeks in Germany on account 
of the Belgian personal tax benefits because he receives them no matter where 
he works. But if Schumacker’s competitor, the German resident, receives 
German personal tax benefits only when she works at home in Germany, then 
she will lower the wage she seeks in Germany relative to the wage she seeks in 
Belgium on account of those benefits. The nonuniform German tax preference 
thus allows the German to bid down the wages she seeks in Germany relative 
to those she seeks in Belgium on account of the benefit, allowing her to out-
compete Schumacker (and other foreign workers) in Germany. Of course, in a 
case where Schumacker received personal tax benefits at home, he might 
appear to be a less compelling plaintiff, but he should not be, because the 
German tax system just described would discourage Schumacker from working 
in Germany by putting him at a tax-induced competitive disadvantage 
compared to German workers who receive personal tax benefits from Germany 
only if they work in Germany. 
This analysis suggests that under a competitive neutrality approach to 
nondiscrimination, the ECJ should not determine whether there has been 
discrimination by examining whether the cross-border worker has received 
personal tax benefits at least “once somewhere” in the EU.186 Competitive 
neutrality does not require that taxpayers receive at least one set of personal tax 
benefits. Instead, all competitive neutrality requires is that states confer 
benefits on a uniform basis. They must confer benefits either on a uniform 
source basis to everyone working in their territory (no matter where they 
 
185.  Since violations of competitive neutrality cause distortions in two directions, it would also 
discourage Germans from working outside of Germany. 
186.  See supra text accompanying notes 69-73. 
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reside) or on a uniform residence basis to all residents (no matter where they 
work).187 This makes sense because EU member states retain autonomy under 
EU law to decide whether they want to offer personal tax benefits at all. If an 
EU member state decided not to offer personal tax benefits, the “once 
somewhere” method would lead the court astray. Checking for double 
recoveries or double denials is no more effective a way to identify violations of 
competitive neutrality than is comparing absolute tax rates.188 
Our analysis of Schumacker ends with the observation that, as a matter of 
tax policy, most states offer their own residents the same family deductions and 
other personal tax benefits regardless of where in the world those residents 
earn their income. In terms of Figure 8, they offer benefits on a uniform 
residence basis to taxpayers in Quadrants 1 and 2, while excluding taxpayers in 
Quadrant 3. This common practice does not violate competitive neutrality. If 
Germany followed this traditional practice, then it did not place Schumacker at 
a comparative tax disadvantage in Germany, even if it denied him those 
benefits. Thus, a competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination 
would not force states to alter the well-settled practice, memorialized in the 
OECD model tax treaty, of excluding nonresident taxpayers from personal tax 
benefits.189 Whether Germany actually offered the tax benefits at issue in 
Schumacker on a uniform residence basis was not addressed by the ECJ, likely 
because no one thought it relevant to the issue at hand. 
The other case discussed in Part I was De Groot, in which the defendant 
state was the taxpayer’s residence state. Recall that De Groot, a Dutch resident, 
challenged the Dutch practice of proportionately reducing residents’ personal 
tax benefits on account of their exempt foreign-source income. Proportionality 
can be illustrated by a simple example. Suppose a Dutch resident earned 40% 
of his income in the Netherlands and 60% abroad. The Netherlands would tax 
only the 40% of income that was earned in the Netherlands, but it also would 
grant him only 40% of Dutch personal tax benefits. The Netherlands argued 
that such a cross-border worker should seek the remainder of his personal tax 
benefits from the source state where he earned (and paid tax on) the other 60% 
 
187.  That is, states may confer benefits uniformly on Quadrants 1 and 3, or they may confer 
benefits uniformly on Quadrants 1 and 2. But they may not, for example, confer benefits 
only on Quadrant 1. 
188.  See the numerical examples discussed supra Subsection II.D.3. 
189.  The OECD Model Tax Treaty nondiscrimination article provides that a source state is not 
obliged “to grant to residents of [its tax treaty partner] any personal allowances, reliefs and 
reductions for taxation purposes on account of civil status or family responsibilities which it 
grants to its own residents.” OECD Model Tax Treaty, supra note 13, art. 24, para. 3. 
  
the yale law journal    
1084 
 
of his income.190 The ECJ struck down the Dutch proportionality method, 
holding that except in Schumacker situations, conferring personal tax benefits is 
the resident state’s responsibility. 
It would have been easy for the ECJ to dispose of De Groot under either a 
locational neutrality or a leisure neutrality interpretation of tax discrimination. 
The Netherlands’ reduction of De Groot’s personal tax benefits on account of 
his foreign-source income represented a clear violation of locational neutrality, 
which requires uniform taxation of residents’ foreign and domestic income. 
The residence tax regime challenged in De Groot also violated leisure neutrality, 
since any residence-based taxation violates leisure neutrality. 
In order to resolve De Groot under a competitive neutrality interpretation of 
nondiscrimination, we need more information. If the Netherlands extended 
personal tax benefits only on a residence basis, but it denied residents a fraction 
of those benefits proportional to their foreign-source income, then the practice 
would violate competitive neutrality because it would be a nonuniform 
residence tax. In terms of Figure 8, the Netherlands would be applying 
different residence taxes to Quadrants 1 and 2. 
But recall that, in addition to offering personal tax benefits on a uniform 
residence basis, competitive neutrality also permits states to offer them on a 
uniform source basis to all workers earning income in the jurisdiction. If the 
Netherlands applied the proportionality method on a uniform source basis, 
such that the Netherlands conferred personal tax benefits to all workers in the 
Netherlands, regardless of their residence (i.e., to everyone in Quadrants 1 and 
3), then proportionality would constitute a uniform source tax that would not 
violate competitive neutrality. 
The facts of De Groot do not resolve the question of whether the 
Netherlands conferred personal tax benefits on a uniform source basis. 
However, Professor Peter Wattel wrote an article about the case that 
reproduced much of the opinion he rendered in his role as Advocate General 
for the case when it came before the Supreme Court of the Netherlands prior to 
referral to the ECJ.191 In his opinion, Advocate General Wattel found it 
probative that the Netherlands would extend personal tax benefits to both 
resident and nonresident workers in proportion to their Dutch-taxable 
 
190.  Case C-385/00, De Groot v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën, 2002 E.C.R. I-11819, paras.  
54-60. 
191.  Peter J. Wattel, Progressive Taxation of Non-Residents and Intra-EC Allocation of Personal Tax 
Allowances: Why Schumacker, Asscher, Gilly and Gschwind Do Not Suffice, 40 EUR. TAX’N 
210 (2000). Like Advocates General for the ECJ, Advocates General for the Dutch Supreme 
Court do not represent any litigant in the case and provide advisory opinions to the court in 
advance of its ruling. 
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income.192 Thus, in our terminology, the Netherlands offered personal tax 
benefits on a uniform source basis. From an international tax perspective, this 
practice is highly unusual. However, conferral of personal tax benefits on a 
uniform source basis maintains competitive neutrality. Perhaps for this reason, 
Wattel advocated that all the EU member states should adopt the Dutch  
proportionality method for conferring personal tax benefits.193 If the 
nondiscrimination principle were interpreted to require competitive neutrality, 
the Dutch proportionality method would be nondiscriminatory: if the 
Netherlands confers personal tax benefits on a uniform source basis to both 
resident and nonresident workers, it does not violate competitive neutrality. 
i i i .  eu nondiscrimination as competitive neutrality 
In the previous Part, we described three alternative efficiency-based 
benchmarks that the ECJ could use to define nondiscrimination, showed how 
each approach could be implemented, and applied each approach to two ECJ 
cases. Interpreting the tax nondiscrimination principle to require any of the 
three alternative efficiency benchmarks described in this Article would have 
several advantages, including making tax discrimination cases much easier to 
resolve. However, because the benchmarks contain contradictory prescriptions 
for how states should tax, no court can pursue all three benchmarks 
simultaneously.194 It is our view that, in the context of the EU common market, 
nondiscrimination should be interpreted to promote competitive neutrality. 
Accordingly, we describe in this Part some aspects of the language, structure, 
and history of the EU treaties that support or are consistent with our 
interpretation. We also describe some of the benefits that would accrue if  
the ECJ explicitly adopted a competitive neutrality interpretation of 
nondiscrimination. 
Before diving into that discussion, it is worth looking at the choices that the 
ECJ faces with its tax discrimination jurisprudence. One possibility is for the 
ECJ to continue to decide cases in an ad hoc way that gives little guidance to 
future parties. That is not an attractive option. The extensive critical 
commentary of the ECJ’s tax discrimination jurisprudence and the ongoing 
 
192.  Id. at 215 (calling the Dutch approach a “solution with a very high degree of international 
neutrality and therefore, from the perspective of the Internal Market, laudable”). 
193.  Id. at 222-23 (arguing for the Dutch proportionality method in terms consistent with 
interpreting the nondiscrimination principle to require competitive neutrality); see, e.g., id. 
at 222 (“Taxing non-residents as if they were residents would remove both the progression 
advantage and the allowance disadvantage . . . .”). 
194.  See discussion supra Section II.D. 
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efforts of practitioners, government officials, and scholars to determine what 
tax discrimination means underscore the need for clearer guidance. A second 
possibility is that the ECJ could reverse itself and hold that the 
nondiscrimination principle does not apply to direct taxation. That is also 
unattractive because the requirement of member state unanimity for EU-wide 
direct tax legislation has resulted in the court’s nondiscrimination doctrine 
being the principal means of removing direct tax obstacles to the EU common 
market. Removing direct taxation from the scope of the nondiscrimination 
principle would eviscerate it. Member states could then enact with impunity all 
sorts of nonuniform tax laws that burdened nonresidents and interstate 
commerce more heavily than residents and domestic commerce. If the 
nondiscrimination principle did not cover direct taxation, it would be far more 
difficult for the ECJ to protect free movement rights. A third possibility would 
be for the court to identify as the motivation behind the tax nondiscrimination 
principle a single value (or a set of values) other than the three we discuss in 
this Article, and to enforce the nondiscrimination principle in a way that 
rigorously promotes that value (or values). The problem with this option is 
that we are unaware of any values other than those that we discuss in this 
Article that have been seriously proposed as a foundation for the 
nondiscrimination principle. Nor have we any to offer. The fourth approach is 
to choose between the three efficiency values that we discuss: locational 
neutrality, leisure neutrality, and competitive neutrality. We thus believe that 
the ECJ should make a choice. 
Support for a competitive neutrality interpretation of tax discrimination 
derives from the goals of the EU common market, the language and structure 
of the EU treaties, and the ECJ’s case law. Although we do not primarily 
advocate competitive neutrality from first principles, in this Part, we also 
consider some normative arguments (including economic efficiency) for a 
competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination.195 As part of this 
analysis, we observe that expressly interpreting the EU nondiscrimination 
principle to require competitive neutrality would link the fundamental 
freedoms with a value espoused not only by economists, but also by taxpayers, 
politicians, lawyers, and policy analysts. 
 
195.  We do not argue in favor of a competitive neutrality interpretation for tax discrimination 
from economic or philosophical first principles. Thus, we do not argue that a competitive 
neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination would do a better job of promoting economic 
welfare or any specific notion of the good, justice, or fairness than other possible 
interpretations that might be imposed on the member states. 
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A. Interpretive Arguments 
This Section describes how the goals of the EU and the language and 
structure of the fundamental freedoms support a competitive neutrality 
interpretation of nondiscrimination. Because leisure neutrality receives so little 
support as a goal of international tax policy, we primarily focus on comparing 
locational neutrality with competitive neutrality. 196  
1. The Goals of the EU Treaties 
The nondiscrimination principle derives from the fundamental freedoms, 
which themselves represent the foundation of the EU’s internal market. That 
market is intended to encourage increased competition, increased 
specialization, and larger economies of scale. A competitive neutrality 
interpretation of nondiscrimination would advance the EU goal to integrate the 
economies of Europe because it would constrain state practices (including tax 
laws) that decrease competition, hamper specialization, and prevent the 
exploitation of economies of scale.  
Support for the contention that creating an integrated market in which 
larger companies can operate and compete was one of the purposes behind the 
establishment of the common market can be found in the 1956 Spaak Report, 
one of the EU’s few foundational documents that were readily available to the 
states that initially created what would later become the EU.197 The report198 is 
named for Belgian foreign minister Paul-Henri Spaak, chair of the 
Intergovernmental Committee on European Integration. The report calls for a 
European common market that would fuse together separate national markets 
in order to promote the growth of Europe’s productive facilities.199 The report 
emphasized that this common market should prize competition and forbid 
 
196.  Commentators often advocate for a tax system that achieves locational neutrality. Rarely, if 
at all, do commentators advocate pursuing leisure or savings neutrality. When they advocate 
for exemption, the argument is usually on the grounds of competitiveness. 
197.  Joseph J. A. Ellis, Source Material for Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty, 32 FORDHAM L. REV. 247, 
248 (1961) (noting that few of the preparatory acts to the Rome Treaty were published or 
submitted to the national legislatures when states introduced bills to ratify the Rome 
Treaty). 
198.  COMITÉ INTERGOUVERNEMENTAL CRÉÉ PAR LA CONFÉRENCE DE MESSINE, RAPPORT DES 
CHEFS DE DÉLÉGATION AUX MINISTRES DES AFFAIRES ETRANGÈRES: REPORT OF THE HEADS OF 
DELEGATION TO THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Doc. MAE 120 f/56 (1956) [hereinafter 
SPAAK REPORT]. 
199.  de la Feria & Fuest, supra note 35, at 3. 
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national laws that would restrain competition, since “[s]ystems of protection 
which eliminate outside competition have . . . particularly harmful consequences 
on the progress of production and the raising of the standard of living . . . .”200 
The Report was a crucial step in the path to the Treaty of Rome, a predecessor 
to the modern TFEU.201  
As the Spaak Report makes clear, one of the motivations behind the 
creation of a European common market was to encourage the formation and 
development of large, competitive European companies that could operate on a 
multinational scale without becoming monopolies. Achieving this goal 
required companies based in one member state to be able to acquire productive 
assets in other member states. A prohibition against tax systems that distort 
competition to acquire such assets furthers that vision, while allowing member 
states to maintain significant control of their domestic tax systems. Although 
the treaties governing the EU have been amended over time, the prominent 
place accorded competition has not. For example, the member states hope to 
make the EU “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy 
in the world.”202 
2. The Language and Structure of the Treaty 
The last Subsection explained that interpreting the nondiscrimination 
principle to promote level competition among EU nationals would advance the 
overarching goals of the EU. This Section discusses aspects of the structure and 
language of the TFEU that support a competitive neutrality interpretation of 
nondiscrimination. 
a. Avoiding Construing Treaty Provisions as Superfluous 
Whereas construing the nondiscrimination principle to require competitive 
neutrality would give independent force to each of the fundamental freedoms, 
construing nondiscrimination to require either locational or leisure neutrality 
in taxation would render some of the fundamental freedoms superfluous. 
 
200.  SPAAK REPORT, supra note 198, at 13-14, translated in Ellis, supra note 197, at 261-62. 
201.  Pinar Akman, Searching for the Long-Lost Soul of Article 82EC, 29 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 
278 (2009); de la Feria & Fuest, supra note 35, at 3. 
202.  Towards an Internal Market Without Tax Obstacles—A Strategy for Providing Companies with a 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base for their EU-Wide Activities, at 3, COM (2001) 582 final (Oct. 
23, 2001).  
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For example, Article 49 of the TFEU, which sets forth the freedom of 
establishment, would be unnecessary if the only goal of the fundamental 
freedoms were to achieve locational neutrality.203 To obtain locational 
neutrality with respect to capital, it is sufficient to provide for the free 
movement of portfolio investments (“capital movements” in EU parlance). 
Allowing free movement of direct investments (“establishments” in EU 
parlance) simply is not necessary for achieving locational neutrality. Thus, in 
order for the freedom of establishment to have meaning independent of the 
freedom of capital movement, the freedom of establishment must pursue a goal 
or goals other than locational neutrality.204 
In the same vein, the ECJ has interpreted Article 63 of the TFEU, the 
freedom of capital movement, to apply to both portfolio and direct 
investment.205 But again, free movement of portfolio investments is sufficient 
to achieve locational neutrality for capital. Protecting direct investments makes 
sense only if the provision aims to promote a goal other than locational 
neutrality, such as competitive neutrality. 
Similarly, interpreting the nondiscrimination principle to require savings 
neutrality (leisure neutrality’s capital analogue) likewise would render certain 
fundamental freedoms superfluous. For example, free movement of portfolio 
investments is sufficient to secure savings neutrality because savings neutrality 
requires only that individual investors earn the same after-tax rate of return 
regardless of where they reside. Thus, if the exclusive purpose of the 
fundamental freedoms were to promote savings neutrality, the freedom of 
capital movement would be sufficient to achieve that purpose, rendering the 
freedom of establishment superfluous. In contrast, construing the 
nondiscrimination principle to require competitive neutrality would give each 
of these provisions independent meaning because each provision is needed for 
there to be competitive neutrality with respect to the subject matter covered by 
that freedom.  
 
203.  See TFEU, supra note 45, art. 49. 
204.  See Horst, supra note 60, at 796. 
205.  For a nonexhaustive list of covered capital movements, see Council Directive 88/361/EEC, 
Annex 1, 1998 O.J. (L 178) 5, 8-11. Although this Directive implemented Articles 69 and 70 
of the Treaty Establishing the Economic Community, which is no longer in force, the ECJ 
has continued to refer to the Directive’s Annex for the list of covered capital investments. 
See, e.g., Case C-510/08, Mattner v. Finanzamt Velbert, para. 19 (2010), available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=83008&pageIndex=0 
&doclang=EN&mode=doc&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=40969HTML (“[T]he Court has 
previously recognised the nomenclature which forms Annex I to Directive 88/361 as having 
indicative value, even though that directive was adopted on the basis of Articles 69 and 
70(1) of the EEC Treaty . . . .”). 
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b. Consistency in Interpreting the Fundamental Freedoms 
The nondiscrimination principle applies not only to taxes, but also to all 
other areas of law. And there is no reason to think that the interpretation of the 
nondiscrimination principle or the fundamental freedoms should be different 
in the tax area than in other areas. 
Taxation is one of the few areas in which it is theoretically possible for 
member states to achieve locational neutrality without harmonizing their 
policies. That is because taxes are assessed in money, and so one state’s taxes 
(those of the source state) can be offset by another state’s taxes (those of the 
residence state).206 That is precisely how worldwide taxation with an unlimited 
foreign tax credit in principle works. Through the residence state’s taxes and 
credits, the source state’s taxes are effectively rendered invisible to the taxpayer. 
However, in other situations, the allegedly offending practices are rules and 
regulations. In such cases, residence states cannot readily offset the practices of 
source states—there is no equivalent of the foreign tax credit for regulation. 
Instead, to assure efficient allocation across the EU of the factors of production 
(i.e., to secure locational neutrality), member states would have to either 
harmonize their substantive law or forbid regulation by source states.207 In 
contrast, a competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination would 
carry the same implication for regulation that it carries for taxation, namely, 
that destination (source) states must apply the same regulation to residents 
and nonresidents and that origin (residence) states must apply the same 
regulation to residents engaged in domestic and intra-EU commerce. Thus, if 
the nondiscrimination principle were interpreted to promote competitive 
neutrality in the tax area, that interpretation could be carried over into other 
regulatory areas.208 
c. The Language of the Fundamental Freedoms 
The language of the fundamental freedoms supports a competitive 
neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination. For example, Article 45 calls for 
the “abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of 
 
206.  Ian Roxan, Assuring Real Freedom of Movement in EU Direct Taxation, 63 MOD. L. REV. 831, 
833-34 (2000). 
207.  This latter option would be the regulatory equivalent of “residence-only” taxation, that is, 
the prohibition of source taxes.  
208.  It is not clear how leisure neutrality is affected by regulations. That states could regulate as 
they please without any limitation is another reason for rejecting a leisure neutrality 
interpretation of nondiscrimination. 
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the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions 
of work and employment.”209 Likewise, Article 45 ensures that EU nationals 
may “stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment,” and that they 
may “remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in 
that State.”210 Similarly, Article 45 includes the right of nationals of a member 
state to “accept offers of employment.”211 This language protects cross-border 
workers themselves, and it reflects concerns about the matching of jobs and 
workers, which is a part of competitive neutrality.212 
Other articles are similar. For example, Article 49, which sets forth the 
freedom of establishment, states that “restrictions on the freedom of 
establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another 
Member State shall be prohibited.”213 This language suggests that the freedom 
applies on both an inbound and an outbound basis—that is, it restrains an EU 
national’s own member state from preventing that national from establishing 
business abroad, and it also prevents a host member state from preventing an 
EU national of another member state from establishing business in its own 
territory. Thus, the freedom of establishment applies to both residence states 
and source states, which is consistent with the idea of leveling competition 
among businesses. Indeed, Article 49 emphasizes obligations on source states: 
“Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue 
activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings, in 
particular companies or firms . . . under the conditions laid down for its own 
nationals by the law of the country where such establishment is effected.”214 
This emphasis on uniformity of treatment in the source state is consistent with 
the idea of leveling competition among businesses. Moreover, as noted earlier, 
the freedom of establishment would be superfluous if efficient allocation of 
capital were the only goal of the fundamental freedoms, since an efficient 
allocation of capital can be achieved via the free movement of portfolio 
investments alone. 
 
209.  TFEU, supra note 45, art. 45, para. 2. 
210.  Id. art. 45, paras. 3(c) & 3(d). 
211.  Id. art. 45, para. 3(a). 
212.  Cf. Communication from the Commission to the Spring European Council: Implementing the 
Renewed Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs, para. 2.3, COM (2006) 816 final (Dec. 12, 2006), 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SPLIT_COM:2006 
:0816(01):FIN:EN:PDF (describing the Lisbon strategy as pursuing “flexicurity” for 
workers, and noting that “[r]ather than protecting jobs, the aim is to protect the worker, 
help them deal with rapid change and so ensure secure employment” (emphasis added)). 
213.  TFEU, supra note 45, art. 49. 
214.  Id. 
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3. ECJ Nondiscrimination Doctrine 
The ECJ’s tax discrimination case law also supports a competitive—but not 
a locational or leisure—neutrality interpretation of the tax nondiscrimination 
principle. 
a. “Direct Effect” 
Interpreting the nondiscrimination norm to require competitive neutrality 
is consistent with the idea found in many legal contexts that discriminatory 
taxes harm specific, identifiable taxpayers. For example, bilateral tax treaties 
give taxpayers legal recourse against the contracting states for violating the 
nondiscrimination article of the tax treaty. Likewise, state and federal courts in 
the United States regularly hear tax discrimination cases brought by individual 
taxpayers under the dormant Commerce Clause and the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause. In the EU, the doctrine of “direct effect” reflects the notion 
that violations of the nondiscrimination principle constitute violations of 
personal rights.215 Under this doctrine, EU nationals may sue their own (or 
other) member states for discrimination that violates EU law. That courts pay 
careful attention to whether challenging taxpayers possess standing to bring 
their claims shows that courts regard discriminatory taxes as harming specific, 
identifiable taxpayers. 
The notion that discriminatory taxes harm particular parties aligns well 
with competitive neutrality, but not with locational or leisure neutrality. For 
example, identifying the specific taxpayers harmed by violations of locational 
neutrality is problematic because such violations do not disadvantage a 
particular taxpayer relative to another. Instead, in the simplest models, a 
violation of locational neutrality distorts the location of capital and labor to the 
detriment of everyone. Rather than creating winners and losers (or even larger 
and smaller losers) or leaving some with more than others, locational 
distortions cause all investors to earn a lower return on their capital and all 
workers to earn lower after-tax wages. Thus, locational neutrality simply does 
not make sense as a personal right. Nor does leisure neutrality.216 In this sense, 
 
215.  See Case C-26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen,  
1963 E.C.R. 1 (holding that EC rights have direct effect, that is, they give rise to a private 
right of enforcement in national courts). 
216.  While it is possible to conceptualize a violation of leisure neutrality as a violation of a 
personal right, all income tax systems distort choices between labor and leisure because all 
income tax systems currently tax the returns from labor, but they do not tax leisure. Thus, 
income taxes distort labor/leisure decisions even for residents of a single state engaged in 
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construing nondiscrimination as requiring competitive neutrality fits the plain 
meaning of nondiscrimination better than does construing it to require 
locational neutrality. Conceiving of tax nondiscrimination as a personal right 
also matches conventional nontax notions of nondiscrimination, including 
prohibitions of discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or nationality. Thus, 
the framing of tax discrimination as a violation of personal rights seems to 
accord better with competitive neutrality than with locational neutrality. 
A competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination is also 
consistent with the court’s general approach to resolving tax cases, in which it 
compares the tax treatment of idealized taxpayers; typically the court compares 
a resident taxpayer with purely domestic income to a resident taxpayer with 
foreign income or to a nonresident taxpayer with income sourced in the 
defendant state. Comparing the tax treatment of particular taxpayers in this 
way is a sensible approach to identifying discrimination if discrimination 
means violations of competitive neutrality. This is because, as explained in Part 
II, the court can identify violations of competitive neutrality by comparing 
taxpayers’ relative tax rates on work opportunities.217 In contrast, because 
violations of locational neutrality involve tax distortions to the overall 
allocation of workers across member states, comparing the tax treatment of a 
resident taxpayer and a cross-border taxpayer would not tell the court whether 
there has been a violation of locational neutrality. 
b. Tax Cases 
As we discussed in Part II, the ECJ’s decisions in Schumacker and De Groot 
provide anecdotal evidence that the ECJ does not interpret the 
nondiscrimination principle to require locational neutrality or leisure 
neutrality. We also explained in Part II that determining whether the ECJ’s 
rulings in these cases comported with competitive neutrality would require 
more information about the German and Dutch tax systems. In both cases, the 
rulings could be reconciled with competitive neutrality. While the ability to 
reconcile these cases with competitive neutrality hardly constitutes persuasive 
evidence that the ECJ interprets the nondiscrimination principle to require 
competitive neutrality, at least the court’s decisions do not directly violate that 
 
purely domestic economic activities. Furthermore, there is widespread, though not 
universal, support for tax systems with increasing marginal tax rates. Progressive tax rates 
distort leisure choices among residents of the same state, but they are not generally 
understood to discriminate illegally against high-bracket taxpayers or to give rise to personal 
causes of action for discrimination by such taxpayers. 
217.  Tax discrimination occurs only when states impose nonuniform source or residence taxes. 
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principle. In contrast, far from upholding locational or leisure neutrality, the 
ECJ’s rulings in those two cases themselves introduced new locational and 
leisure distortions.218 
More probative than the anecdotal evidence provided in just two labor tax 
cases is the ECJ’s overall approach to deciding tax cases. Interpreting the 
nondiscrimination principle to require locational neutrality would force the 
ECJ to rule out exemption as a valid method of taxing international income. 
That is because in the absence of harmonization of member state tax rates, 
locational neutrality requires states to tax their residents’ worldwide income 
while providing unlimited credits for source taxes. The ECJ, however, has held 
that nondiscrimination both permits exemption219 and does not require tax rate 
harmonization.220 
Furthermore, locational neutrality would place no nondiscrimination 
burdens on source states—no matter how onerous or selective their taxes. 
Under a locational neutrality interpretation, the expectation would be that any 
source state distortion would be negated by foreign tax credits in the residence 
state. But the ECJ repeatedly has found source states to discriminate. Taken 
 
218.  For example, the ruling in Schumacker—that where a cross-border worker earns “almost all” 
his income in the source state, the source state should grant him personal tax benefits—itself 
violates both locational and leisure neutrality. See Case C-279/93, Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt 
v. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. I-225, para. 38. The ruling also contradicts provisions in tax 
treaties that expressly disclaim such obligations. See, e.g., OECD Model Tax Treaty, supra 
note 13, art. 24, para. 3 (providing that source states need not extend personal tax benefits to 
nonresidents). To the extent that the decision in Schumacker results in EU taxpayers 
receiving personal tax benefits in their source state, rather than exclusively from their 
residence state, it violates locational neutrality by presenting an opportunity for cross-
border workers to access substantively different personal tax benefits by working abroad. 
Such cross-border differences could be expected to distort the global allocation of labor. The 
ruling in Schumacker also violates leisure neutrality because it does not require states to 
apply the same taxes to resident and nonresident workers. Instead, Schumacker requires the 
source state to tax residents and nonresidents identically only when nonresidents earn 
“almost all” their income in the source state. Thus, in Schumacker, the court ensures 
maintenance of neither locational nor leisure neutrality. Because the ECJ in De Groot applied 
the Schumacker rule, that decision also violates both locational and leisure neutrality. 
219.  See, e.g., Case C-513/04, Kerckhaert v. Belgium, 2006 E.C.R. I-10967, para. 22 (holding that 
member states are not obliged to relieve double taxation on cross-border income within the 
EU and noting that EU law “does not lay down any general criteria for the attribution of 
areas of competence between the Member States in relation to the elimination of double 
taxation within the Community”); Case C-336/96, Gilly v. Directeur des Services Fiscaux du 
Bas-Rhin, 1998 E.C.R. I-2793, para. 24 (“The Member States are competent to determine 
the criteria for taxation on income and wealth with a view to eliminating double taxation.”). 
220.  See, e.g., Gilly, 1998 E.C.R. I-2793, para. 34 (holding that divergences in the “level” of 
taxation among member states are nondiscriminatory because EU law does not prescribe or 
harmonize member state tax rates). 
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together, the ECJ’s approval of exemption and national rate differences and its 
imposition of nondiscrimination burdens on source states suggest that it does 
not understand the EU tax nondiscrimination principle to require locational 
neutrality.221 
The ECJ’s case law is also inconsistent with leisure neutrality. First, leisure 
neutrality would forbid taxation at residence, but the ECJ has upheld a variety 
of residence taxes under the EU nondiscrimination principle.222 Second, states 
would have no specific nondiscrimination obligations when taxing in a 
residence capacity under a leisure neutrality interpretation of 
nondiscrimination—beyond the requirement that they exempt foreign-source 
income. But the ECJ has repeatedly found residence states to have specific 
nondiscrimination obligations other than exemption.223 Third, to maintain 
leisure neutrality, source states would have to tax residents identically in all 
circumstances for work performed in their jurisdiction, but the ECJ has 
repeatedly approved different tax treatment of residents and nonresidents.224 
These factors suggest that the ECJ does not understand the nondiscrimination 
principle to require leisure neutrality. 
Because competitive neutrality can be achieved via either global adoption of 
worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits or global adoption of 
ideal deduction (of which exemption is one instantiation), none of the holdings 
just mentioned—that failure to grant unlimited foreign tax credits is not 
necessarily discriminatory, that EU law does not require tax rate 
harmonization, that nondiscrimination imposes obligations upon source states, 
and that nondiscrimination imposes obligations on residence states—is 
inconsistent with competitive neutrality. Rather, each of these rulings is 
 
221.  Slightly fewer than half of ECJ tax claims have been brought against source states, with the 
remainder brought against residence states. See Mason, supra note 63, at 95 n.88. Defendant 
states lose the overwhelming majority of tax cases before the ECJ whether defending their 
source tax or residence tax regimes. See id. at 76 n.18. 
222.  See, e.g., Gilly, 1998 E.C.R. I-2793. 
223.  See, e.g., Case C-385/00, De Groot v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën, 2002 E.C.R. I-11819 
(holding that a state must confer a full complement of personal tax benefits on residents 
who earn foreign income, even if the state exempts residents’ foreign-source income). 
224.  See, e.g., Case C-279/93, Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. I-225 
(holding that the source state’s obligation to treat nonresidents the same as residents was 
triggered only when nonresidents earn “almost all” their income in the source state). 
Different final tax treatment of residents and nonresidents is permissible under competitive 
neutrality, but not leisure neutrality. See the numerical example discussed infra note 249. 
Although competitive neutrality requires source taxes to be uniform, it does not require 
residents and nonresidents to be treated identically, since source states tax nonresidents on 
only one basis (source), whereas they tax residents on two bases (source and residence), and 
source and residence taxes can be cumulative. See numerical examples, supra Section II.D. 
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consistent with a posture of enforcing the source and residence uniformity 
requirements of competitive neutrality, while withholding judgment on the 
legislative question of whether competitive neutrality should be implemented 
through worldwide taxation or ideal deduction. 
Finally, although the ECJ does not express itself formally in terms of 
competitive neutrality,225 the language it uses in its decisions evinces concern 
for the ability of EU taxpayers from different states to compete for jobs on a 
level tax playing field, which is the logic behind competitive neutrality. For 
example, in Schumacker, the ECJ analyzed whether Germany “discouraged” 
nonresidents from working in Germany by excluding them from the personal 
tax benefits it provided to German residents, inquiring whether the German 
rule placed Schumacker in “a less advantageous position than [German] 
residents.”226 This language suggests that the ECJ was interested in the 
competition between German residents and other EU residents for jobs in 
Germany. The ECJ’s approach in Schumacker is not unique. The ECJ regularly 
uses the language of competitive (but not locational or leisure) neutrality when 
striking down source tax provisions on the grounds that they “discourage” or 
“deter” cross-border economic activity.227 In addition, the ECJ applies the same 
type of analysis to residence taxation. For example, in De Groot, the court held 
that the Dutch practice of reducing home state tax benefits in proportion to 
residents’ foreign-source income “discouraged” De Groot from working in 
other member states.228 Application of such principles at both source and 
residence is compatible only with competitive neutrality. 
 
225.  In contrast, U.S. tax discrimination cases are filled with language that invokes competitive 
neutrality. See discussion infra Part IV. 
226.  Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. I-224, para. 52. 
227.  See id. and cases cited supra note 82. The ECJ’s language about “discouraging” or 
“deterring” cross-border activity is inconsistent with locational neutrality, which is informed 
by the aggregate amount of work (or investment) that occurs in a state, not who holds a 
given job (or makes a particular investment). That one nation’s tax policies discourage or 
encourage residents of a particular member state from working (or investing) in another 
member state is irrelevant, as long as their absence is made up for by others (most likely 
from the member state enacting the provision). The ECJ’s language about “discouraging” or 
“deterring” cross-border activity also is inconsistent with the technical and non-intuitive 
notion of leisure (and savings) neutrality, which concerns the work/leisure (and 
saving/consumption) tradeoffs made by taxpayers residing in different states. 
228.  De Groot, 2002 E.C.R. I-11819, paras. 84, 103-09. 
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c. Distinguishing the ECJ’s “Nondiscrimination” and “Restrictions” 
Jurisprudence 
Although we argue that the ECJ’s interpretation of the principle of tax 
nondiscrimination hews more closely to competitive neutrality than to 
locational neutrality (and that it does not coincide at all with leisure neutrality), 
that argument does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that locational 
neutrality plays no role in EU law. EU law recognizes two distinct aspects to 
the fundamental freedoms: prevention of discrimination and prevention of 
“restrictions” or “obstacles” to movement.229 Both of these doctrines derive 
from the fundamental freedoms.230 Our point in this Article is not to advocate 
competitive neutrality to the exclusion of the pursuit of locational neutrality in 
Europe (after all, they can be achieved simultaneously if all states adopt 
worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax credits). Rather, our argument 
is that the legal concept of tax nondiscrimination found in the TFEU and 
derived from the fundamental freedoms is best understood as promoting 
competitive neutrality. If the ECJ expressly adopted this view, the resolution of 
tax cases in the EU would become a simpler and more straightforward affair. 
Other scholars have argued that the ECJ’s “restrictions” jurisprudence aims to 
promote locational neutrality, but we offer no view on that question here.231 
B. Normative Arguments 
Although we do not advocate competitive neutrality primarily from first 
principles, this Section discusses some normative arguments for a competitive 
neutrality construction of nondiscrimination, namely, that competitive 
neutrality would promote welfare, decrease legal uncertainty, promote 
 
229.  See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, The EU and Sport: Background and 
Context, ¶ 1.3.1, SEC (2007) 935 final (July 11, 2007) (“For the free movement of workers to 
be a reality, two main principles must be respected: there must be no discrimination on 
grounds of nationality, and there must be no obstacles to free movement.”). 
230.  Id. 
231.  Scholars dispute whether the concepts of discrimination and restriction have been 
distinguished meaningfully in the tax area. See, e.g., Axel Cordewener, The Prohibitions of 
Discrimination and Restriction Within the Framework of the Fully Integrated Internal Market, in 
EU FREEDOMS AND TAXATION 1, 27 (Frans Vanistendael ed., 2006) (pointing out that “a vast 
number of decisions using the term ‘restrictions’ in substance actually dealt with 
discriminatory national measures”); see also Mason, supra note 17, at 1313 (likening the ECJ’s 
“restriction” doctrine under the fundamental freedoms to the U.S. Supreme Court’s “undue 
burdens” doctrine under the dormant Commerce Clause). 
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representation reinforcement and political unity among residents of different 
EU member states, and allow the ECJ to avoid making legislative decisions. 
1. Welfare Promotion 
Of the three neutrality benchmarks we discuss, many economists are likely 
to view violations of locational neutrality as having the largest negative welfare 
consequences.232 In contrast, no one seriously advocates leisure neutrality (or 
its capital analogue, savings neutrality) as an important goal from a welfare 
perspective. Although some commentators advocate exemption, which is the 
only method for achieving leisure neutrality in the absence of tax rate and base 
harmonization, they generally do so on the grounds that it promotes 
competitiveness, which is to say competitive neutrality.233 There is no 
consensus among economists that competitive neutrality should be the goal for 
designing cross-border tax systems, or that competitive neutrality is more 
important than locational neutrality from a welfare perspective. However, 
economists generally agree that policies that interfere with the matching of 
owners to investments and workers to jobs reduce welfare. Thus, there is 
consensus that violations of competitive neutrality reduce welfare. Economists 
also widely recognize that states, unless they are constrained, will enact trade 
barriers that tilt the playing field in favor of domestic interests with attendant 
negative welfare consequences. In other words, absent legal or other restraints, 
states will tend to violate competitive neutrality, which will reduce welfare. 
Thus, we do not argue that the ECJ should adopt a competitive neutrality 
interpretation of nondiscrimination because a competitively neutral tax system 
would best promote EU welfare. Other more extensive and intrusive tax 
measures than what we propose here—such as imposing the same tax base and 
rate structure on all member states—might best promote EU welfare. We take 
no position on the question of which tax system would best promote EU 
welfare. Instead, we argue that given the language of the Treaty, the goals of 
the EU, and the interpretations of the nondiscrimination principle so far, the 
best interpretation of that principle is that it promotes competitive neutrality. 
Nevertheless, a competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination 
would improve welfare, compared to a situation in which member states face 
no constraints on how they tax nonresidents or residents with income sourced 
 
232.  Graetz, supra note 23, at 270 (“Typically, economists regard [capital export neutrality] as 
essential for worldwide economic efficiency . . . .”); id. at 285 (“[T]aking a worldwide 
efficiency perspective, [capital export neutrality] generally is thought to dominate [capital 
import neutrality].”). 
233.  See id. at 273. 
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in other EU member states. As explained above, a competitive neutrality 
interpretation of tax discrimination would discourage states from enacting tax 
laws that tilt the playing field for jobs against cross-border workers. Because 
workers have different skills, nonuniform tax laws interfere with the efficient 
matching of workers and jobs.234 Thus, we believe that there would be welfare 
gains from adopting a competitive neutrality interpretation of tax 
nondiscrimination.235 Indeed, such gains (even if only understood intuitively) 
may be what the founders of the EU hoped to secure by implementing the 
prohibition on discrimination; those aims likewise may be what the members 
of the ECJ understand their interpretations in tax cases to pursue. Of course, 
the institutional limitations on the ECJ mean that even if the court expressly 
adopted a competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination, it could 
not ensure complete competitive neutrality throughout the EU because 
interactions between states using different methods of eliminating double 
taxation (that is to say, worldwide taxation or the ideal deduction method) will 
undermine competitive neutrality. Nevertheless, the court’s express adoption 
of a competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination, and its 
enforcement of the uniformity requirements of competitive neutrality, would 
sharply restrict the member states from using their tax systems to provide 
advantages for their residents over nonresidents. In contrast, an interpretation 
of tax discrimination that does not look to competitive neutrality risks allowing 
states to design their tax systems to explicitly and directly tilt the playing field 
in favor of domestic residents and domestic economic activity. That would be a 
dangerous path—and it could potentially have large negative welfare 
consequences—because protectionist sentiments can be strong, especially 
during tough economic times, and because the EU already regulates many 
alternative tools that states have traditionally used to favor residents. 
2. Increased Predictability 
A common criticism of courts interpreting nondiscrimination principles is 
that their decisions are unpredictable.236 This uncertainty is not only a problem 
for the parties to any given litigation; it is a serious problem for the states 
subject to legal obligations to avoid tax discrimination. States need to enact and 
administer tax systems without fear that particular tax provisions will be held 
 
234.  See supra Section II.D. 
235.  Of course, the general theory of the second best precludes making conclusive statements 
about welfare as long as some distortions remain. 
236.  See sources cited supra notes 2-8. 
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discriminatory and therefore need to be rewritten or replaced. Explicitly 
interpreting nondiscrimination as competitive neutrality and requiring states to 
enact uniform taxes would provide clear guidance to state legislatures, tax 
administrators, and taxpayers. As we showed in Part II, the legality of any tax 
would be easy to assess under a competitive neutrality interpretation of 
nondiscrimination, so states could enact and administer their tax laws with 
clear guidance and substantial flexibility.237 
3. Promotion of Representation Reinforcement and Political Unity 
Although the tax nondiscrimination norm principally promotes economic 
efficiency, the fundamental freedoms also promote noneconomic values. Two 
important noneconomic values that a competitive neutrality interpretation of 
nondiscrimination promotes are representation reinforcement and political 
unity. Explicit adoption of a competitive neutrality construction of 
nondiscrimination would promote representation reinforcement by protecting 
nonresidents from being exploited by residents entitled to participate in the 
source state’s political process.238 By insisting that source states tax 
nonresidents the same way as residents, competitive neutrality ensures that the 
interests of nonresidents secure proxy representation in the source jurisdiction, 
which helps prevent the exploitation of nonresidents. Such proxy 
representation links the interests of residents and nonresidents, and also may 
help to promote feelings of political unity among residents of the common 
market. 
Likewise, by removing tax barriers to cross-border economic activity, the 
nondiscrimination principle also seeks to promote the notion that the relevant 
community is not the state, but the whole community subject to the 
nondiscrimination rule.239 This, too, promotes political unity. Finally, if 
economic integration promotes political unity, then by striking down tax 
provisions that would otherwise hinder such integration, competitive 
neutrality is likely to further promote political unity. Indeed, reducing animus 
among the peoples of Europe by tying their economic fates was one of the 
principal motivations for the formation of the EU.240 Thus, in addition to 
 
237.  This benefit would also arise if nondiscrimination were alternatively interpreted as 
locational or leisure neutrality. 
238.  Cf. Heinzerling, supra note 84, at 220-21 (describing the representation reinforcement 
rationale for the dormant Commerce Clause). 
239.  Cf. id. at 222 (describing the political unity rationale for the dormant Commerce Clause). 
240.  Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950, available at http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9-
may/decl_en.htm (describing the coal and steel community as “a first step in the federation 
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promoting efficiency, a competitive neutrality interpretation of 
nondiscrimination advances two non-efficiency values promoted by common 
markets, namely, representation reinforcement and political unity. 
4. Avoidance of Legislative Decisions 
Because a competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination would 
allow courts to decide tax cases based on a formal inquiry regarding the 
uniformity of the challenged state tax law, it would help courts avoid making 
the kinds of policy decisions that are typically made by legislatures. 
For example, consider the Gerritse case in which the ECJ ruled that 
although an EU member state taxing in a source capacity could not exclude a 
resident of another EU member state from the benefit of its progressive tax 
rates, it could exclude the nonresident from its personal tax exemption.241 The 
ECJ reached this ruling because, in its view, the personal exemption 
represented a tax benefit related to the worker’s “personal and family 
situation,” which, under the Schumacker rule, had to be accounted for by his 
residence state, unless the cross-border worker earned “almost all” of his 
income in the source state. While the ECJ may have been confident that the 
personal exemption represented a “personal and family” tax benefit, while 
progressive tax rates did not, the history of tax expenditure analysis has shown 
that it is difficult or impossible to distinguish social welfare benefits 
administered through the tax system (such as family deductions) from 
structural or income-defining tax provisions.242 Is the personal exemption a 
family benefit, or is it simply the zero bracket of a progressive tax system? By 
distinguishing between different kinds of tax benefits, the court inadvertently 
drew an unworkable distinction between personal and family tax benefits and 
other tax provisions. 
In contrast, a competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination 
would eschew thorny questions regarding what kinds of tax benefits must be 
extended to outsiders by insisting only that all tax provisions and all personal 
tax benefits—whatever their content—apply on either a uniform source or a 
uniform residence basis. Because a competitive neutrality interpretation of tax 
nondiscrimination would allow courts to decide cases on a purely formal basis 
 
of Europe” that would produce a “solidarity in production” and make “any war between 
France and Germany not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible”).  
241.  Case C-234/01, Gerritse v. Finanzamt Neukölln-Nord, 2003 E.C.R. I-5933. 
242.  See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., A RECONSIDERATION OF TAX 
EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS (Comm. Print 2008) (reviewing long-standing academic debates 
concerning how to define tax expenditures). 
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by checking for uniformity, it would allow courts to avoid making legislative 
decisions.243 
C. Settling Open Questions 
Express recognition of competitive neutrality as the value motivating the 
efficiency component of the tax nondiscrimination principle would also settle a 
number of vexing questions that have generated controversy among 
commentators. In this Section, we describe how our approach would resolve 
some important and longstanding controversies. 
1. Comparing Absolute Tax Rates 
For reasons discussed at length in Part II, express adoption of a competitive 
neutrality construction of nondiscrimination would imply that comparing a 
resident’s and a nonresident’s absolute tax rates is not an effective way to 
identify tax discrimination. Noneconomists—including members of the 
ECJ244—tend to believe that a tax’s impact on competitiveness can be 
ascertained simply by comparing competitors’ absolute tax rates. Under this 
reasoning, if a French resident has an effective marginal tax rate of 20% in 
France, while a German resident has an effective marginal tax rate of 40%  
in France, the French resident has a tax-induced competitive advantage in 
securing a job in France. This reasoning is intuitive, but wrong. To establish 
that the French resident has a competitive advantage over the German resident 
in acquiring the job in France, we need to know more. Specifically, we need to 
know what effective tax rate the French resident would face if she worked 
elsewhere, as well as the effective tax rate the German worker would face if he 
worked elsewhere. While this point is well understood by public finance 
economists, it may have been lost by advocates general and judges interpreting 
nondiscrimination principles, leading to unsatisfying decisions.245 
 
243.  This benefit would also arise if nondiscrimination were alternatively interpreted as locational 
or leisure neutrality. 
244.  See, e.g., Case C-513/04, Kerckhaert v. Belgium, 2006 E.C.R. I-10967, paras. 26-27 (opinion 
of Advocate General Geelhoed) (evaluating whether there was discrimination by comparing 
absolute tax rates). But see Mason, supra note 17, at 1295-97 (arguing that the comparison of 
absolute tax rates in Kerckhaert was insufficient because a tax credit granted by the source 
state obscured underlying discrimination by the taxpayer’s residence state). 
245.  Mason, supra note 17, at 1295-97. For more on measuring tax-induced competitive 
advantages, see generally Michael S. Knoll, Taxation and the Competitiveness of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds: Do Taxes Encourage Sovereign Wealth Funds To Invest in the United States?,  
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2. Progressive Taxation 
Another open question is what implications the nondiscrimination 
principle has for progressive taxation. All the member states of the EU have 
progressive income tax systems, but each state has a different rate structure. 
Which state’s progressive tax rates should apply to an EU national with income 
from more than one state? One of the authors of this Article previously 
analyzed this question from an equity perspective and concluded that the 
progressive tax rates of the cross-border worker’s residence state should apply 
to his income.246 This conclusion was based in part on the fact that the 
residence state is generally the one where the cross-border worker votes, and as 
a result, the cross-border worker helps to decide both the content of the tax 
rates and the public expenditures that those rates fund.247 From an 
administrative perspective, assessment of progressive tax rates only at residence 
is also desirable because residence states generally have better access to 
information on taxpayers’ overall income and because assessment of 
progressive tax rates only at residence relieves cross-border taxpayers of the 
need to file full returns in every state in which they earn income.248 
Competitive neutrality allows states to apply progressive tax rates to their 
own residents’ worldwide income while applying flat tax rates to nonresidents 
for work performed in their territory. For example, as long as Germany applies 
the flat taxes on a uniform source basis to both residents and nonresidents 
working in Germany, then Germany’s assessment of additional progressive 
taxes on a uniform residence basis need not violate competitive neutrality.249 
 
82 S. CAL. L. REV. 703 (2009); and Michael S. Knoll, The UBIT: Leveling an Uneven Playing 
Field or Tilting a Level One?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 857 (2007). 
246.  Mason, supra note 20, at 1585-93. 
247.  Id. 
248.  Id. at 1599-1604. 
249.  To subject nonresidents to flat tax rates while subjecting residents to progressive taxation 
consistently with competitive neutrality requires use of the ideal deduction method in which 
source taxes apply uniformly to both resident and nonresident workers, and in which 
residents are uniformly taxable on their worldwide income, but all source taxes are 
deductible from income. 
For example, suppose that in addition to a 25% German source tax, which applies 
uniformly to resident and nonresident workers, Germany also taxes its residents on their 
worldwide labor income. Suppose further that Germany allows residents to deduct any 
source taxes (including German source taxes) assessed against that income. (Thus, Germany 
implements ideal deduction.) Moreover, assume that Germany’s progressive residence tax 
rate ranges from negative 33⅓% to positive 33⅓%. Under those assumptions, the total tax 
paid by German residents would range from 0 to 50%. Thus Wilhelm, a German resident 
who earns €100 in Germany and has no other income, would pay €25 in source taxes to 
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Because free mobility of labor will tend to push after-tax wages into equality 
across states for the residents of any state, the fact that residents and 
nonresidents pay different total (source and residence) tax rates on work in 
Germany will not compromise competitive neutrality because it is differences 
in relative tax rates—not differences in absolute tax rates—that affect 
competition. This is an important result because it accords with our intuitions 
about what equity demands. It also preserves longstanding tax practices 
memorialized in thousands of bilateral tax treaties of taxing nonresidents at flat 
rates but residents at progressive rates. Finally, it substantially reduces taxpayer 
compliance costs by avoiding the need for cross-border workers to file full 
income tax returns in every jurisdiction where they earn income. 
3. Double Benefits and Burdens 
Express adoption of a competitive neutrality interpretation of tax 
nondiscrimination also provides insight into how to resolve cases involving 
double burdens and double benefits. As we noted earlier, in the Schumacker line 
of cases, the ECJ expressed concern that cross-border EU workers should not 
be completely denied personal tax benefits, nor should they be able to secure 
duplicative benefits from their source and residence states. We characterized 
this as the “once somewhere” approach, but the issue can be cast more 
generally. Instead, it really concerns whether the reviewing court should 
resolve tax discrimination questions by appeal only to the challenged state’s 
law, or whether it should take into consideration the laws of any other state 
 
Germany. He would also be liable to Germany for residence taxes on his worldwide income 
of €100. Against the €100, Germany would allow a deduction of €25 for the German source 
tax, leaving €75 against which Germany’s progressive residence tax rates would apply. If we 
assume that all of Wilhelm’s net income is taxable at the highest German residence rate 
(33⅓%), he would owe an additional €25 in taxes to Germany, which would leave him with 
€50 after taxes, yielding a net effective tax rate of 50%. Had Wilhelm been subject to the 
lowest German residence rate (negative 33⅓%), he would have received a refundable credit 
of €25, bringing his net effective tax rate to zero. We constructed this example with 
residence tax rates ranging from negative 33⅓% to positive 33⅓% in order to approximate 
the actual progressive tax rates for German residents described in the well-known Gerritse 
case, which ranged from 0 to 50%. See Case C-234/01, Gerritse v. Finanzamt Neukölln-
Nord, 2003 E.C.R. I-5933, para. 55 (holding that, for nonresidents that do not earn almost 
all their income in the source state, the source state may deny nonresidents the benefit of 
personal tax exemptions but not the benefit of progressive tax rates). 
In the example just explored, nonresidents would be subject to source tax in Germany 
at 25%, whereas German residents would be subject to source tax in Germany at 25% and to 
residence tax in Germany at rates ranging from negative 33⅓% to positive 33⅓% (before 
deduction of German source taxes), which translates into net taxes from 0 to 50% (after 
deduction of German source taxes). This tax regime does not violate competitive neutrality.  
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that taxes the cross-border worker. For example, suppose the challenged tax 
rule is a source rule. When making its determination of whether there has been 
discrimination, some commentators have suggested that courts also must take 
into consideration any rules to which the taxpayer may be subject in his or her 
residence state. This view has been endorsed by at least one ECJ Advocate 
General,250 and the ECJ has vacillated between the two approaches.251 
Competitive neutrality provides a convincing justification for limiting 
judicial review to the laws of the challenged state. Violations of competitive 
neutrality can be identified simply by checking to see whether the challenged 
tax law (be it a residence rule or a source rule) applies uniformly. The 
interactions of the rules of the source and residence states have no bearing on 
this inquiry. This is a good result because it simplifies judicial decisionmaking 
in an area characterized by highly complex substantive law. Furthermore, by 
limiting analysis to the laws of only one state, a competitive neutrality 
conception of nondiscrimination would prevent the possibility that a single tax 
law will be held to be discriminatory when applied to workers from some, but 
not all, other states. 
Thus, despite the intuitive appeal of the “once somewhere” approach, 
limiting judicial review to the laws of only the challenged state accords better 
with the economic principles that ground the nondiscrimination principle. It 
has the added advantage of simplifying judicial review in an already complex 
area. Finally, we observe that because no law we are aware of requires any state 
to offer personal tax benefits, the “once somewhere” approach would lead 
courts astray because the failure of an EU national to secure personal tax 
benefits does not necessarily indicate wrongdoing by any state. 
4. A Way out of the Labyrinth 
Finally, a competitive neutrality interpretation provides a powerful 
response to the claims by Professors Graetz and Warren. Graetz and Warren 
argue that the ECJ’s approach to nondiscrimination, under which it imposes 
burdens upon both source and residence states, is incoherent because it 
simultaneously promotes both locational neutrality and savings neutrality (the 
capital analog of leisure neutrality). But these two neutralities are inconsistent 
 
250.  See Case C-374/04, Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Grp. Litig. v. Comm’rs of Inland 
Revenue, 2006 E.C.R. I-11673, para.95 (opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed) (supporting 
the “overall” approach). 
251.  Compare Case C-294/97, Eurowings Luftverkehrs AG v. Finanzamt Dortmund-Unna, 1999 
E.C.R. I-7447, paras. 43-44 (adopting the per-country approach), with Case C-319/02, In re 
Manninen, 2004 E.C.R. I-7477, para. 54 (adopting the overall approach). 
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with one another in the absence of tax rate harmonization. We have shown that 
imposition of nondiscrimination obligations at both source and residence does 
not necessarily imply that a court is trying to do the impossible by 
simultaneously achieving locational and savings (or leisure) neutrality without 
harmonizing taxes. Instead, such an approach can be consistent with 
competitive neutrality. Moreover, the notion that the nondiscrimination norm 
should apply at both source and residence is in accordance with many people’s 
intuition that states may impermissibly discriminate in either capacity: when 
taxing in a source capacity, they may discriminate between resident and 
nonresident workers; when taxing in a residence capacity, they may 
discriminate between residents’ foreign and domestic income. 
iv.  tax nondiscrimination in the united states 
In laying out our arguments about how legal prohibitions of tax 
discrimination in common markets might be interpreted, we relied on 
examples from the ECJ for several reasons. First, our arguments are designed 
in part to respond to Graetz and Warren’s criticism that imposition of 
nondiscrimination obligations at both source and residence is incoherent. 
Although this criticism also could be leveled against U.S. courts, which have 
imposed nondiscrimination burdens at source and residence, Graetz and 
Warren addressed the EU context, and so we found it appropriate to respond 
by analyzing ECJ cases. Second, the new efficiency conception we offer in this 
Article derives from economics literature that analyzes international taxation. 
Although taxation of cross-border labor income by U.S. states bears substantial 
similarity to taxation of international income by nation-states, the ECJ cases 
are a better fit because they involve taxation of international income by nation-
states. Finally, the ECJ decides many more tax discrimination cases than does 
the Supreme Court. As a result, it is easier to find cases with straightforward 
legal and factual scenarios in the ECJ doctrine. One reason for the relative 
abundance of ECJ tax cases could be that the ECJ cannot refuse to hear tax 
cases because there presently is no EU counterpart to the U.S. certiorari 
process.252 As a result, tax cases constitute about 10% of the ECJ’s caseload.253 
Despite our use of EU examples to illustrate our arguments, this Part shows 
 
252.  As two chroniclers of the Court noted, Justice Brennan’s typical reaction to a certiorari 
request in a tax case was: “This is a tax case. Deny.” BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, 
THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 362 (1979). 
253.  See Mason, supra note 17, at 1281 (citing annual statistics kept by the ECJ). 
  
what is tax discrimination? 
1107 
 
that those arguments apply with equal, if not more, force to the interpretation 
of constitutional prohibitions of U.S. state tax discrimination. 
U.S. states taxing interstate income face challenges similar to those of 
nation-states taxing international income. For example, when a taxpayer 
resides in one U.S. state but works in another, both states may tax him.254 To 
avoid double taxation, the residence state typically credits the income taxes 
levied on the labor income by the source state.255 The taxation of interstate 
workers by the U.S. states raises issues similar to those raised by taxation of 
intra-EU workers by the EU member states. The Supreme Court, lower federal 
courts, and state courts have decided important tax discrimination cases, 
mostly under the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause.256 
The nondiscrimination provisions in the U.S. Constitution are even less 
explicit than those in the TFEU. For example, in the Supreme Court’s view, 
because the Constitution reserves the power exclusively to Congress “to 
regulate Commerce . . . among the several States,” in the absence of federal 
regulation, the states may not regulate or inhibit interstate commerce, 
including by applying discriminatory taxes that interfere with interstate 
commerce (this negative implication of the Commerce Clause has been called 
the “dormant Commerce Clause”).257 Likewise, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, which provides 
that “[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and 
Immunities of Citizens in the several States,” to prohibit tax discrimination by 
one U.S. state against residents of another U.S. state.258  
 
254.  HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 10, ¶ 20.10. 
255.  Id. 
256.  The Supreme Court also has decided some tax discrimination cases under the Equal 
Protection Clause, which provides that “[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see, e.g., Metro. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985) (holding that, under the Equal Protection 
Clause, Alabama could not assess nonresident insurance companies to higher taxes than 
resident insurance companies); see also HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 10, ¶¶ 3.01-.05 
(analyzing tax discrimination jurisprudence under the Equal Protection Clause). 
257.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 
(1977) (setting forth four factors used in evaluating whether states comply with the dormant 
Commerce Clause: nondiscrimination, nexus, fair apportionment, and reasonable-relation-
to-government-services-provided). See generally HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 
10, ¶¶ 4.01-.26 (analyzing tax discrimination jurisprudence under the Commerce Clause). 
258.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; Lunding v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287 (1998) 
(holding that New York violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause when it denied 
alimony deductions to a Connecticut resident with New York-taxable income while 
permitting New York residents to deduct alimony). See generally HELLERSTEIN & 
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One question that immediately presents itself is whether the tax 
nondiscrimination principle under the dormant Commerce Clause means the 
same thing as the tax nondiscrimination principle under the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause. The Supreme Court has not interpreted the two provisions 
the same way. For example, the personal scope of those provisions differs 
because corporations cannot raise nondiscrimination claims under the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause. Likewise, although Congress can consent to 
state tax rules that would violate the nondiscrimination principle under the 
dormant Commerce Clause, congressional consent cannot cure tax 
discrimination that violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Although 
the personal scope and available justifications for tax discrimination vary across 
these two constitutional provisions, it is possible (and we suggest here 
plausible) that the economic efficiency component of both prohibitions of tax 
discrimination seeks to promote competitive neutrality. This notion is perfectly 
consistent with the idea that nondiscrimination under the dormant Commerce 
Clause emphasizes economic efficiency more than does nondiscrimination 
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, which emphasizes equality more. 
A second preliminary question is whether there is any reason to think that 
the nondiscrimination principle in either of these constitutional provisions 
would have the same meaning as the EU nondiscrimination principle. We 
suggest that there is. The U.S. Constitution and the EU treaties both reflect the 
goals of their framers to foster political and economic unity among the 
residents of each union. Prohibiting states from using their tax systems to 
interfere with economic integration is an important part of that process. And, 
like the ECJ, in deciding tax discrimination cases, the Supreme Court 
emphasizes the goal, embodied in the Constitution, of forming a common 
market where state laws do not unreasonably impede interstate commerce. 
Thus, although a premise of this Article is that tax nondiscrimination 
principles have not been interpreted clearly, one clear purpose of those 
principles in both the U.S. Constitution and the TFEU is to prevent states 
from enacting tax barriers to interstate commerce. In other words, although 
nondiscrimination principles in different contexts may promote different 
values, one component that they have in common is the goal of promoting a 
level playing field among residents of different member states. 
Moreover, the case for a competitive neutrality interpretation of 
nondiscrimination is, if anything, stronger in the United States than in the EU 
because in applying nondiscrimination, the Supreme Court expressly considers 
whether the challenged tax distorts competition between in-state residents and 
 
HELLERSTEIN, supra note 10, ¶ 20.06 (analyzing tax discrimination jurisprudence under the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause). 
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out-of-state residents. For example, in West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, the 
Supreme Court used the dormant Commerce Clause to strike down a tax that 
applied to both in-state and out-of-state milk dealers doing business in 
Massachusetts because it was linked to a preferential subsidy for in-state milk 
producers. In the Court’s view, the combination of the tax and preferential 
subsidy “neutraliz[ed] the advantage possessed by lower cost out-of-state 
producers.”259 This analysis expressly evinces a concern that states should not 
use taxes to undermine out-of-state residents’ comparative advantage over in-
state residents. 
Likewise, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause suggests that that Clause also promotes competitive 
neutrality. For example, in one of its earliest interpretations, the Court stated 
that the purpose of the Clause was to “place the citizens of each State upon the 
same footing with citizens of other States, so far as the advantages resulting 
from citizenship in those States are concerned.”260 Similarly, in a concurring 
opinion in Toomer v. Witsell, Justice Frankfurter argued that the decisions 
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause “bar a State from penalizing the 
citizens of other States by subjecting them to heavier taxation merely because 
they are such citizens or by discriminating against citizens of other States in the 
pursuit of ordinary livelihoods in competition with local citizens.”261 And writing 
for the majority in Travis v. Yale & Towne Manufacturing Co., Justice Pitney 
expressed the concern that an out-of-state worker who was denied a personal 
exemption by a source state nevertheless had to “compet[e]” with in-state 
workers “as to wages, salaries, and other terms of employment.”262 Thus, the 
Supreme Court has expressly appealed to competitive neutrality values in 
deciding tax discrimination cases. 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the nondiscrimination principle as 
having what the Europeans call “direct effect” bolsters the claim that the 
principle promotes competitive neutrality. Specifically, violations of  
the nondiscrimination principles of both the dormant Commerce Clause and 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause give rise to private rights of action by 
affected taxpayers. Such direct effect is consistent with competitive, but not 
locational, neutrality. Explicit adoption by the Supreme Court of a competitive 
 
259.  West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 194 (1994); see also id. at 193 (noting that 
the Constitution forbids internal tariffs because they “artificially encourage in-state 
production even when the same goods could be produced at lower cost in other states”). 
260.  Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1868). 
261.  334 U.S. 385, 408 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
262.  252 U.S. 60, 80 (1920) (holding that a state violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
when it denied nonresident taxpayers personal exemptions available to resident taxpayers). 
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neutrality construction of nondiscrimination and endorsement of the 
interpretive rules we develop in this Article could bring predictability and 
coherence to the Court’s tax discrimination jurisprudence. It would also 
generate some of the advantages discussed in the previous Part. 
For example, like the ECJ, the Supreme Court has been caught up in 
legislative questions in its own tax discrimination jurisprudence. In Lunding v. 
New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, the Supreme Court set forth its views on 
personal tax benefits.263 Unlike the ECJ in Schumacker, the Supreme Court in 
Lunding refused to hold that personal expenses generally should be allocated to 
the taxpayer’s residence state.264 Instead, the Supreme Court concluded that a 
source state could categorically deny nonresidents personal expense deductions 
only under limited circumstances, such as when the particular expense could be 
“geographically fixed” in another state.265 The Court gave examples of personal 
expenses that it believed could be geographically fixed, including mortgage 
interest and real estate taxes.266 But the Supreme Court’s “geographic” 
approach in Lunding is no more administrable than the ECJ’s “personal and 
family” benefit approach in Schumacker. For example, in her dissent in Lunding, 
Justice Ginsburg argued that the quality of house that a taxpayer can afford 
(and therefore the size of her mortgage) relates to how much she earns 
overall.267 This point calls into question the majority’s assertion that mortgage 
interest deductions have a clear geographic nexus with the state in which the 
property is located, as opposed to the state or states in which the homeowner 
earns her income.268 The Supreme Court’s express adoption of a competitive 
neutrality interpretation of tax nondiscrimination would render unnecessary 
the need to categorize tax benefits by reference to their geographic nexus with a 
particular state. Instead, the Court would have to ensure that both taxes and 
tax benefits were conferred on either a uniform source or a uniform residence 
basis. 269 
 
263.  522 U.S. 287 (1998). 
264.  Id. at 314. 
265.  Id. at 311. 
266.  Id. The Lunding Court considered how to allocate a deduction for an expense actually 
incurred by the taxpayer. It is unclear how the Court’s reasoning in Lunding would apply to 
other personal tax benefits, although the Court previously had held that a source state could 
not categorically deny nonresidents personal tax exemptions. Travis, 252 U.S. at 79. 
267.  Lunding, 522 U.S. at 327 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
268.  See id. at 327-28. 
269.  Accordingly, under a competitive neutrality interpretation, the Supreme Court should have 
upheld New York’s tax treatment of alimony payments, because it appears that New York 
offered the alimony deduction on a uniform residence basis. That is, New York provided the 
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Likewise, members of the Supreme Court could leave behind their debates 
about whether constitutional prohibitions of tax discrimination require a two-
state or a single-state analysis. Consider again Lunding, which involved a 
Connecticut resident’s privileges-and-immunities claim of discrimination 
against New York for New York’s failure to grant him the same alimony 
deductions that it granted to New York residents. Both the majority in Lunding 
and Justice Ginsburg writing in dissent considered what significance to assign 
to the fact that Lunding could not obtain an alimony deduction in Connecticut 
because at that time Connecticut neither taxed income nor allowed deductions 
for alimony.270 While the majority found the law of Connecticut had no 
bearing on whether New York discriminated, Justice Ginsburg thought it 
mattered. A competitive neutrality interpretation of nondiscrimination, 
however, would imply that the Court should consider only the law of the 
defendant state. This approach is largely consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
practice. Notwithstanding Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Lunding, the Court 
generally has adopted a single-state approach because to do otherwise would 
mean that the constitutionality of the defendant state’s tax law “would depend 
on the shifting complexities of the tax codes of 49 other States.”271 
The Supreme Court’s tax discrimination jurisprudence resembles that of 
the ECJ in another way. The Supreme Court has been criticized for producing 
a series of confused and incoherent tax discrimination decisions.272 For 
example, although they do not raise the issue, the criticism that Professors 
Graetz and Warren level against the ECJ’s tax jurisprudence also could be 
leveled against the tax jurisprudence of U.S. state and federal courts. 
Specifically, because courts have applied the nondiscrimination principle to 
 
deduction on the same basis to all New York residents, no matter where they earned their 
income. This alimony treatment is furthermore consistent with New York’s overall method 
of taxation, under which it taxed residents on their worldwide income and granted credits 
for the taxes paid to other states. 
270.  Id. 
271.  Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 645 (1984). 
272.  Tracy A. Kaye, Tax Discrimination: A Comparative Analysis of U.S. and EU Approaches, 7 FLA. 
TAX REV. 47, 80, 91 (2005) (calling tax cases decided under the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause “ad hoc”); see also id. at 91 (quoting Professor Kirk Stark as saying that the Court’s 
tax jurisprudence has a “wild west quality to it”); id. at 90-91 (noting that, in Boston Stock 
Exchange, “the Supreme Court itself observed again that its judicial application of 
constitutional principles to the multitude of state tax cases ‘left much room for controversy 
and confusion and little in the way of precise guides to the States in the exercise of their 
indispensable power of taxation’” (quoting Bos. Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’r, 429 U.S. 
318, 329 (1977))). 
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states taxing in both source273 and residence capacities,274 U.S. courts could be 
seen as attempting to pursue both locational neutrality and leisure (or savings) 
neutrality. But pursuit of both goals simultaneously is futile unless all U.S. 
states harmonize their tax rates. However, as the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged, the Constitution does not require the U.S. states to harmonize 
their tax rates.275 Competitive neutrality resolves the seeming incongruity of 
imposing nondiscrimination obligations at both source and residence in the 
absence of rate harmonization. 
One more lesson can be drawn from comparing U.S. and EU law, and it 
relates to the issue we raised earlier of the competence of courts to impose any 
of the efficiency benchmarks in their respective jurisdictions. As we noted 
above, the ECJ lacks the institutional competence to impose upon the member 
states a specific method for taxing cross-border income, even though 
international harmonization of the method for taxing cross-border income is a 
prerequisite to fully achieving competitive neutrality.276 Similarly, the U.S. 
Supreme Court lacks authority to impose upon the U.S. states a common 
method for dividing interstate income among the states,277 although Congress 
could impose a common method on the states, or the states could coordinate a 
common method among themselves.278 
 
273.  See, e.g., Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920) (holding that a state violated 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause when it denied nonresident taxpayers personal 
exemptions available to resident taxpayers). 
274.  Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996) (striking down a state intangibles tax that had 
the effect of exempting the stock of a corporation doing all of its business in-state, while taxing 
the stock of a corporation doing none of its business in-state); Ceridian Corp. v. Franchise Tax 
Bd., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 611, 615 n.2 (Ct. App. 2000) (striking down under the Commerce 
Clause a state dividends-received deduction that was limited to the portion of the dividends 
that came from in-state sources). 
275.  Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1959) (discussing states’ wide 
discretion in taxation). 
276.  See, e.g., Case C-336/96, Gilly v. Directeur des Services Fiscaux du Bas-Rhin, 1998 E.C.R.  
I-2793, para. 24 (“The Member States are competent to determine the criteria for taxation on 
income and wealth with a view to eliminating double taxation . . . .”); Case C-513/04, 
Kerckhaert v. Belgium, 2006 E.C.R. I-10967, para. 22 (noting that EU law “does not lay 
down any general criteria for the attribution of areas of competence between the Member 
States in relation to the elimination of double taxation within the Community”). 
277.  See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair 437 U.S. 267, 279 (1978) (holding that since the Constitution 
prescribed no standards for choosing a single method for dividing cross-border income 
among the states, the Supreme Court would not impose such a standard, and stating that 
“[t]he Constitution . . . is neutral with respect to the content of any uniform [apportionment] 
rule”). 
278.  See id. at 280 (“[T]he legislative power granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution would amply justify the enactment of legislation requiring all States to adhere 
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U.S. states (like nation-states) tax labor income according to source and 
residence principles, but unlike nation-states, U.S. states do not tax active 
business income according to source and residence principles. Instead, they use 
formulary apportionment.279 Rather than focusing on the (often elusive) 
geographic source of income, formulary apportionment divides the overall 
profits of an integrated enterprise doing business in the United States among 
the states in which the enterprise does business according to a formula that 
takes into account the presence in each state of the enterprise’s productive 
factors, such as its payroll, property, and sales.280 If every state used the exact 
same formula to determine its portion of the enterprise’s overall income, no 
double taxation would arise, even if the states applied different tax rates. 
Unfortunately, not all states use the same apportionment formula, and 
differences in the formulas lead to gaps and overlaps in state income taxation. 
Use of different apportionment formulas by the U.S. states gave rise to 
dormant Commerce Clause challenges by taxpayers claiming that overlaps in 
state apportionment formulas discriminated against out-of-state businesses or 
imposed unjustifiable burdens on interstate commerce.281 Despite the Supreme 
Court’s acknowledgement of its lack of institutional competence to impose 
upon the states a common method for dividing interstate income,282 the Court 
has taken a strong position on what the nondiscrimination principle of the 
dormant Commerce Clause requires of state apportionment formulas. 
Notwithstanding the states’ substantial latitude in taxing cross-border income, 
the Court has held that states may not choose a method for dividing cross-
border income that is biased against nonresidents or interstate commerce. 
Specifically, the Court developed the “internal consistency test” to judge 
whether state apportionment formulas violate the dormant Commerce Clause. 
Under this test, the Supreme Court asks: If all fifty states adopted the 
challenged formula, would multiple taxation inevitably result?283 If so, the 
 
to uniform rules for the division of income. It is to that body, and not this Court, that the 
Constitution has committed such policy decisions.”). 
279.  See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 10, ¶¶ 20.05-.10. 
280.  The model formula under the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA) 
equally weighs sales, property, and payroll. For example, if a taxpayer had $100 of 
apportionable income, and 30% of its payroll, property, and sales were located in California, 
California would apply its tax rate to $30. For analysis and criticism of UDITPA, see Charles 
E. McLure, Jr., A Comprehensive and Sensible UDITPA, 37 ST. TAX NOTES 929 (2005). 
281.  See, e.g., Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983); Moorman, 
437 U.S. 267. 
282.  Moorman, 437 U.S. 267. 
283.  Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995); see also Container Corp., 
463 U.S. at 169 (holding that a state’s apportionment formula “must be such that, if applied 
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apportionment formula is invalid. The internal consistency test provides a 
formal method for courts to evaluate whether a state’s tax law improperly 
impedes interstate commerce without embroiling the reviewing court in 
legislative second-guessing and without invading states’ tax sovereignty. Thus, 
under the dormant Commerce Clause, states retain substantial tax autonomy—
they can select their tax base, rates, and apportionment formulas—but their tax 
choices are nevertheless constrained by the dormant Commerce Clause and 
judicial review. The Supreme Court recognized that it could not always prevent 
taxation from being a drag on cross-border commerce because states’ use of 
different apportionment formulas create such drags, and the Court lacks 
institutional authority to impose a common formula. However, the internal 
consistency test ensures that states do not adopt formulas that are inherently 
biased against cross-border commerce.  
Like the Supreme Court, the ECJ faces institutional constraints that 
prevent it from fully achieving any of the neutrality benchmarks on its own. 
Instead, achieving any of the benchmarks would require legislative cooperation 
to harmonize states’ methods for taxing cross-border income. In light of the 
need for legislative harmonization to fully achieve any of the neutrality 
benchmarks, we argued earlier that courts should advance competitive 
neutrality by interpreting the nondiscrimination principle to require fidelity to 
competitive neutrality’s uniformity requirements, namely the requirements of 
uniform residence taxes and uniform source taxes. The requirement under 
competitive neutrality that states apply only uniform source and residence 
taxes works similarly to the U.S. internal consistency test. While it does not 
eliminate the drags on cross-border commerce that stem from states’ use of 
different methods of taxing cross-border income (for example, worldwide 
taxation or exemption), it nevertheless strikes down tax provisions that directly 
tilt the tax playing field between residents and nonresidents. The Supreme 
Court’s deployment of the internal consistency test shows that courts can 
coherently advance notions of economic efficiency even when they lack 
institutional competence to impose particular legislative outcomes upon states. 
We urge the ECJ similarly to advance tax neutrality without overstepping its 
institutional authority. 
 
by every jurisdiction, it would result in no more than all of the unitary business’ income 
being taxed”). 
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conclusion 
If taxes imposed at either source or residence can disrupt cross-border 
commerce by tilting the playing field against cross-border workers, one might 
then ask, why have courts failed to expressly adopt a competitive neutrality 
interpretation of nondiscrimination? Our answer is that until recently formally 
trained economists all but ignored competitive neutrality, so judges and 
lawyers have lacked guidance on what competitive neutrality required of state 
tax rules. 
Contrary to the requirements for competitive neutrality, the requirements 
for locational and savings neutrality have long been understood. Thus, had the 
ECJ wanted to interpret nondiscrimination to require either of these two 
traditional capital neutrality benchmarks, the court and legal advocates could 
have found clear direction in the economic literature. Even if judges and 
advocates did not understand the implications for labor taxation of the 
traditional capital neutrality benchmarks (because they have, until now, lacked 
the analysis provided in Part II of this Article), they still could have applied the 
traditional benchmarks to capital tax cases. However, as Graetz and Warren 
showed, despite their ready availability and prominent use in international tax 
policymaking, the ECJ did not coherently apply either traditional benchmark 
to capital tax discrimination cases. Nor, we would add, has the Supreme Court 
coherently applied either traditional benchmark in its own tax discrimination 
case law, despite long-standing scholarly calls for it to do so.284 Because courts 
failed to interpret the nondiscrimination principle as requiring either of the 
two traditional neutrality benchmarks, commentators justifiably concluded 
that the tax nondiscrimination concept was empty, incoherent, or inconsistent. 
In contrast, formal economic analysis of taxation and competitive neutrality 
only came to prominence in 2004 when economists Desai and Hines published 
their influential paper on the effects of capital taxation on competition for the 
ownership of assets.285 Although economists are only now formalizing the 
connection between taxes and competitiveness, noneconomists have long been 
concerned with considerations of competitiveness, including how taxation can 
tilt the playing field between residents and nonresidents. Thus, it would not be 
surprising if such non-experts read protections for level competition into legal 
prohibitions of tax discrimination. 
 
284.  See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90 MICH. 
L. REV. 895 (1992) (advocating that the nondiscrimination principle in the dormant 
Commerce Clause should be interpreted to require locational neutrality). 
285.  Desai & Hines, supra note 33, at 494. 
  
the yale law journal    
1116 
 
Moreover, as we show above, competitive neutrality remains a complex and 
subtle concept. That may help explain why, even though we argue that 
applications of tax nondiscrimination rules in the EU and United States reflect 
competitive neutrality goals, they do not reflect rigorous application of our 
formal conception of competitive neutrality. The complexities and subtleties of 
competitive neutrality do not, however, make it an unworkable standard for 
enforcement by noneconomist judges. As we have explained, to interpret 
nondiscrimination to promote competitive neutrality, courts would not have to 
conduct in-depth economic analysis. Instead, to uphold a challenged tax, a 
court would merely have to confirm that the defendant state assessed it 
uniformly. Specifically, if a state assesses the challenged tax on a residence 
basis, then the tax must apply the same way to both residents with out-of-state 
income and residents with domestic income. Similarly, if the state assesses the 
challenged tax on a source basis, then the tax must apply the same way to both 
residents and nonresidents working within the jurisdiction. All that a court 
must do to assess whether a tax provision is discriminatory is to ask whether 
the provision applies on a uniform residence or uniform source basis. 
Sophisticated economic analysis shows this to be the right question to ask, but 
the answer to the question in a particular case does not depend on fancy 
economic theories, reams of data, or advanced econometrics.  
For courts that agree with our argument that nondiscrimination requires 
competitive neutrality, we provide simple guidelines for resolving practically 
any case. For courts that do not agree with our conclusions, we also provide 
clear guidelines for interpreting nondiscrimination to require adherence to 
either of the traditional efficiency goals of locational or savings (and leisure) 
neutrality. Whether they agree with our analysis or not, we hope our Article 
will encourage courts to articulate the goal or goals that they believe the 
nondiscrimination principle promotes and to undertake a rigorous analysis of 
whether a challenged tax interferes with those goals. 
